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"The SNR 300 Fast Breeder
in the Ups and Downs of its History"
The Fast Breeder Project was founded in Karlsruhe in 1960. After an initial period of
fundamental research, industry assumed responsibility for designing the SNR 300.
Construction of the Kalkar Nuclear Power Station was hampered by a variety of political
influences, but finally completed in 1985. As a consequence of the North Rhine-West-
phalian party-in-government's opting out of nuclear power, no startup permit was issued
for the SNR 300. Consequently, the Kalkar Nuclear Power Station project was discon-
tinued for political reasons in March 1991.
ZUSAMMENFASSUNG
liDer Schnelle Brüter SNR 300
im Auf und Ab seiner Geschichte"
Das Projekt Schneller Brüter wurde 1960 in Karlsruhe gegründet. Nach anfänglichen
Grundlagenforschungen übernahm die Industrie die Auslegung des SNR 300. Der Bau
des Kernkraftwerks Kalkar wurde durch vielfältige politische Einflußnahmen gestört,
1985 aber letztlich doch fertiggestellt. Wegen des Kernenergieausstiegs der regieren-
den Landespartei in Nordrhein-Westfalen konnte die Inbetriebnahmegenehmigung für
den SNR 300 nicht erlangt werden. Im März 1991 wurde deshalb das Projekt Kernkraft-
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The Fast Breeder Project, including the construction in Kalkar of the SNR 300, covered
the 34-year period between 1957 and 1991. In the first twelve years, most of the devel-
opment werk was centered at Karlsruhe, then activities moved to Bensberg and, still
later, to Kalkar.
An attempt is made in this report to record, in a spirit of accuracy and fairness, the per-
formance of those participating in the Project, and to recall the events marking the de-
velopment. The development of the fast breeder in Germany, with its manifold technical
complications and the weight brought to bear by politicians and the public, is not a pro-
ject history like many others; it is a technology saga. Describing it in full detail would fill
atome. Bearing in mind everybody's lack of time, and also in the interest of readability,
I decided to limit this account to approximately one hundred pages.
The Kalkar Nuclear Power Station has been completed, but it has never been commis-
sioned because of the lack of political consensus among the major political parties. Law
enforcement by the State of North Rhine-Westphalia in the interest of opting out of nu-
clear power made the SNR 300 a failed investment monument. Kalkar is not the first
project failing because of the dissent of political parties in energy policy issues. Whether
it will be the last one remains to be seen.
Many of my colleagues have spent decades, some even their entire professional ca-
reers, contributing to the development of the fast breeder; theirs is a tremendous tech-
nical achievement.
To them this report is dedicated.





makes us more certain
in assessing the present
and forecasting the future.
1. THE BEGINNINGS OF THE FAST BREEDER PROJECT
(1957 - 63)
The beginnings of the Fast Breeder Project date back to 1957.
In the 1957/58 winter term, Professor Karl Wirtz ran a seminar about fast breeder re~
actors at the Institute for Neutron Physics and Reactor Engineering (INR). On that oc-
casion, the scientific interest in the physics of fast neutrons, the breeding process, and
the technical conceptual design of breeders was aroused at the Nuclear Research
Center. The "computer" then available to the INR, a Zuse Z 22, was used for some pre-
liminary calculations showing the interdependence of the core structure, critical mass,
and breeding ratio 1, 2, 3,
This was a modest beginning, leaving open many questions. Consequently, the Head
of the INR Theoretical Group at that time, Dr. Wolf Häfele, was delegated to the Oak
Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) in the United States for one year in 1959 to familiar-
ize with work in the area of thermal breeders going on at that center. At that time, Wirtz
was rather skeptical of the sodium cooled breeder, especially because of the core melt-
down accident in the EBR I, and wanted to learn from the ORNL arguments against the
fast breeder developed at the competing Argonne National Laboratory (ANL).
However, Häfele came back from the USA all enthusiastic about fast breeder technolo~
gy. In a detailed memorandum he outlined the drawbacks of the thermal breeder work-
ing on uranium 233, especially its low breeding ratio, and proposed to study the fast
breeder at the Nuclear Research Center4. On April 1, 1960, the INR and the Technical
Reactor Department (TAlR) jointly set up the "Fast Breeder Project Group," appointed
Dr. Wolf Häfele its leader, and announced the event to the management of the Nuclear
Research Center in a memorandum dated April 21, 1960. At Karlsruhe, most of the
Franz-Josef Strauß, first German Minister for Atomic Affairs,
signing the document establishing the
Karlsruhe Nuclear Research Center.
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physics studies underlying the FR 2 reactor had meanwhile been completed, and sci-
entists welcomed this prospect of a new major activity 5.
This marked the beginning of the Fast Breeder Project in Karlsruhe.
1.1 Authorization and Organization
The establishment of the Fast Breeder Project, PSB for short, was an absolutely
unique event at the Nuclear Research Center. True, some of the work on the FR 2 had
already been carried out in a joint effort by several institutes, but they had not been co-
ordinated bya project management staff, but mainly by the Institute for Neutron Physics
and Reactor Engineering (INR)
and by top management. Conse-
quently, authorization by the offi-
cial bodies of the company and
the expert groups of the German
Advisory Committee on Atomic
Energy was required to ensure
that the Fast Breeder Project was
given the proper mandate and
last, but not least, the necessary
funds.
On May 15, 1960, the Superviso-
ry Board of the company ap-
proved the Project as requested
by management. The decision
was based on a memorandum which explained the planned stepped approach by the
Project Group - as it was still called at that time. According to the plan, three develop-
ment steps were to be taken 6:
(1) Preselection of possible reactor Iines under physics and engineering as-
pects.
(2) First conceptual design draft of the type of reactor envisaged, and perform-
ance of physical and tectmieal-experiments.
(3) Execution of a critical zero power experiment.
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This was to be followed by detailed planning of the type of reactor chosen, and then by
the construction of the nuclear power plant.
In the reasons given in support of the project application it was stated that future devel-
opments might weil replace the present line of power reactors by breeder reactors. In
the U.K., 1970 was envisaged as a date for this change, while elsewhere a longer pe-
riod of development was being considered. For Germany, this would open up the pos-
sibility to be in the front line of development of an important reactor line.
At the request of the Supervisory Board, also Working Party 111/1, "Nuclear Reactors,"
and Expert Committee 11 of the German Advisory Committee on Atomic Energy were
asked for their opinions on the Project. Under the chairmanship of Prof. Maier-Leibnitz,
Working Party 111/1 approved the Project on December 7, 1960, expressly including the
possibility of reasons arising for which it might have to be discontinued after the three
years applied for. Expert Committee 11, chaired by Prof. Winnacker, approved the Proj-
ect on February 9, 1961; in its decision, it warned against prematurely transferring it to
an international level 6.
In the organization of the Project Group, initially a core staff of 20 was to be set up for
the first stage. The Project Leader was to determine the general policy line and, in im-
portant decisions and in recruiting more personnei, had to agree with the Heads of the
INR and the Technical Reactor Department (TAlR) 5.
From the outset, development werk on a fast breeder was considered a major activity.
A nuclear research center was deemed to be the appropriate type of organization for
such a job. The spectrum of administrative units of the Center, whose cooperation was
sought, was correspondingly broad 6:
(1) Institute for Neutron Physics and Reactor Engineering (INR), for theoretical
calculations, experimental work, basic concepts, fundamental design drafts.
(2) Technical Reactor Department (TA/R),
for design drafts and major technical experiments.
(3) Institute for Hot Chemistry (IHCh),
for the development of reprocessing techniques.
(4) Institute for Radiochemistry (IRCh),
for studies of the diffusion of fission product noble gases.
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(5) Institute for Transuranium Elements (TU),
for plutonium technology.
(6) FR 2 Reactor Operations Division (RB),
for irradiations of fuel specimens.
The FR 2 research reactor under construction.
Aperiod of three years (1961 till 1963) was deemed to be sufficient for preliminary theo-
retical and experimental werk; afterwards, the final design draft and construction of the
breeder reactor were to be decided upon. The total Project costs were estimated at
DM 200 million; this amount included the planned SNEAK zero power plant, but not the
plutonium to be obtained from the USA 6.
Coordination of the Project work among the Institutes and the Project Management
early on had been made the responsibility of the so-calied Breeder A Committee. Its
members were the Heads of the administrative units Iisted above, the General Manag-
ers of the Center and, of course, the Project Leader. The Committee met approximately
once a month under the chairmanship of Wirtz (from 1966 on, under the Technical
General Manager, Dr. Walther Schnurr). The weekly project discussions (also calied
Brain Trust - BT - meetings) were led by Häfele. They served for detailed Project control
and included the Project staff plus a few Heads of Institutes and important senior staff
members.
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From the outset, much attention was devoted to the public presentation of the progress
made in the Project. This was done at annual Status Reports, which initially were in-
ternal affairs, but soon were attended by prominent external guests, frequently also the
Federal Minister for Research in office. The painstaking organization of the one~day
lecture event became an impressive ritual normally preceded by a "full rehearsal" the
day before.
1.2 Project Goals and Fundamental Problems
After the administrative and financial preconditions for the Project had been estab~
lished, Project Management defined the fundamental goals to be worked upon over the
next few years 7, 8, 9 :
(1) The envisaged type of reactor was to be a genuine breeder, Le., its breeding
ratio was to be clearly above 1.
(2) It was to work with the smallest possible critical mass.
(3) Its safety level was to correspond to that of thermal reactors.
(4) The fuel element was to permit a very high burnup to be attained at low
manufacturing costs.
(5) The reactor was to operate in a closed cycle, Le., the plutonium generated
in-pile was to be separated by fuel reprocessing and then recycled in the re-
actor.
(6) The breeder power plant was to be as economic as possible.
The general wording of these project goals has remained valid to this day; in a few
cases (breeding ratio, reprocessing), one would even wish that they had not been sup-
pressed temporarily or later reduced in significance.
In the early phase of the Project, around 1960/61, there were quite a number of funda-
mental issues which had to be resolved in a major effort. Although these discussions
have long since come to an end, some of the points should be reiterated for their histor~
ic interest.
For some time, weighing between an external and an internal breeder was a major is-
sue. In the first breeder generation, much emphasis was placed on the breeding ratio.
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As the amounts of plutonium available were smalI, and typical nuclear power plant ca-
pacities were below 100 MWe, the resultant reactors had metal fuel and high enrich-
ment levels (> 30%). The cores of these reactors contained only little fertile material;
nuclear transrnutation took place mostly in the surrounding breeding blanket of U-238.
These reactors were called "external breeders;" their breeding ratio was 1.5 and
more 9,10.
Because of their high concentrations of fissile materials these breeders were cooled
only with liquid metal. The burnup of metal fuel elements at that time was limited to 10-
15,000 MWd/t because of swelling. For nuclear power plant operation, the external
breeder version was unsuitable because of the frequent reloading, associated outages,
and the many reprocessing steps.
The transition from a metal fueled to an oxide fueled external breeder was an obvious
step to take, but it failed on grounds of safety. While the expansion of the metal fuel
ensured inherent dynamic stability because of the resultant negative power coefficient,
there was no reliable expansion in oxide fuel of low density and high burnup. Moreover,
the safety potential inherent in the Doppler effect had to be forgone, as the sign of that
effect could not be proven with sufficient reliability at that time.
The solution of these problems was found in the step to the "internal breeder," with
fuel enrichments of 10 - 15% in the core, still the customary level. This had become
possible as a result of the interest by electricity utilities in larger units, and also the in-
creased arisings of plutonium from thermal power reactors. The large fraction of urani-
um 238 in the core guaranteed a highly negative Doppler coefficient and an almost
constant reactivity throughout the burnup period, with the consequence of short control
rod travel. Finally, also the needs of the operators were met, because they thought they
needed only one core reloading outage per annum when using oxide fuel.
In reactor control, the development of scram units was pursued for some time. The
still insufficient knowledge of the dynamics of fast reactors had initiated the work. To
this day, it has remained a cause for amazement to uninformed and superficially in-
formed persons that fast and thermal reactors, despite their different average neutron
generation times, have approximately the same control characteristics 7.
From the outset, the fuel element occupied a central position. As very high burnups
were to be achieved with oxide fuels, the IIstrong can, weak fuel ll concept was dis-
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cussed for some time. A strong, thick-walled cladding was to enclose the oxide fuel
which, because of its high thermal plasticity, was not expected to show particularly good
stability characteristics. The design
envisaged were simple cylindrical
tubes of molybdenum and Inconel,
respectively, with an outside diame-
ter of 5 mm, which were to contain
a mixture of PU02 and U02 vibrated
into place. The tubes had very thick
walls, which is expressed in the 1:2
ratio of volumes of the cladding and
the fue!. In this concept, which natu-
rally would have been implemented
at the expense of the breeding ratio,
burnup was considered to be limited
only by fission product gas buildup.
The upper pressure limit was as-
sumed to be around 500 - 600 bar.
Later on, also the neutron physics
properties of molybdenum required
that this material be given up; as a
result of errors in measurement, the
absorption cross section initially had
Experimental installations around the FR 2. been taken to be much too low 7,8.
The early inclusion of the fuel cycle in the overall concept has already been men-
tioned. The fabrication of breeder fuel elements initially was devised as a process al-
most entirely run by remote control because of the radioactivity of the higher Pu-iso-
topes. In this way, reprocessing required no high decontamination factors; a factor of 10
per extraction cycle was deemed to be sufficient.
In the early Project Memoranda, the coolant surprisingly plays a minor role. It was
hardly ever discussed, once some eccentric ideas hatched at ORNL, such as a reactor
operated like the molten salt reactor, with liquid plutonium and advantageous plutonium
compounds, respectively, had been shelved. Of the two protagonists of the Project,
Wirtz and Häfele, Wirtz, for safety reasons, preferred helium, while Häfele, for reasons
of heat transfer, was in favor of sodium. Finally, both coolants were studied side by
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side. After Ludolf Ritz had been appointed Head of the Institute for Reactor Compo-
nents in 1961, also steam cooling was taken on board 4, 11.
From 1961 on, the three coolants, sodium, helium, and steam, were to be tested as
equally important variants; adecision was not to be taken untillater.
1.3 The Role ofthe INR
Among the roughly half dozen of Institutes and Technical Departments existing at the
Nuclear Research Center in the early sixties, the Institute for Neutron Physics and
Reactor Engineering (INR) under its Director, Professor Karl Wirtz, c1early played a
dominant role. In 1956, Wirtz and 36 of his staff members had moved to Karlsruhe from
Göttingen, where he had been Head of Division under Professor Heisenberg; in
Karlsruhe he had assumed responsibility for planning and building the FR 2 research
reactor 12.
After the Breeder Project had been established, the Institute grew to more than 100
members, attaining its maximum manning strength of 170 in 1964, among them approx-
imately 20 students and guest scientists from Germany and abroad. For a long time,
the Institute was organized in four Groups and Departments, respectively: Theory, Ex-
periment, Test Rigs, and Materials. The Theoretical Department also operated the
computer facility of the Center; for the rest, it elaborated the basic principles of safety
as weil as nuclear data and codes. The Experimental Department, among other activi-
ties, ran the SUAK, STARK, and SNEAK experimental facilities, while the Technical
Test Rigs Department was mainly concerned with reactor studies and the associated
experimental setups. The Materials Group, finally, was responsible for fuel element de-
velopment, including irradiations. Later, in 1963, also the Measurement and Control
Department (MRTA) was added.
It was a logical consequence of the increasing size of the Institute, but also of the per-
sonalities it contained, that independent units developed out of the INR. In 1963, the
Institute for Applied Nuclear Physics (IAK), under Karl-Heinz Beckurts, and the Institute
for Applied Reactor Physics (IAR), under Wolf Häfele, in 1964 the Institute for Reactor
Components (IRE), under Dieter Smidt, were founded, and the Heads of these Insti- '
tutes were made professors. The INR, in a way, was the mother of all these institutes.
Professor Wirtz explaining the FR 2 design to
Nobel Prize winner atto Hahn.
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Also the later Managing Director of the Kalkar Nuclear Power Station, Werner Koop,
came from the INR.
Wirtz managed his Institute in a paternalistic style; his staff had to deliver quality. Publi-
cations, above all, had to offer in-depth scientific and technical contents. In order to get
this point across, he created an INR Prize. the awarding ceremony of which was one of
the highlights of the annual Christmas
parties, and was always associated with a
detailed citation by the boss. The Prize
was coveted far beyond its real value of
DM 500, as all members of the In.stitute
knew that it was not automatically
awarded to the higher brass, such as
Group Leaders or Heads of Department,
but everybody had a chance to win it for
some scientific achievement. In his
Christmas addresses, Wirtz never failed
to emphazise the achievements not only
of his scientists, but also of the other
staff, for instance the c1eaners. He also
made the point to Management and the
shareholders (1961) to use as a basis for
a pay scheme at the Nuclear Research
Center not the pay regulations for public service employees (the so-calied BAT), but the
much more favorable pay scheme of the electricity utilities. Unfortunately, he failed in
these efforts 13.
Wirtz c1early had a predilection for the helium coolant because of its safety characteris-
tics, such as non-flammability and low void coefficient. But he loyally supported the de-
cision in favor of sodium taken by the Project Management, even in the turbulent days
of the coolant debates in 1968/69. However, he thought the combination of Project
Leader and Head of Institute in a single person (as had sometimes been the case un-
der Häfele) administratively wrong, and he expressed that opinion quite frankly 14.
As Chairman of the Scientific Council, Wirtz always strove to find for the Center a c1ear
scientific and technical profile. He urgently warned against abandoning the nuclear field
prematurely, given the large number of open technical and scientific problems. He suc-
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cessfully counteracted the intentions at the Center in the late sixties to switch to accel-
erator research.
The Fast Breeder Project at the INR and in the whole Center developed most impres-
sively in the years to follow. The committed project management by Häfele, the enthu-
siasm of all participants, and the absence of any external obstaeles of the kind people
are forced to fight against nowadays, all contributed to this atmosphere. A characteristic
feature of that boom period were the thoughts about basic safety questions, the delib-
erate collection of nuclear data and codes, and the construction of physico-technical
experimental facilities and test loops.
Professor Karl Wirtz died in Karlsruhe in February 1994 at the age of 84.
1.3.1 Safety and Nuclear Data
In safety maUers, the Project from the beginning sought elose contacts with the USA,
especially the Argonne National Laboratory (ANL) run by the U.S. Atomic Energy
Commission (USAEC). The causes of the core meltdown accident in the EBR I had
meanwhile been recognized as spontaneous positive power oscillations of the
Mark 11 core, caused bya positive bowing coefficient of reactivity. The Bethe-Tait report,
which was to be quoted widely later on, gave an impression of the maximum release of
mechanical energy to be expected in a nuelear excursion, and the negative Doppler
effect was assumed to be an important inherent possibility of power reduction in oxide
reactors 15, 16, 17, 18.
At a seminar held in Washington in late 1962, the importance of the Doppler coeffi-
cient for the safety of fast breeders was hotly debated between Häfele and Spinrad
(ANL). While Häfele aUributed to the Doppler coefficient an overriding importance in
respect of safety, Spinrad considered it merely one factor besides many others, such as
core structure. Nevertheless, at that early date, eloser cooperation in safety maUers
was agreed between the USA and the Federal Republic of Germany, which later devel-
oped into a relationship of trust over many years 19. The work going on in Karlsruhe
soon was reflected in pioneering publications furthering the knowledge of prompt su-
percritical power excursions 20, 21, 22,
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Around 1963, the positive, destabilizing sodium void coefficient became a matter of in-
creasing interest at the Nuclear Research Center. The clear assumption that reactors of
more than approximately 300 MWe can experience positive reactivity effects and, con-
sequently, suffer core degradation, was rightly considered an important phenomenon
and became a matter of concern especially to the Head of INR, Professor Wirtz. As a
consequence, extended boiling experiments were planned at the IRE, in the course of
which the sodium expulsion process and the two-phase flow of liquid metals was stud-
ied in detail 23, 24.
Under the assumption of non-functioning shutdown systems, the first calculations of the
Bethe-Tait accident were carried out. The significance of the equation of state for
evaporating fuel had already been recognized, and also the secondary-excursion con-
cept came up at that time. In one of the first estimates, a 1000 MWe reactor had been
attributed an energy release "c1early below 1000 MWs" 25.
Probably the biggest uncertainty factor in the nuclear calculations of fast reactors was
introduced by the cross sections of the reactor materials, which were not known very
precisely. For this reason, careful checking and revision of the database available was
initiated, which found its expression in a three-volume KfK report by INR staff member
J.J. Schmidt. That study was the basis of the first Karlsruhe set of group constants,
KfK-26-10. The group constants were formed with a weighting spectrum typical of a
1000 MWe sodium cooled breeder. After resonances had been taken into account, this
led to the RESI program system, part of the comprehensive MIGROS system 26, 27.
The programs designed for approximate solutions of the neutron transport equation
were combined in the "Karlsruhe Nuclear Program System," NUSYS. It offered informa-
tion about nuclear reactor quantities, such as criticality, power distribution, safety coef-
ficients, breeding ratio, etc., and reached the limits of applicability not so much in the
programs proper, but rather in the restricted capacity of the IBM 7070/7074 computer
installed at that time.
A one-dimensional burnup code was available for burnup calculations. It was used
also for calculations designed to optimize the breeding blanket. Calculations about fuel
management, even at that time, were run to determine the changes in the composition
of the Pu isotopes over long periods of reactor operation and multiple Pu-recycling 28.
The beam tube of SUAK.
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1.3.2 Van de Graaff Generator, SUAK and STARK
For cross section measurements, a Van de Graaff generator was purchased and
commissioned in 1964. It operated by directing the proton pulse generated in a high-
frequency ion source onto a lithium or tritium target, which released neutrons with a
broad energy spectrum between 10 keV and 1.5 MeV. Application of the time-of-f1ight
method allowed the fission cross sections of the most important breeder isotopes,
U-235, Pu-239, Pu-240, and Pu-241, to be determined in the energy range indicated
above.
A cyclotron, bought originally for research in radiochemistry, was used also for cross
section measurements within the Fast Breeder Project after 1965. It covered the en-
ergy range between 0.5 and more than 10 MeV 29.
In October 1964, the "Karlsruhe Fast Subcritical Assembly" (SUAK) was commissioned.
It was an unshielded subcritical system with a
multiplication constant, kaff, not exceeding 0.9.
Neutron pulses were periodically applied from
the outside to a uranium cube of 30 to 50 cm
length of the edges. In principle, this allowed
the neutron time-of-f1ight to be measured from
.the setup to a remote detector; if the f1ight path
is known, the energy distribution of fast neu-
trons can thus be determined between a few
keV and several MeV. Extensive measure-
ments were conducted to determine the so-
calied decay constant. This is an integral reac-
tor quantity dependent on the composition of
materials and sensitive to changes in the fast
neutron spectrum, especially in the resonance
range.
The third experimental facility commissioned in 1964 was the "Karlsruhe Fast-Thermal
Argonaut Reactor" (STARK). It was developed from the thermal Argonaut reactor,
whose inner graphite reflector zone had been replaced by a fast core zone with variable
material compositions. The two zones were separated by a cylindrical buffer blanket of
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natural uranium to reduce the penetration of slow neutrons from the thermal into the
fast regions. The dynamic behavior of the reactor was determined almost exclusively by
the thermal driver core, which greatly facilitated operation. After the necessary startup
measurements, work with this facility served for the development of methods of detec-
tion for neutron spectra and reaction rates, as weil as reactivity determination. Especial-
Iy the research into noise analysis, which was begun in STARK, should be mentioned.
1.3.3 Test Loops
To gather practical experience with the three coolants, technical-scale test loops had to
be built and were planned from the outset.
At the Institute for Neutron Physics and Reactor Engineering (INR), a 500 kW helium
loop was built which allowed pressures of up to 50 bar and heat flows of up to
300 W/cm2 to be generated. The setup, among other purposes, was used for measur-
ing heat transfer coefficients in fuel rods at high temperatures and at various surface
roughness levels 10.
A whole set of test loops were built at the Institute for Reactor Components (IRB). In the
sodium corrosion loop with three test sections of 12 kW each, the corrosive impact of
sodium on cladding materials, initially in particular vanadium alloys, was examined.
Another, physically adjacent, sodium loop (280 kW) allowed fundamental hydraulic and
thermohydraulic investigations to be performed in fuel rod bundles 3D,
This had been preceded by the technically sophisticated development of finned tubes
for the steam cooled breeder. In this design, space between the fuel rods is kept by
helical fins on the c1adding tubes. Compared to the helical wire concept already cus-
tomary at that time, the integrated concept offered major advantages in terms of avoid-
ing plate out, hot spots, and fretting corrosion. In addition, at a given maximum c1adding
temperature, it allowed the highest enthalpy rise and the lowest pressure drop to be
achieved, Le. it was near-ideal in the thermodynamic and fluid dynamic sense. Techni-
cal development was carried out together with industry, but was stopped later at In-
conel 625 because of difficulties arising in manufacture, cost problems, and also when
the steam cooled breeder was discontinued. Experience with the Inconel 800 c1adding
tube material in the Mol 70 in-pile experiment for the sodium cooled breeder was excel-
lent; six finned tubes were used, and a burnup of 90,000 MWd/t was achieved.
26
A system of key significance in the development of the steam cooled breeder was the
3 MW Löffler circuit established at the IRB. The circuit was arranged within a pres-
sure vessel, the bottom part holding the electrically heated "core," the upper part, the
spherical evaporator, and the dome-shaped superstructure, the steam compressor-
steam turbine system. The flowsheet and the
mode of operation simulated a reactor circuit,
with the turbine being replaced by a steam
pressure reducing and desuperheating sta-
tion. In an extended experimental program,
startup and shutdown processes as weil as
transients occurring in assumed accidents
were studied.
The IRB also ran other test rigs for the de-
velopment of steam blowers and Löffler
evaporators, and for studies of thermohy-
draulics and hot spot corrosion in fuel ele-
ments 30.
The 3 MW Löffler circuit.
2. THE PROJECT BECOMES INTERNATIONAL
(1962 - 64)
2.1 The Association with EURATOM
Cooperation with Euratom, which was laid down in an agreement in 1963, was an ex-
tremely important decision. It stabilized the Project by including an internationally expe-
rienced partner willing, in addition, to contribute oonsiderable funds 31, 32,
Already in 1960, when the Karlsruhe Project was founded, EURATOM considered em-
barking on breeder development on a large scale. Those plans were initiated also by
the finding that the contribution the Community was able to make in the fields of light
A. H. Oe Haas van Oorsser and J. van Oievoet,
the Breeder Project representatives respectively of the
Netherlands and Belgium.
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water, gas or organically cooled reactors was Iimited, for a variety of reasons. As a con-
sequence, attention was devoted to breeders, and at one point in time even the con-
struction of a fast zero power assembly was considered, which was bound to lead to
contacts with the Karlsruhe plans. Initially, EURATOM thought about building a critical
assembly at Cadarache. However, this was in line with neither the German nor the
French ideas, and ultimately agreement was reached on the construction of two na-
tional plants at Karlsruhe (SNEAK) and Cadarache (MASURCA). For these plants,
plutonium had to be obtained from the USA which, under the agreements with the
Community, was not possible on anational level, but only through EURATOM 33.
In the spring of 1963, after lengthy negotiations, the Agreement of Association in the
fast breeder field was signed by EURATOM and the Federal Republic. Similar agree-
ments were offered to, and accepted by, France and Italy. The agreement mainly pro-
vided for exchanges of information and delegations of personnel. For the Karlsruhe
Breeder Project, a budget of DM 185 million was earmarked for the period 1963 - 67, to
which EURATOM was prepared to contribute 40%. In addition, the Community pledged
to obtain 300 kg of plutonium from the USA; the material arrived in 1965 and was
shared equally between Karlsruhe and
Cadarache 34, 35.
In 1965/66, the Netherlands and
Belgium entered into similar agree-
ments of association with EURATOM,
with the proviso that they were to as-
sociate themselves either with France
or with Germany. The reason for this
condition was fear, on the part of
EURATOM, that otherwise there would
be too much of a dispersion of breeder
activities in Europe. The two countries,
as we know, joined Germany. The
Karlsruhe Project Management in-
cluded the Belgian organizations,
CEN/SCK Mol and Belgonucleaire,
as weil as the Netherlands institutions,
RCN Petten and TNO/Neratoom, in
accordance with their levels of experience and the requirements of the Project 36.
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CEN/SCK Mol had experience in reprocessing, particularly by the volatilization tech-
nique. Belgonuch3aire had already worked with the Enrico Fermi Project and with
French plutonium and reactor projects and, consequently, was assigned a special role
in fuel development. ReN Petten and TNO/Neratoom were to assume responsibilities
for fundamental studies and for work on sodium components.
Cooperation with EURATOM and the resultant internationalization lent to the Project a
high degree of stability. The number of scientists and technicians involved in the PSB
increased to 400 by 1966; in addition, the same number again were statt members in
the infrastructure sector. This paralleled the increase in personnel at the Center, which
had run from 120 to 3000 persons between 1956 and 1966.
2.1.1 The Karlsruhe Fast Zero Power Assembly (SNEAK)
By far the most sophisticated research facility planned at the Nuclear Research Center
at that time was the Karlsruhe Fast Zero Power Assembly (SNEAK). It was built in
1964 - 66 by Siemens on the basis of ideas developed by the Project under the man-
agement of Dr. Peter Engelmann, Häfele's deputy. The reactor core was designed
flexible, thus allowing fast cores of variable sizes, geometries, and compositions to be
assembled. Accordingly, the core was made up of a large number of element tubes
suspended into a grid plate from below. The
tubes were filled with platelets 51 x 51 mm2 in
cross section and of variable thickness. The mix-
tures of these platelets made of uranium, plutoni-
um, steel, graphite, aluminum oxide, sodium,
polythene, etc. determined the composition of the
core. In this way it was possible to simulate at
random the configurations of fast reactors fueled
with uranium and plutonium, cooled by sodium or
gas, and containing a variety of c1adding and
structural materials. Provided the necessary
amounts of fuel were available, these "reactors"
were studied on a full scale, but at a low power
level (1 - 1000 Watt) and at room temperature 37.
The SNEAK experimental reactor
under construction. The experimental program in SNEAK encom-
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passed the determination of critical masses, power distributions, control rod worths,
breeding ratios, neutron spectra and, above all, the important power coefficients
(Doppler coefficient, void coefficient, etc.). A large number of experimental facilities
were available for running these measurements, including a pile oscillator, a Doppler
loop, a pulsed neutron source and others.
The plutonium (175 kg) and enriched uranium (550 kg of U-235) initially required to
build up the core was purchased under the EURATOM Association Agreement men-
tioned above and made up most of the cost of the SNEAK facility. In the further devel-
opment of the Project it was possible to increase the amount of plutonium to 300 kg,
that of U-235 to 1000 kg. In addition, more than 60 t of natural uranium and depleted
uranium, respectively, was bought.
SNEAK was built parallel to the French zero power facility, MASURCA, at Cadarache.
That plant contained not platelets, but rod lets filled with metal fuel, but its inner tube
dimensions were chosen so that the plutonium inventories could be exchanged.
The construction of SNEAK was delayed, among other events, by a fire in the insulating
layer on the roof which had occurred during welding activities. Nevertheless, both plants
were commissioned in the night of December 15 to 16, 1966. SNEAK I was a replica of
ZPR 111 assembly No. 41; it took up all the uranium fuel available. Criticality was at-
tained with 179 elements; predictive calculations had indicated 178 elements.
The first plutonium core assembly, SNEAK 3, was measured in 1968 in connection with
steam-cooled breeder activities.
2.1.2 The Southwest Experimental Fast Oxide Reactor (SEFOR)
Originally, another large facility was to have been erected on the premises of the
Karlsruhe Nuclear Research Center. The Doppler coefficient was to be determined by
analyses of power excursion measurements in a fast test reactor to be operated at a
few megawatt power, "Karlsruhe Powder Godiva." From the beginning, the Project
had attributed considerable significance to the verification of a sufficiently high negative
Doppler coefficient of the fue!. As a result of the switch from metal to oxide fuel, the ex- ,
pansion coefficient and its stabilizing impact on the power level ceased to be available,
and all hopes were now focused on the inherent shutdown effect provided by the Dop-
Signing the SEFOR agreements
(Ieft to right: J. R. Welsh, SAEA; R. Greifeid and
W. Schnurr, both KfK).
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pier coefficient. The rather strange names, "powder" and "Godiva," referred to the oxide
fuel powder and to the absence of any covering blanket or reflector in the planned reac-
tor. In a rather bold comparison, it presented itself Iike the legendary English Lady
Godiva who rode a horse without wearing any clothes. Aprecursor, the U.S. metal
reactor "Godiva," had been built and used for weapon research purposes by the
USAEC 2.
The plan to run this experiment, which was not without danger, at the Karlsruhe Nuclear
Research Center was dropped when it became known in 1962 that General Electric in
the United States was on the verge of building a similar test reactor to be calied EFCR
(Experimental Fast Ceramic Reactor). Negotiations about cooperation were begun and
converged in a number of agreements signed in 1964: KfK and EURATOM acquired an
interest in Southwest Atomic Energy Associates (SAEA), an association of 17 utilities in
the southwest of the USA. They commissioned General Electric to build the 20 MWth
reactor now called SEFOR (Southwest Experi-
mental fast Oxide Reactor). KfK contributed
$3.5 million to the construction cost; the USAEC
financed the subsequent experimental program
to the tune of $12.7 million 38.
Cooperation in SEFOR functioned very smoothly
despite the large number of partners, which in-
cluded the French CEA. From the outset, a large
group of Karlsruhe scientists worked on site in
the United States of America together with dele-
gates from Interatom, Siemens, and the French
CEA, all of whom made committed contributions
to the reactor design and to test preparations.
The first superprompt critical transient tests
were carried out in 1971/72, slightly later than
originally planned, and confirmed the power-reducing effect of the negative Doppler
coefficient. When an excess reactivity of $1.3 was added deliberately, the power briefly
rose to approximately 1000 times its previous level; this power excursion was accom-
modated within split seconds by the negative action of the Doppler coefficient, thus
leaving time for the safety system to shut the plant down.
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2.1.3 Fuel Development
Many documents in those early years contain references to the special importance of
the fuel element for the breeder reactor; this is seen most clearly in the Technical An-
nex to the EURATOM Association Agreement 39:
"The design of a prototype with such consequences for the future must be based
on the fact that the fuel element is the most important component determining
everything else. In a way, the reactor must be designed around the fuel element."
Fuel development was a responsibility of the Institute for Applied Reactor Physics
(IAR), the European Institute for Transuranium Elements (TU), and the Institute for Ra-
diochemistry (IRCh). Also the Plutonium Prototype Laboratory and the Reactor Opera-
tions Division with the Hot Cells (RB) joined in the effort. The Institute for Materials and
Solid-state Research (IMF) was founded under Professor Fritz Thümmler in 1965 and,
initially, worked not only on uranium oxide, but also on uranium mononitride and coated
nuclear fuel particles as source materials for oxide cermets of high thermal conductivity.
The IMF was the first of the up to four subinstitutes to be established in the course of
time 40.
One special feature of Project organization at that time was the early inclusion of
NUKEM, a subsidiary of DEGUSSA. The firm was bound to the Project through devel-
opment contracts from the outset and for many years, as this was feit to obviate the
need for an independent fuel development department at the Center. After 1965,
NUKEM had fabricated some 5000 UOz-pellets and vibration-compacted some 75 kg of
fuel into rods under these development contracts. Some of the UOz was mixed with ce-
rium oxide, cerium being intended to simulate the plutonium chemically without having
its alpha activity. Also the addition of molybdenum was tested, as it was hoped to im-
prove thermal conductivity of the fue!.
In December 1963, ALKEM was founded as a joint subsidiary of NUKEM and Dow In-
ternational (30% interest), a U.S. company experienced in handling plutonium. ALKEM
rented premises at the Institute for Hot Chemistry (IHCh) and was awarded the contract
for manufacturing the platelets for SNEAK. Fabrication proceeded at such a rapid pace
that the Project Leader was able to show the audience at the 1965 Status Report a
plutonium-bearing SNEAK platelet. The SNEAK contract for a long time remained the
largest production contract in the world for mixed oxide pellets, and had served to dem-
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onstrate the skills of ALKEM. ALKEM later also manufactured mixed oxide fuel rods, es-
pecially for irradiation within the PSB. In 1971, the company gave up its Karlsruhe facili-
ties and moved to Wolfgang
near Hanau in the State of
Hesse. This also expressed the
need by the NUKEM parent
company to concentrate its fuel
activities in one place 23,25.
The Institute for Materials and
Solid-state Research (IMF) from
the beginning recognized the
fuel c1adding to be a critical
Sodium-filled steel platelets for SNEAK. component. The desired operat-
ing parameters, namely linear
rod power (> 300 W/cm), sodium temperature (approx. 550°C), and burnup (around
100,000 MWd/t), required highly heat-resistant materials. The search was concentrated
on iron, nickel, and vanadium alloys. There was also some interest in molybdenum al-
loys. Early studies were devoted to the creep-rupture strength of 16/13-CrNi and
20/25-CrNi types of steel, and Incoloy 800 and Inconel X in various stages of heat
treatment. In the presence of sodium, the time-to-rupture of tubes made of 16/13-CrNi
steel was found to be reduced. The strengths of the vanadium alloys developed jointly
with the Metallgesellschaft were determined in vacuum test rigs. Also techniques, such
as electron beam welding and hot isostatic pressing for the production of cermet fuel
rods, were learned at that time 41.
Initially, only the FR 2 thermal reactor of the Center, with a neutron flux of nearly
1014 n/cm2s, was available for irradiation of the test fuel rods made by NUKEM, ALKEM,
or at the Prototype Laboratory under the responsibility of Karl Kummerer. For the
spacious central channel of that reactor, the Institute for Reactor Development (IRE)
designed the so-calied burnup loop, a helium cooled in-pile loop for a maximum speci-
men power of 30 kW. A short-time in-pile rig supplemented this loop, which was oper-
ated successfully for many years.
The so-calied capsule test rigs were operated on fuel element positions and isotope
channel positions in the FR 2. These instrumented capsules contained specimens sur-
rounded by liquid sodium and a lead-bismuth alloy, respectively. Also this design
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worked weil after the operators had learned how to fill the Pb-Bi eutectic into the cap-
sule without leaving any voids.
The lack of a reactor on the premises with a sufficiently high fast flux soon was feit as a
disadvantage in materials irradiation. The Compact Sodium-cooled Nuclear Reactor
(KNK), in its KNK I version, was not a fast reactor, but a thermal reactor. Thanks to the
efforts also of Wirtz and Häfele, it was moved to Karlsruhe from its original planned site
at Jülich, but an unmoderated mixed oxide core was not installed until the late seven-
ties. In the meantime, the Fast Breeder Project had to use expensive external irradia-
tion facilities. Also in administrative terms, KNK was not fully integrated into KfK by
1973, but was under the management of the independent GfK Experimental Facilities
Division and was operated by KBG, a subsidiary of the Badenwerk AG utility.
To make up for the lack of in-house irradiation capacity, connections were established
with the CEN/SCK Mol Research Center, where the SR 2 reactor with a maximum fast
flux share of 5 x 1014n/cm2s had been available since 1968. Contracts were signed,
which remained in force until the end of the Project, under which part of the BR 2 irra-
diation space was reserved to PSB. In the course of the Mol I test series, 16/13, 15/25,
and 20/25-CrNi types of steel, various nickel-base alloys (Inconel 600, 625, X 750), and
vanadium-base alloys were irradiated. In the subsequent Mol II series, tubes were kept
under an internal pressure and exposed to the neutron field at an elevated temperature.
One of the most important results elaborated in those years was the confirmation of
theoretical concepts of high-temperature embrittlement. According to those findings,
this type of radiation-induced damage is due to helium bubbles at the grain boundaries;
the helium is produced in (n, a)-reactions.
2.1.4 Reprocessing
The problems of the external nuclear fuel cycle, especially of reprocessing, were ad-
dressed vigorously right from the beginning. Initially, the Decontamination Department
studied the recovery of uranium from aqueous fission product solutions; subsequently,
the responsibility for reprocessing associated with the fast breeder was transferred to
the Institute for Hot Chemistry (IHCh) 42.
One of the points raised in the reprocessing discussion at that time was the choice be-
tween wet and dry reprocessing. Some people thought that converting ceramic spent
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fuel into an aqueous phase was adetour on the road to refabrication. They also were
afraid of the high radiation exposure of the organic solvents and the criticality problems
associated with the higher plutonium content. In the dry methods, molten salt was sub-
jected to pyrochemical processes. A drawback associated with this procedure was the
low decontamination factor, which did not exceed 101 - 102, while aqueous methods
were believed to attain 108. The fuel recovered in the dry process could have been
used in fast reactors despite its minor fission product contamination; however, refabri-
cation into fuel elements would have had to be handled in hot cells, undoubtedly giving
rise to extra cost.
Another dry technique considered at that time was the so-calied volatilization process.
As the USAEC based its repurchase of spent uranium on the price of uranium hexa-
fluoride, some people thought about reprocessing by fluoride volatilization. Because of
the low raw material price of chlorine, also chlorination was discussed, for instance, in
Belgium.
The early decision by the Institute for Hot Chemistry (IHCh) in favor of the aqueous
PUREX process for breeder fuel reprocessing turned out to be wise. Theoretical con-
siderations converged in the decision to build the MILLI plant, a laboratory-scale re-
processing plant with a capacity of 1 kg per day. It was planned bya German industrial
group, and completed with the committed participation by the Institute for Hot Chemistry
and the Technical Department 43.
In 1967-70, also the Karlsruhe Repracessing Plant (WAK) was designed and built by
the Uhde-Leybold-Lurgi engineering consortium at a total cost of almost DM 70 million.
It was commissioned by the Gesellschaft zur Wiederaufarbeitung von Kernbrennstoffen
(GWK). WAK employed the solvent extraction process in combination with the chop-
leach method to extract fuel fram spent fuel elements. In the early phase of operation,
light water reactor fuel elements were to be repracessed, and subsequently the plant
was to be used for the advanced reactors, Kalkar LMFBR and Schmehausen THTR. In
actual fact, however, only fuel fram light water reactors was reprocessed (approx.
200 tons), until the plant was to be decommissioned in the late eighties 44.
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3. INDUSTRY COMES IN (1964 - 66)
The inclusion of EURATOM and of Netherlands and Belgian partners had strengthened
the financial base of the Project as weil as its further technical course. Although still
young, the Karlsruhe Breeder Project increasingly attracted the attention of the interna-
tional breeder community which, however, was already able to base its work on smaller
fast experimental reactors (EBR 11 in the USA, DFR in the UK, Rapsodie in France,
BR-5 and BOR-60 in the USSR). Undoubtedly, relations with the United States of
America were most advanced; liaisons with the European partners, France and Britain,
were far less developed, though those countries were much closer geographically.
Relations with German industries mainly existed in the form of delivery contracts. This
changed in 1964 - 66 as a consequence of some decisive events, which will be outlined
below.
3.1 Assessments of the Energy Situation
In the autumn of 1964, a "Nuclear Power Reserves 5tudy Group" was established
at the Nuclear Research Center, members of which were AEG, BBC-Krupp, GHH, In-
teratom, NUKEM, RWE, and Siemens as industrial members, the German Federal
Ministry for Research, and GKSS Geesthacht, KFA Jülich, and the Aachen Technical
University as research institutions. Under the leadership of the Fast Breeder Project, a
comprehensive report written about the situation of the power economy and the eco-
nomic potential of the nuclear power plant lines known at that time, and presented at
the 2nd Foratom Congress in Frankfurt in 1965. A EURATOM report published roughly
at the same time contained an analysis of the prospects of nuclear power in the Euro-
pean Community and arrived at comparable conclusions 45, 46.
KfK report No. 366, so widely quoted afterwards, also contained forecasts of the ura-
nium reserves, the electricity requirement in Germany, the specific electricity generation
costs of various types of reactors in the seventies, and the split of the market between
light water reactors and breeders by the year 2000.
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Strategie calculations of the nuclear generating capacity
installed in the DeBeNeLux region by 2050.
For the year 2000, the generating
capacity installed in the then Fed-
eral Republic of Germany was es-
timated at 230 GWe; the nuclear
share was assumed to be around
110 GWe. In a dual-type strategy
approach, it had been assumed that
this requirement would be met ex-
c1usively by light water reactors and
sodium cooled fast breeders. For
the LWR capacity, the maximum of
approx. 30 GWe had been calcu-
lated for the year 1995; the fast
breeder capacity was assumed to
rise continuously and reach approx. 80 GWe around the year 2000.
World uranium reserves in the three price categories of $8, 20, and 30/lb U30 a were
estimated at a total of 4.4 million tons of U30 a. This was based on the assumption that
some 5%, Le., 0.22 million tons,
would be available for Germany 45.
The rapid penetration of the breeder into the energy market was attributed to two
reasons 36:
(1) The compact construction of a breeder reactor, due to the absence of the
moderator, implies a considerable relative decrease in capital costs for larger
plants. Problems arising from the use of fast neutrons do not affect the costs,
as they are only "physical" in nature.
(2) As breeder reactors require no enrichment and achieve high burnups, the fuel
cycle costs will be lower; they were estimated to be less than Pf O.4/kWh, in-
c1uding expenditures for the first core.
On the basis of these capital costs and nuclear fuel cycle costs, the specific electricity








The KfK 366 study referred to above concludes that the difterence in costs between a
line consisting only of light water reactors and a combination of LWR/breeder reactors,
cumulated up until 1984, already implies cost savings of DM 1 billion. By that time, the
total expenditure then estimated for fast breeder development would have been re-
couped in the economic sense.
The conclusions arrived at in the study can be summarized as folIows:
"There are valid reasons to engage in breeder development, if only because of the
limited natural fissile material reserves.
Because of the excellent economic potential of the fast breeder, there is every
reason to do so quickly." 36.
3.2 The Schedule Becomes Tighter
The favorable assessment of the situation of breederreactors within the framework of
energy policy seemed to agree with the international situation. In 1963, the first suc-
cessful sale of a light water power plant took place in the United States of America un-
der economic conditions and in competition with fossil fired power plants. This
"Oyster Creek event" had frequently been regarded as the breakthrough of nuclear
power.
But competition seemed to be developing even in the breeder sector. Press releases by
General Electric in the United States were interpreted in Karlsruhe to indicate an in-
tention of that company to ofter fast breeders at economic terms already in the mid-
seventies 36, 47, 48.
A memo written for the benefit of the German Federal Ministry for Research reads as
folIows:
"... Under these circumstances it is to be expected that Britain, France, and espe-
cially the United States will be able to ofter large breeder power plants economi-
cally around the mid-seventies, and have all the necessary information as a con-
sequence of their prototype experiences. General Electric, as is weil known, an-
nounced this situation publicly (Nucleonics, November 1964) ... Given the im-
mense speed of development at the present time, it is now imperative to take the
step towards prototype construction in Germany quickly ... That there is brisk
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competition already in the development phase is the best proof of this reactor de-
velopment being promising." 36.
In the light of this presumed competitive pressure from the USA, the PSB Project
decided in 1965 to start detailed planning and construction of prototypes at an earlier
point in time. Originally, Le. even until 1964, plans had foreseen the decision among
sodium, steam, and helium coolants to be taken at the end of extensive development
activities, and the start of construction of one prototype approximately around 1973. In
addition, it had been feit necessary to work with a fully tested fuel element. According to
estimates in 1965, sodium and steam as coolants seemed to enjoy equal development
potentials, and as no decision was possible at that time it was decided to design two
prototypes in a parallel effort, each with 300 MWe power, namely a steam cooled and
a sodium cooled fast breeder. For the fuel element, only a minimum of advance testing
was to be required, while the actual statistical fuel element tests were to be moved for-
ward into the prototype reactor phase proper.
Now the timetable for the sodium cooled prototype was as folIows:
Detailed planning and Iicensing: 1965-68.
Construction: 1969-71.
Trial operation: from 1972.
The steam cooled prototype was to be built in the same steps, only one year later. For
the 1000 MWe demonstration power plants, 1973 was envisaged as the start of plan-
ning activities, 1977 for the start of construction. By the start of operation of the first
prototype, the SCHARADE (fast chemical processing and refabrication plant) reproc-
essing plant was to be built with a capacity matching these requirements in order for
breeders to be operated in a closed cycle right away 23,36.
Designing and building two 300 MWe prototype power plants would have exceeded the
possibilities available at the Nuclear Research Center by far. For this reason, it was
planned from the beginning to integrate German industry at this project stage. In No-
vember 1966, two industrial consortia were established: the AEG/GHH/MAN group of
industries was commissioned by the then Federal Ministry for Scientific Research to
draft the construction documents for the steam cooled breeder line, while the Sie-
mens/lnteratom group was to design the sodium cooled breeder. The activities by both
industrial groups were to result in the presentation, by 1969/70, of documents allowing
the contracts for the two prototypes to be awarded. The companies were chosen on the
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basis of past experience in the field: AEG was involved in building the Superheated
Steam Reactor (HDR) and had already delivered the VAK light water nuclear power
plant, while Interatom was commissioned to build the KNK reactor and even at that time
had an extensive background of experimental experience in the sodium field, e.g. with
the 5 MW facility 37, 49, 50.
The appropriation conditions of the Federal Ministry for Scientific Research had re-
quired, inter alia, that construction of the sodium breeder be preceded by the irradiation
with fast neutrons in sodium of 30 mixed oxide fuel rods to a burnup of 50,000 MWd/t.
For the steam cooled breeder, 500 fuel rods were to be irradiated under representative
conditions. While, for the sodium cooled breeder, irradiation facilities seemed to exist
abroad, e.g. in the Enrico Fermi reactor, there was no such possibility for the steam
cooled breeder. Consequently, a special program was planned to convert the HDR
thermal reactor in Großwelzheim into a fast-thermal reactor (STR). Some tentative in-
pile experiments in a thermal flux field were to be run in the VAK Nuclear Power Sta-
tion.
This deliberate inclusion of industry marked an important turning point in the adminis-
trative execution of the Fast Breeder Project. As important responsibilities were being
shifted from Karlsruhe to the partners in industry, this entailed a certain amount of fric-
tion. Where PSB Karlsruhe could refer to its knowledge of basic breeder principles and
its reactor studies, the industrial side was probably more experienced in plant engineer-
ing.
3.2.1 Reactor Design Studies
The reactor designs and test loops were the technical counterparts of the physical ex-
perimental setups and the fundamental studies mentioned above. Planning studies of
breeder power plants cooled with helium, sodium, and steam were completed one by
one, and served for studies of the technical plant concepts, safety problems, and capital
costs as weil as fuel cycle costs.
The first reactor design completed at Karlsruhe was for a 150 MW nuclear power plant
cooled by helium. Advantages of helium were considered to be the simpler technology
of the cooling circuits, the lower void coefficient, the higher breeding gain, and the
chemical neutrality and lower susceptibility to activation of the helium coolant. However,
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when the helium reactor design was investigated in more detail, soon the disadvan-














have led to ne-
Helium-cooled irradiation loop tor tuel elements. gative economic
consequences
as weil. In 1963, areport about Karlsruhe activities in the field of helium cooling was
presented at the Argonne conference, but afterwards this cooling variant had practically
ceased to exist, and adecision was then sought only between sodium and steam. On
the other hand, the helium cooling concept experieilced a comeback in the late six-
ties/early seventies, when technical developments had overcome many of the draw-
backs mentioned above, and a large American company came on the scene 51.
The first consistent German reactor design of a sodium cooled breeder was the so-
calied Na-1 Study. It had been produced under the responsibility of the Technical De-
partment of KfK, later converted into the Institute for Reactor Development (IRE). The
reactor had apower of 1000 MWe, a steam temperature at the turbine inlet of 540 oe,
and an efficiency of 40%. The reactor core, with a height-diameter ratio of 1:3, was
moderately flat and reflected the outcome of a carefully balanced compromise between
the highest possible Doppler coefficient, the lowest possible void coefficient, and the
highest possible internal breeding ratio. In the design of the primary system, the ex-
pected safety of the pool design was to be combined with the economic advantages,
also presumed, of the loop design. In this way, the entire primary system was accom-
modated in a cylindrical containment only 28 m in diameter. The top section of the reac-
tor containment was to be designed as a hot cell allowing the tops of the fuel elements
41
to be grabbed by manipulators under direct viewing conditions for loading and unload-
ing. The costs were estimated together with numerous industries; capital costs were to
be DM 440/kW, fuel cycle costs, Pf 0.33/kWh 52.
One major finding in the subsequent engineered safeguards analysis indicated that also
in sodium cooled fast breeders a conventional safety system of the kind known from
light water reactors was sufficient for control and shutdown.
After the Sodium Study, IRE compiled the so-calied 0-1 Study, the design draft of a
1000 MWe steam cooled breeder. It was based on many findings elaborated at IRE and
IRB. At those Institutes, it was feit that the steam breeder could weil outperform the
boiling water reactor in economic terms, as steam, being a single-phase coolant, al-
lowed the move towards the higher pressures and temperatures of conventional fossil












Schematic diagram of the steam cooled fast breeder.
As the coolant in a steam
cooled breeder had to evapo-
rate outside the reactor core,
various flowsheets were ex-
amined for feasibility, reliabil-
ity, efficiency, etc. Finally, the
so-calied Löffler circuit was
chosen, and a prototype was
set up at the IRB. The main
criterion of this circuit is the
physical separation of evapo-
ration from superheating it al-
lows, although both processes
are due to the nuclear heat of
the reactor core. In the Löffler
circuit, the reactor core acts as
a superheater of the saturated
steam generated in the evapo-
rator and recirculated by a
steam compressor. The super-
heated steam leaving the re-
actor is split into two partial
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streams. The smaller partial stream, approximately 40% of the total volume of super-
heated steam, flows straight to the turbine; the other, larger, partial stream is passed to
the evaporator where its heat is used to evaporate the feedwater. The saturated steam
generated is passed back to the reactor by the steam compressor. The Löffler circuit
was attributed certain advantages in technical safety, also because the evaporator
automatically acts as a heat sink and source, respectively, in pressure fluctuations 30.
The 0-1 Study completed in early 1966 was based on the Löffler circuit. The pressure
in the plant was 160 bar. Inconel 625 was to be used as a c1adding material for the fuel
subassemblies.
The 0-1 Study was received with much attention in the United States of America and
compared with two other studies of steam cooled breeders by Babcock and Wilcox
within the Alternate Coolant Task Force. The B & W plants also were to be operated in
a direct circuit, but were designed for low pressures (88 bar) and supercritical steam
pressures, respectively 54.
In a comparison of the two studies, Na-1 and 0-1, the following situation was de-
scribed by the PSB Project Management in 1966:
"Sodium cooled fast breeder reactors have a slightly higher breeding ratio and,
hence, a more advantageous fuel cycle. They are more economic in the baseload
regime of very large units (>1000 MWe).
Steam cooled fast breeders are characterized by lower capital costs in the me-
dium-power range (approx. 1000 MWe), which offset the slightly higher fuel costs.
Especially outside full-Ioad operation, they may be superior to sodium cooled
breeders in this unit size category.
Consequently, both systems are complementary in asense. For this reason, both
the sodium and the steam cooled breeder versions will be developed further." 10.
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4. THE 5TEAM COOLED BREEDER PROJECT 15
DI5CONTINUED (1966 - 69)
4.1 Decisionmaking
This prediction did not come true, however; on the contrary, work on the steam cooled
breeder began to slow down and soon had to be abandoned entirely.
The decision to discontinue the Steam Cooled Breeder Project had become appar-
ent already in 1966 and was accompanied by a violent, even emotional, debate until
1971. The most important stages in this decisionmaking process will be outlined below:
(1) In late 1967, AEG found that the HDR could not be turned into a fast-thermal
reactor (STR) because the Doppler coefficient was not negative enough.
(2) In March 1968, Project Leader Häfele indicated at the Status Report for 1967
that parallel development of the steam and sodium lines might have to be
given up.
(3) In April 1968, at the 6th meeting of the Fast Breeder Project Committee, AEG
themselves proposed to discontinue design work on the steam cooled
breeder.
(4) In December 1968, Working Party 111/1, "Nuclear Reactors," unanimously ar-
rived at the same finding.
(5) In January 1969, the same result was proclaimed by the Breeder A Committee
at Karlsruhe.
(6) At a hearing of the experts pro and con on January 23 and 24, 1969, which
had been organized by Federal Minister for Scientific Research
Dr. G. Stoltenberg together with members of the Parliamentary Committee
for Scientific Research, the decision was prepared on technical grounds.
On February 5, 1969, Dr. Stoltenberg, announced that the Steam Cooled Breeder
Project would be phased out. His press release ran as folIows:
"(1) The development of the steam cooled fast breeder as an independent subpro-
ject within the Fast Breeder Project will be discontinued.
(2) Industrial activities within
this subproject must be
brought to a meaningful
conclusion such that a
comprehensive final re-
port can be produced.
This should be compiled
so that it could serve as a
basis on which work
could be resumed, if re-
quired.
(3) Specific projects within
the Basic Program of the
Fast Breeder Project at
the Karlsruhe Nuclear




Discussing the breeder reactor
(Iett to right: Federal Minister for Research Stoltenberg,
G. Schuster, BMwF; R. Harde, Interatom).
This decision was explained in an annex:
"The German Steam Cooled Breeder Program had to be reexamined thoroughly
because of technical difficulties encountered with respect both to the basic objec-
tives and to the timetable.
In the light of the new international situation, a development of a steam cooled fast
breeder in the Federal Republic of Germany would have to be carried out in isola-
tion and without the backing by findings elaborated in parallel developments
abroad.
As things now stand, the concept of the steam cooled fast breeder reactor prom-
ises no advantage over that of the sodium cooled fast breeder reactor with oxide
fuel elements; on a long-term basis, the steam cooled fast breeder does not seem
to offer any potential for further development corresponding to that of the sodium
cooled fast breeder in the switch to carbide fue!.
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The date of commercialization of steam cooled breeder power plants will be de-
layed over previous assumptions, thus adding to the risk associated with the mar-
ket introduction of this type of nuclear power plant." 55.
Adecision had been taken, but it had done nothing to stop the discussion. Following an
initiative by Federal Minister for Research Leussink, Dr. Stoltenberg's successor, a
public hearing on the grounds underlying that decision was held within the framework
of the 1970 Status Report at Karlsruhe on February 15, 1971 56.
R&D work on the steam cooled breeder was not discontinued for good until 1974. This
phase-out program, which caused expenses totaling approx. DM 5 million per annum,
concentrated on the following items: experiments on steam contamination in the prima-
ry system conducted in the FR 2 superheated steam loop; out-of-pile corrosion tests in
the HKW loop; DRF trefoil irradiation experiments (discontinued after a defect); prepa-
rations for the irradiation in VAK of four fuel rods with apressure equalization system
(not carried out).
The discussion about the Steam Cooled Breeder Project caused considerable polari-
zation at the Nuclear Research Center. The arguments of the antagonists, Project
Leader Professor Häfele and IRB Institute Director Ritz, for a long time sounded like
opposed, even hostile, points of view and greatly damaged the public reputation of the
Center. Perhaps we should briefly go through those points of view and also list the most
important arguments raised by the industrial partner, AEG, and by K. Rudzinski, a jour-
nalist and committed critic of the Sodium Cooled Breeder Project.
4.1.1 The Arguments of the PSB Project Management
Project Leader Professor Häfele was in favor of discontinuing the Steam Cooled
Breeder Project, thus articulating the official opinion also supported by a majority at the
Nuclear Research Center. These were his main reasons:
(1) The Pu-a event has had a much more negative impact on the predicted
breeding capabilities of the steam cooled breeder than on those of the sodium
cooled breeder; a is the ratio between the (n, y)-capture cross section and the
fission cross section. At the IAEA Conference about the Physics of Fast Reac-
tors held in Karlsruhe in October 1967 it became known that the KAPL data
for Pu were too low for the resonance range of 10 - 20,000 eV. Higher a-val-
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ues mean a lower breeding capacity, which affects especially the steam
cooled breeder, because of its softer spectrum and as its breeding ratio any-
way is lower than that of the sodium cooled breeder,
The reduction in the breeding ratio by 4
points, together with the concept, pursued
up to that point, of a strong, freestanding
c1adding tube made of Inconel 625, would
have left almost no breeding capacity for
the steam cooled breeder. This would have
required a switch to a concept of a weak
cladding material, primarily Incoloy 800,
partly supported by the fuel (lltoothpaste
tube conceptll).
(2) Given the impossibility to convert the HDR,
a separate test reactor would have had to
be built for fuel element irradiation. The as-
sociated expenses would have been
DM 200 million over aperiod of six years.
Construction of the steam cooled prototype
would have been delayed by the same
I th f t' Ith h d' t I' Project Leader W. Häfele,eng olme a oug, accor Ing 0 ear ler advocate of the sodium cooled breeder.
concepts, it had been planned for construc-
tion at the same time as the sodium cooled breeder.
(3) ln-pile experiments in the EBR 11 run by General Electric in the United States
of America had indicated that nickel-bearing fuel rods experienced unexpect-
edly high defect rates in a fast neutron flux. On the other hand, the German-
American EVESR Program found that it was precisely the nickel component
which made the cladding material stable under superheated-steam corrosion
conditions. The question of a c1adding material suitable for a steam cooled
breeder thus was wide open again.
(4) The fuel rod c1adding tubes in a steam cooled breeder are subjected to a high
external pressure accompanied by high temperatures in the early stages of ir-
radiation. This load may cause IIbucklingll produced by the omnipresent initial
lIovalities,1I Le, deviations from the ideal round shape, Experiments indicated
that, under the systems steam pressures of 120 - 170 bar under discussion,
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maximum c1adding tube temperatures of 700 - 735°C and c1adding tube wall
thicknesses of less than 0.4 mm, the required times-to-rupture would not be
reached.
(5) As far as safety is concerned, emergency core cooling of the steam cooled
breeder reactor is problematic. While a sodium cooled breeder has a practical-
Iy non-pressurized coolant of high thermal conductivity, steam cooled breed-
ers, in all probability, would require many active measures to be taken, such
as water sprayed into a superheated core. In addition, there is the drainage
accident, which can occur only in a steam cooled breeder. Consequently, the
licensing procedure of the steam cooled breeder reactor is burdened with
major problems, some of which have not even been fully recognized.
(6) In the early summer of 1968, General Electric in the United States announced
that, because of many technical problems and, above all, lack of support by
the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission, they no longer intended to work on the
steam cooled breeder line. As a consequence, the German Steam Cooled
Breeder Project would have had to bear the entire development risk all alone.
(7) On an international level, the development of the sodium cooled breeder line
has reached the most advanced stage. In addition to Germany, the USSR,
USA, UK, France, Japan, and Italy pursue this line. Agreements securing ex-
changes of experience thus can help to back the basis of in-house develop-
ment.
(8) The sodium cooled breeder reactor operated on oxide fuel can be improved
by the use of carbide fuel in a further step. This applies especially to the in-
crease in the breeding ratio, while simultaneously reducing the fuel inven-
tory 47,57,58,59,60,61,62.
4.1.2 The Arguments Used by AEG
AEG, the leading industrial partner in the Steam Cooled Breeder Project, was in favor
of terminating activities. Dr. Kornbichler, responsible AEG Project Manager, cited
these reasons, among others:
(1) A factor of overriding and, finally, decisive importance, in the opinion of AEG,
is the fact that General Electric in the United States had given up the ESCR
(Experimental Steam Cooled Reactor) Project and, consequently, steam
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cooled breeder development altogether. As also Sweden, Italy and Japan
wanted to discontinue their efforts in this field, Germany would be isolated.
Without international exchanges of information, experience would grow more
slowly, and the risk of setbacks would increase. On top of that, it would be the
first time that Germany would have to carry a reactor line through to success
all on its own. When the high temperature, heavy water, and light water reac-
tor lines were developed, considerable external know-how was added, without
which the effort sometimes would have been hard to sustain.
(2) Assessing the future market and, in particular, the commercial prospects of
steam cooled breeders is a venture replete with considerable risks. Industry,
however, must seek not only technical, but also commercial success. When
competitors, such as General Electric, abandon a development line, surely
after having pondered that decision for a long time, this means that also AEG
should proceed very cautiously.
(3) An important, though negative, technical event is the failed attempt to convert
the HDR reactor into a fast-thermal reactor (STR). After approximately one
year of activities it was seen that the small core planned would not have a suf-
ficiently negative Doppler coefficient; other measures envisaged to achieve
quasi-inherent safety were not deemed to be reliable enough. The alternative
concept of a large, all fast reactor core failed, especially for cost reasons. Now
that STR is not available, no representative irradiation test of steam cooled
breeder elements would be possible 56, 63.
4.1.3 The Arguments Voiced by L. Ritz
Ludolf Ritz, an engineer by profession, had been
Head of the Institute for Reactor Components (IRB)
since 1961 and had been c10sely associated with the
Steam Cooled Breeder Project. Before joining KfK, Ritz
had been Chief Engineer with Parsons in Newcastle,
where he had contributed to the British Atomic Energy
Program, also by studies of steam cooling systems.
After he had joined Karlsruhe, incidentally on a rec-
ommendation by Otto Hahn, he resumed his earlier
activities with the full approval of Project Management.
L. Ritz, advocate of the steam cooled
breeder, discussing with W. Schnurr.
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However, his work was not confined to those studies, for his Institute also investigated
sodium components in liquid metal loops.
Ritz was in favor of continuing the Steam Cooled Breeder Project, and he expressed
the opinion of a non-negligibly small minority at the Nuclear Research Center:
(1) As far as plant design is concerned, the steam cooled breeder reactor is most
c10sely related to the light water reactor. As the LWR line has proved to work
satisfactorily so far, this would constitute an important argument in favor of
continuing this development line. It would also agree with the conservative
inclinations of manufacturers and operators of steam power plants, who will
be skeptical in accepting revolutionary innovations, such as the introduction of
coolant metals. On top of that, they can always refer to costly experiences as-
sociated with former technical modifications.
(2) The sodium cooled breeder is a revolutionary innovation, with respect to both
its coolant and its components. In addition, it suffers from an inherent cost
disadvantage, as its technical design is much more complicated than that of a
steam cooled breeder. Achieving industrial maturity and economic competi-
tiveness of the sodium cooled breeder line will take another ten or fifteen
years and require very high development expenses.
(3) In the autumn of 1968, the European Nuclear Energy Agency (ENEA), an in-
dependent organization, published the draft of a comprehensive Steam
Cooled Breeder Report, which contains this positive assessment 64:
"From this evidence we have concluded that there should be no major fea-
sibility problems and that, although substantial proving is required in certain
areas, in particular the fuel element, the reactor can be constructed essen-
tially on the basis of existing technology."
(4) The creep buckling problem can be counteracted effectively by apressure
equalization system for fuel rods developed at the IRB. In this design, the
usual gas plenum is replaced by a compartment filled with water and steam,
respectively, kept at temperature by the saturated steam entering the reactor.
Water and steam, respectively, is separated from the helium fission product
gas mix by a lead seal which is liquid at operating temperature. The pressure
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equalization systemallowstheuseofthinnerfuelelementcladdingswhich.in
turn, benefits the breeding ratio 62, 65, 66.
Irrespective of this clear opinion about the steam cooled breeder line, Ritz and his Insti-
tute continued to participate in the Breeder Project now that the decision in favor of so-
dium had been taken. In a reorientation phase, a sodium laboratory was built to work on
materials studies and heat transfer problems.
Ludolf Ritz died in Karlsruhe in June 1991 at the age of 82.
4.1.4 The Arguments Brought forth by K. Rudzinski, Journalist
Kurt Rudzinski, journalist, after unfinished studies of chemistry, Science Editor of the
"Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung" (FAZ), followed the breeder activities at the Nuclear
Research Center with critical interest. Around 1965 he came to the conclusion that the
development of the sodium cooled breeder
line was absolutely wrong, and expressed his
conviction in many articles in his paper. His
criticism became even more vociferous when
the discontinuation of the steam cooled
breeder line was rumored and then came
true. Rudzinski argued his point vehemently
and with a surprising knowledge of detail. His
Wednesday columns were famous and
feared, also because of the headlines, which
contrasted markedly with the rather self-
K. Rudzinski, critic of the sodium cooled breeder,
talking to W. M. Lehmann, KfK. effacing style of his paper. Here is a selec-
tion:
"ls Karlsruhe Gambling away a Chance in Nuclear Technology?"
(May 1, 1965).
"Steam Cooling Gaining Ground." (January 26, 1966).
"The Sodium Cooled Breeder - Billions Spent on Misdirected Investments."
(July 20, 1966).
"Billions down the Drain." (October 26, 1968).
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"Steam Breeder Fuel Elements - no Risk." (December 18,1968).
"Reactor Theology and Reactor Reality." (January 27, 1969).
"Wrong Forecasts in the Fast Breeder Project." (April 8, 1970).
'The End of Sodium Breeder Illusions." (May 6, 1970).
Rudzinski was also famous for timing his articles. Many of them appeared shortly be-
fore status reports or reactor conferences, influencing the opinions of experts and poli-
ticians by first-hand information indicative of a considerable amount of inside knowl-
edge. Moreover, they caused MPs to inquire, during question time of the German Fed-
eral Parliament, about specific decisions taken within the Project, or about events at the
Nuclear Research Center. Finally, other media picked up his arguments or wrote about
the author:
"Secret Slaughter." (Der Spiegel, December 2, 1968).
"Grumbling and Cheating." (Der Spiegel, June 2, 1969).
"FAZ Journalist Fighting the Establishment." (Capital, 2/69).
K. Rudzinski was firmly convinced of the technical and economic advantages of steam
technology as compared to sodium technology, and untiringly explained them to his
readers again and again on the basis of many examples. In detail, his arguments went
along the lines of what was written above. However, one should not forget that this ex-
change took place as early as in the mid-sixties, when the arguments against nuclear
technology or breeder reactors were not as familiar, even hackneyed, as in the follow-
ing decade.
At the Nuclear Research Center, it was regretted that Rudzinski only rarely verified the
information he had received from unofficial sources by talking to those responsible for
decisionmaking. It was also feit that the Karlsruhe Fast Breeder Project, compared to
other research organizations, was one of his pet objects of criticism. The consistently
negative approach to the sodium cooled breeder and to PSB research activities did
lend to these FAZ articles a unique flavor, but the frequent repetitions smacked of a
loss of proportion. Many staff members at the Nuclear Research Center also regretted
that the two main combatants, Häfele and Rudzinski, did not seem to find - or seek - an
opportunity to meet for personal discussions and, perhaps, reconcile these differences
of opinion which, in their early phase, were still purely theoretical.
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It is little known that Rudzinski was interested in a great many things other than tech-
nology. Thus, he was an enthusiastic collector of coins, taught himself the difficult art of
coin photography, participated in several excavations as an archaeologist, and wrote
renowned articles about Greek vase painting.
In any case, the critic signing K. R. has become one of the inseparable parts of the his-
tory of the Fast Breeder Project.
Kurt Rudzinski died in Frankfurt in February 1992 at the age of 80.
5. THE BEGINNINGS OF THE KALKAR NUCLEAR
POWER STATION (1969 -73)
5.1 The Contracting Parties Are Established
After 1966, there was a c1ear division in the administrative setup of the Breeder Proj-
ect. The industrial partners assumed more and more responsibilities for the detailed
design of the SNR 300 Project based on the Na-2 Study. The Centers, especially the
Karlsruhe Nuclear Research Center, kept fundamental research and, in some in-
stances, also research and development for the SNR 300 accompanying the construc-
tion phase.
The important function of assembling all partners of the SNR 300 Project around one
table was taken over after 1966 by the "Fast Breeder Project Committee." That
body was composed of representatives of the governments, the manufacturing indus-
tries, the utilities, and the research centers under the chairmanship of the German Fed-
eral Ministry for Scientific Research, and met approximately twice or three times a year
to take the decisions necessary for the SNR 300 Project to be continued. After the
SNR 300 delivery contracts had been concluded, the Project Committee ceased to
meet, but was reinstituted in 1977 and continued to exist until the early eighties.
The Vendors' and Operators' Consortia for the SNR 300, Le. the later contracting par-
ties, were organized step by step over several years; this development will be summa-
rized below 67, 68.
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The Vendors' Consortium for the SNR 300 was established along the lines of Ger-
man-Belgian-Netherlands cooperation among the research centers, which had been in
existence since 1965; That cooperation had been regarded as most satisfactory by all
partners. Consequently, memoranda were exchanged at government level in 1967 on
extending cooperation to the construction of the SNR 300. The government agreement
already determined the way in which the Project was to be financed, and subsequent
shares in deliveries were to be defined, in a ratio of 70:15:15. One year later, Siemens
Advocates of the sodium cooled breeder project
(Iett to right: A. W. Eitz, SBK; D. Smidt, KfK; w.-J. Schmidt-KOster and
U. Däunert, Federal Ministry for Research, Bonn).
and Interatom (Federal Republic of Germany), Belgonucleaire (Belgium), and Neratoom
(Netherlands) signed an Agreement on Cooperation in Development and Construction
of the SNR 300 based on these memoranda. In 1972, when the SNR 300 delivery con-
tracts were signed, this so-calied SNR Consortium was renamed "Internationale Natri-
um-Brutreaktor-Baugesellschaft mbH" (INB). Its members were Interatom, Belgonucle-
aire, and Neratoom. The Luxatom company from Luxemburg for some time held a 1%
share in the SNR Consortium, but withdrew in 1972, before the contracts were signed.
Between 1969 and 1974, a number of changes occurred in the German partners, Sie-
mens and Interatom. In 1969, Siemens acquired a 60% interest in Interatom, while
North American Aviation opted out, and the interests held by the other members were
decreased. At the same time, Siemens terminated its breeder development activities
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and moved the staff, Le. those who wanted to be moved, from Erlangen to Bensberg.
Later on, also the remaining partners in Interatom, namely Demag (1971) and Deutsche
Babcock and Wilcox (1972), withdrew, leaving Siemens the sole owner of Interatom.
These shares were transferred to Kraftwerk Union in 1974, when the nuclear divisions
of Siemens and AEG had been included.












of the SNR 300 was set
up by German, Belgian,
and Netherlands electricity
utilities. Karlsruhe initially
had suggested to plan and
build the SNR 300 to-
gether with the manufac-
turing industries and de-
liver it to one operator af-
ter completion. However,
the German Federal Min-
istry for Research had not
accepted that proposal,
wanting to include the op-
erator in the responsibility
for the Project as early as
possible 36, 68.
As a consequence, the "Projektgesellschaft Schneller Brüter" (PSB) was founded in
1969 as a company under private law, with the leading members being RWE as a
German utility and Synatom (Belgium) and SEP (Netherlands) as the two foreign part-
ners. The name of the company, PSB, was frowned upon at Karlsruhe as it was likely to
be mixed up with the same abbreviation (in German) for the established Fast Breeder
Project of the Nuclear Research Center. PSB (Essen) was to prepare construction of
the SNR 300 on the part of the subsequent buyers, Le. to settle especially matters of fi-
nancing, contracts, and licensing. In 1972, the company gave way to the "Schnellbrüter-
Kernkraftwerksgesellschaft mbH" (SBK), which officially commissioned INB to deliver
the SNR 300. This took care of the problems with the abbreviation PSB. In 1973, the
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British Central Electricity Generating Board (CEGB) joined the Buyers' Consortium with
a share of 1.65%.
5.2 From the Basic Design Studies to the SNR 300
The SNR 300 design was based on the so-calied Na-2 Study, which had been elabo-
rated under the leadership of the Nuclear Research Center and with the cooperation of
Siemens and Interatom between 1965 and 1967. This constituted thefirst German de-
sign concept of a 300 MWe sodium cooled breeder. Compared to the earlier
Na-1 Study of a 1000 MWe breeder, the coaxial design of the primary system was
abandoned in favor of a conventional three-Ioop system. As later in the SNR 300, the
reactor core was designed as a dual-zone core; concepts, such as "pancake cores,"
"modular cores," and "spectrum softening cores," were already being considered for
safety reasons, but finally not feit to be necessary. Should all three main circuits fail, the
decay heat was to be transferred to the NaK coolers and air coolers by natural convec-
tion. The reference is cited here as a particularly striking example of the "multi-people
papers" very much en vogue in the late sixties 69.
In the safety analysis forming part of the Na-2 Study, core meltdown was considered a
very unlikely accident. As a worst-case estimate, even at that time mechanical energy
releases were calculated for hypothetical Bethe-Tait accidents. Because of the very
different geometries, physical assumptions, and methods of computation, these figures
cannot be compared directly with the 370 MWs later not to be exceeded for the
SNR 300 70.
The containment as the most important protective device against releases of radioac-
tive materials in accidents was the subject of particularly detailed consideration. The
bone dose was found to be the most important effect of radiation exposure and, conse-
quently, plutonium, not iodine, was seen to be the Iimiting element. Under these cir-
cumstances, a double containment with exhaust air handling of the annulus was con-
sidered to be necessary 71.
The SNR 300 Safety Report was drafted by the SNR Consortium as the responsible
body and submitted on December 31, 1969. It consisted of two volumes of text and one
volume of diagrams and pictures, and constituted the first consistent draft of the
SNR 300. The plant had been designed to apower of 300 MWe, but was to allow an
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extrapolation to 1000 MWe with little risk to most of the components. For the heat
transfer system, the loop concept was selected "because of the greater ease of con-
struction and extrapolation, and also because of the higher development potential with
a view to the possible elimination of the sodium intermediate circuit." The components
located below the emergency sodium level were arranged in concrete troughs for pro-
tection against loss of coolant. No separate emergency cooling circuits were envisaged.
In the field of safety, gaps were found to exist still in the phenomenon of fuel-sodium
interaction and the propagation of accompanying pressure effects. The direct conse-
quences of a superprompt critical energy release were feit to be concentrated on the
reactor cell 72.
The detailed technical plans for the SNR 300 as submitted in the Safety Report in 1969
were changed decisively in subsequent negotiations with the licensing authorities and
the operator. As a consequence, much of the planning had to be revised, causing con-
siderable delays in time and extra cost 73, 74, 75, 76, 77, 78.
5.2.1 Requirements by the Licensing Authority
The electricity utilities had planned Weisweiler in the three-country region around
Aachen as the site for the SNR 300, because several (lignite fired) generating units
were already operated in that part of Germany by RWE, and the necessary infrastruc-
ture existed. However, when compared with the site criteria redefined by the Advisory
Committee on Reactor Safeguards (RSK) in summer 1970, the population density
around Weisweiler was found to be too high. The RSK recommended to find a site with
a population of less than 40,000 within a radius of 5 km. The Projektgesellschaft
Schneller Brüter relatively soon found a suitable reactor site at Kalkar near Kleve on
the Lower Rhine River; the new site also had the advantage of being very elose to the
Netherlands partner ("can be reached by bike"). It is characteristic of the situation at
that time that the Ministry for Research (now calied BMBW, Le. Federal Ministry for
Education and Science) received a number of letters in which those responsible for 10-
cal governments and districts asked to be allowed to site the SNR 300 on their territo-
ries 79.
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The design basis accident for a leak in
the primary system was the prompt
break of the main coolant pipe. Under
this condition, a minimum coolant level
was to be ensured in the reactor vessel,
which was to be achieved by the so-
calied trough concept in which as many
parts of the primary system as possible
were to be arranged in collection
troughs and above the equilibrium level.
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The geographie loeations of the key organizations
involved in the SNR 300.
The severest technical criterion imposed by the expert consultants was the need to take
into account the Bethe-Tait accident. The vessel and the primary system were to be de-
signed so as to withstand mechanicalloads of 150 and 370 MWs, respectively. In addi-
tion, in case both reactor vessels were to fail, a bottom cooling system ("core catch-
er") was to be provided for, which would
be able to accommadate the malten
core and cool it permanently. This crite-
rion, which c1early exceeded the inter-
national state of the art at that time,
later turned out to be the main reason
for the considerable extra work required
for the Kalkar Nuclear Power Station .
The other requirements imposed by the authorities and expert consultants implied im-
mersion coolers, gas bubble separators, an in-vessel sodium inlet line, and an aerosol
recirculation system, which meant an almost complete redesign of the SNR 300 primary
system.
Moreover, as the licensing procedure went on, higher load assumptions had to be
made to take into account external impacts: The outer containment was to withstand
the impact of a high-speed military aircraft and the gas cloud explosion of an LNG tank
vessel passing by on the Rhine River.
Finally, also a cooling tower was demanded, especially to keep the thermal pollution of
the Rhine River sufficiently low in hot summer months.
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5.2.2 Requirements by the Operators
The outer containment of the original SNR 300 design had a cylindrical shape, as was
customary for light water reactors. In 1970, following a requirement by the operators, it
was made rectangular, as this shape was feit to provide more space for maintenance
and repair. As one of the main advantages of the sodium cooled fast breeder is its low
pressure in the primary system, and the Bethe-Tait accident and the external impacts
were not used as basic design criteria by the customer, it seemed logical to give up the
more pressure resistant cylindrical containment. The approaches used in comparable
prototype facilities in France (Phemix) and the United Kingdom (PFR) made this an
understandable measure.
For the steam generators, the straight-tube type was envisaged. The operator had
doubts about this technical concept and demanded that also a variant, the helical-tube
type, be incorporated in at least one system. The original demand for an additional
supplier for this type was given up as soon as problems had arisen about delivery
agreements for large components.
Other modifications related to the handling system, the fuel element storage capacity,
and the hot cell which, unfortunately, was reduced to an observation post, a change
much regretted at a later date.
The modification discussed most widely affected the reactor core and the breeding
ratio. In the course of an economic analysis it had been found in the autumn of 1972
that the SNR 300, because of its surprisingly high fuel element costs, probably would
be operated only at a major deficit, compared with light water reactors. Possible savings
were looked for, and it was decided to have thicker fuel rods (7.6 mm diameter) for the
reload cores in order to reduce greatly the fuel rod fabrication costs because of the
smaller number of fuel rods. The core array was modified so that the full reactor power
could be achieved already with the first core immediately after commissioning and not,
as had been planned originally, after a prolonged burnup period. The inner breeding
blanket row was replaced by fuel elements, while the outer row was equipped with
(cheaper) reflector elements. Consequently, the new fission zone in the reactor core
was made up of 205 elements instead of the 151 planned earlier, while the number of
blanket elements had dropped from 144 to 96.
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As a consequence of the reduction of the breeding blanket, the breeding ratio of the
SNR 300 dropped to slightly less than unity. When this became known, a violent debate
arose among the experts and in the press. Angry voices were heard also at the Nuclear
Research Center, where a breeding ratio above unity had always been regarded as one
of the goals 80.
Differences of opinion about this decision persisted for a long time. The proponents of
the core modification argued that economic operation of the SNR 300 had priority while
the plutonium breeding gain was insignificant during the startup phase of the reactor.
Their opponents considered direct proof of the SNR 300's ability to breed at a breeding
ratio slightly in excess of 1 to be of such overwhelming importance that even an uneco-
nomic mode of operation could be accepted temporarily.
5.3 The Price of the SNR 300
These technical modifications required a revised safety report for the SNR 300 to be
compiled, which was presented in mid-1971. In May 1972, the positive overall expert
opinion was expressed by the Technical Inspectorate (TÜV); in June, the Advisory
Committee on Reactor Safeguards took a final positive vote, and on December 18,
1972, permit 7/1 was issued, in which Kalkar was accepted as the site, and the first
construction measures were authorized.
The delivery contracts between INB and SBK were signed in November 1972 and
became valid in March 1973, after the governments had agreed to make their financial
contributions. Construction work at Kalkar was begun in April 1973. The SNR 300 Proj-
ect had become the Kalkar Nuclear Power Station Project. As the two terms were used
interchangeably in public statements, the same procedure will be adopted in this report.
Compared to earlier concepts, this meant a delay by two years. However, the parties
involved realized that this period had been necessary and had helped to make the
SNR 300 acceptable to the Iicensing authority and the subsequent operator.
In contrast to expectations of the electricity utilities, the safety report presented in late
1969 was not accompanied by a commercial bid for the nuclear power plant. Instead,
an "estimated price" of DM 670 million was quoted, according to Interatom CEO
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Rudolf Harde," in order to enable the three participating governments to enter first into
preparatory negotiations" 56.
Planning the modifications of the SNR 300 and examining its risks in greater depth had
a major impact on the price of the nuclear power plant. The total cost of the SNR 300
at November 1972 prices now ran up to DM 1534 million, which amount breaks down
as follows 81:
SNR 300 costs as per 1972 delivery contract
Delivery contracts DM 984.7 million
Provisions for extra cost DM 247.0 million
Builder's costs DM 103.0 million
Provision for price escalation DM 200.0 million
Total cost DM 1534.7 million (not including the Pu
for the first core)
As the price of the nuclear power station had become considerably higher than origi-
nally estimated, the Federal Ministry for Research in Bonn established a commission
which spent several weeks examining the "justification of the prices" of all components
and systems without, however, contributing greatly towards a price reduction.
The equity capital envisaged for the shareholders in SBK was DM 120 million. More-
over, the governments were to participate in the financial risk of operation to the tune of
up to DM 150 million 82.
Earlier cast estimates, such as those drafted in 1965 (DM 310 million 36) or in 1971
(DM 670 million 56), were exceeded greatly by the contract price of DM 1535 million.
This c1early revealed the margin of uncertainty inherent in such estimates as long as the
scope of delivery is not known sufficiently weil, no detailed engineering plans are avail-
able, and contractual conditions, such as warranty, penalties, etc., have not yet been
negotiated. The situation at that time is characterized by a statement made by a repre-
sentative of industry (Dr. Kornbichler, AEG) in a public panel discussion at the 1971
Status Report:
"Let me first of all correct the idea that the costs of a reactor yet to be developed
can be estimated to the first or second digits after the decimal point. It has been
our experience with light water reactors that they took at least ten years of devel-
opment before the order of magnitude of the costs became at all evident ..." 56.
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The PSB Project Management Staff at Karlsruhe later was repeatedly taken to task for
its relatively low cost estimates for 300 MWe breeder power plants. Although it is not
the primary duty of a research center to publish such economic data, those figures yet
were not invented. The French and British breeder reactors of comparable unit sizes,
Phenix and PFR, were already under construction in 1968 and 1974, and their costs
were known at least tentatively. When the final accounts were settled, Phenix cost
FF 595 million, PFR, :E45 million. Consequently, their final prices were even below the
expenditures for the SNR 300 estimated at that time. The higher contract price of the
SNR 300, and the horrendous extra costs incurred later, cannot be attributed to the
complexity of breeder technology alone, but c1early carry anational component 83.
Under the delivery contracts for the Kalkar Nuclear Power Station, the Vendors' Con-
sortium was to participate "adequately" in the risk of the Project and even contribute
progressively to its extra cost. A cumulated risk of approx. DM 200 million was esti-
mated under this heading. The remaining financial requirement was to be paid out of
public funds 82.
G. Scheuten, as CEO of SBK, declared the SNR 300 ready for construction as far as
the terms and conditions in the delivery contract were concerned. Except for the
price, they largely corresponded to the terms and conditions applicable to LWR nuclear
power plants. Performance obligations could be modified subsequently only by unfore-
seeable events and findings caused by sodium technology or by the impact of fast neu-
trons. Nobody will have realized at that time that a sizable fraction of the extra cost in-
curred later resulted from that very area 84.
5.3.1 The Changed Economic Assessment of the Breeder
After more c1arity had been achieved about the technical design and the cost structure
of the SNR 300, this also meant a reassessment of the economic potential of the so-
dium cooled fast breeder. In contrast to pre-1969 estimates, it was now generally as-
sumed that, on a short and medium term, the breeder would be inferior to light water
reactor plants in terms of electricity generating costs. Equality in costs of these two
types of nuclear power plants was forecast for "the nineties." However, this was as-
sumed under the premise of a major rise in uranium prices. The nuclear fuel cycle was
assumed to offer a cost advantage of the breeder reactor, provided that the costs of
uranium were sufficiently high; that assumption was also supported by the continuous
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rise in separative work costs. The fuel rod fabrication costs were estimated at
DM 790/kg on the basis of a fabrication plant of 50 tla loaded to capacity. The reproc-
essing costs at that time were estimated to run up to DM 500/kg 68,82,85.
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Generally, the breeder was feit to be
at a disadvantage in capital costs.
This was due especially to the more
sophisticated circuit systems which,
obviously, could not be simplified
very much. The technical design
drafts of all prototype and demon-
stration reactors moved towards a
standard scheme and, except for
differences between loop and pool
designs, did not differ too much in
costs. Efforts to eliminate the sec-
ondary system or install a CO2 sys-
tem had been abandoned in gen-
eral 73.
Certain cost advantages of the breeder were expected to arise from economies of
scale. Because of the unpressurized primary and secondary systems, plant powers of
2000 MWe and above appeared to be feasible. However, as long as unit sizes were
limited by the hypothetical Bethe-Tait accident, no credit could be taken of this possibil-
ity.
The need to pursue the breeder technology was explained especially with the need to
ensure the supply of low-cost fue!. Building the SNR 300 was feit to be necessary be-
cause expertise in advanced fast breeder technology had to be demonstrated also in
the interest of nuclear power plant exports. In addition, it was a "pledge" to be used to
exchange experience with other industrialized countries developing breeder reactors.
The SNR 300 was the German loop concept to be contrasted with the pool concept
pursued by the French and the British. Finally, everybody had realized in the meantime
that the licensing procedure stood a chance of succeeding only if it concerned areal
project promising a feedback of experience 82.
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5.4 The Status of the R&D Program
When the technical documents of the SNR 300 were examined in April 1970, an ad hoc
Committee on "Readiness for Construction of the SNR 300" was set up to express
its opinion on the feasibility and the risks of this power plant. In its activity, the Commit-
tee tdentified 26 problem areas which it feit required in-depth investigation. These in-
c1uded structural material swelling; oxide deposits in aerosol compartments, steam and
carbon traps; dynamic stability; and matters of repair and maintenance. Most of these
items resulted from current problems encountered in the KNK experimental reactor and
were c10sely connected with the ongoing R&D program, respectively.
In addition, when commissioning the industrial consortium, the Federal Ministry for Re-
search in 1966 had formulated a number of technical grant-giving criteria, whose
compliance status also had to be assessed. They also constituted part of the R&D
sector, mainly covering fuel elements, safety, and sodium technology. In the sections
below, therefore, the progress and the problems in these research areas in the early
and mid-seventies will be explained in slightly more detail. The R&D program will not be
covered afterwards, as this report is mainly concerned with the history of the SNR 300
plant 86, 87.
5.4.1 Fuel Elements and Fuel Cycle
The accident at the Enrico Fermi Reactor in October 1966, which had been caused by
a blocked fuel element and ultimately caused the reactor to be shut down permanently,
had greatly hampered the irradiation plans of the Project. The FR 2, with its thermal
spectrum, was no proper substitute, especially since 1967 when the phenomena of
swelling of the c1adding tube material had been recognized and, like high-temperature
embrittlement in some ways, had been attributed to the impact of fast neutrons. Mate-
rials irradiation required fast test reactors. As a consequence, the epithermal BR 2 at
Mol was increasingly used in the early phase; 50% of its capacity was leased initially for
aperiod of five years and spent especially on capsule and loop irradiations.
The situation became much more manageable after an agreement had been signed
with the United Kingdom about irradiation in the Dounreay Fast Reactor (DFR). A bun-
die of 77 fuel rods was irradiated jointly with the French CEA, with IDeBeNeLux"
(Germany/Belgium/Netherlands/Luxemburg) securing a share of 39 rods. The DFR 350
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experiment, together with the DFR 304 three-rod monitoring experiment, was a com-
plete success. A burnup of 53,000 MWd/t was attained in 1971, thus formally meeting
one of the grant-giving criteria of the Federal Ministry for Research. However, the c1ad-
ding materials were the 1.4988 and 1.4981 steel grades not used again later. In the
autumn of 1970, the French Rapsodie Fortissimo plant was added as another irradia-
tion reactor, and the irradiation bottleneck more or less ceased to exist 88, 89.
By 1975, more than 100 fuel rads had been irradiated in a fast flux in the DFR and
Rapsodie Fortissimo reactors to a burnup of 90,000 MWd/t. 220 rads had achieved
burnups in excess of 50,000 MWd/t. Post-irradiation examinations were conducted
mostly at the hot cells of the Nuclear Research Center. In this way, oxide fuel was ex-
amined for pore formation, resintering effects, and releases of gaseous fission prad-
ucts. Especially the FR 2, BR 2, and Siloe reactors were used to study fuel swelling and
in-pile creeping. In the important field of chemical interactions (compatibility), the dan-
gers to the c1adding posed by the Cs, Te, and I fission praducts were recognized. For
the first time, the microprobe allowed the radial distributions of Pu and U in spent fuel
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In the early seventies, the potential of oxide fuel was largely feit to have been ex-
hausted, and the Project Management Staff recommended a gradual switch to carbide.
The problem of internal corrosion appeared to be less severe in that material; thanks to
its far better thermal conductivity and higher heavy metal concentration, carbide fuel
especiallY allowed smaller fuel
inventories and higher breeding
ratios to be achieved. In 1973,
15% of the PSB funds already
were spent on carbide develop-
ment. In the sector of clad-
ding material, a preselection had
resulted in the Nb- and
Ti-stabilized steel grades of
1.4988, 1.4981, and 1.4970, re-
spectively. The criteria applied,
above all, included high thermal
stability, sufficient post-irradiation
ductility, and minimal swelling
rate. Detailed analyses of the
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non-uniform in-pile results coupled with comprehensive out-of-pile investigations re-
sulted in the choice of 1.4970 type steel. This was the correct decision to take, as has
been evident to this day. For the fuel element shroud and the spacers, 1.4981 type
steel was proposed 93, 94.
On the basis of existing R&O findings, the INB Industrial Consortium in 1974 specified
the fuel elements for the first core (Mark la) of the SNR 300. The rod diameter was to
be 6 mm, which was halfway between the diameters used in the PFR (5.85 mm) and
Phemix (6.25 mm) plants. The pellet density was determined to be 86.5% of the theo-
retical density and 80%, respectively, of the smear density; later, it was known to be at
the lower end of the international scale. Experimental backing of the spacer was mini-
mal; the honeycomb type was chosen, which consisted of spot-welded strips and had a
certain similarity to the British design. As no complete overview had as yet been ob-
tained of the swelling of c1adding material and the associated gradients, the design de-
liberately was planned on the conservative side. The burnup contractually guaranteed
by INB was 55,000 MWd/t 95,96.
The second reactor core of the SNR 300 was to be equipped with so-calied Mark 11 fuel
elements. They were characterized not only by higher fuel density, but also by thicker
fuel rods (7.6 mm diameter), especially to reduce fuel element fabrication costs, which
made up a major part of the fuel cycle cost. At the same time, the fuel rods were to be
made more compact, which meant the use of spark eroded spacers.
Industrial mixed oxide production was weil under way, with approx. 100 kg of breeder
fuel each manufactured by ALKEM and Belgonuch3aire, including the lots for KNK 11.
ALKEM had left the premises of the Nuclear Research Center in 1971 and built its fab-
rication plant at Wolfgang near Hanau. Fabrication line I was designed for 10 tla of
LWR recycle fuel and 2-3 t of breeder fuel, respectively, while the highly automated
line II was to attain four times that capacity. Belgonucleaire soon afterwards had given
up its pilot plant at Mol and built a new manufacturing plant at Oessei with a capacity of
7.5 tla of breeder fuel 97.
Some of the fresh fuel rods for R&O in-pile experiments were fabricated on small lines
at Karlsruhe and Mol, such as the rods used in the Mol 80 and Mol 16 test groups. For
quality control, an electrochemical probe had been developed for non-destructive
measurements of the OlM ratio.
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In the fuel cycle, the cold trial runs of MILLI had been completed in the spring of 1970.
One problem had been the availability of sufficient amounts of high-burnup fuel for ac-
tive operation of the plant. The SNR 300 fuel elements wereto be reprocessed in WAK;
a special development program had been harmonized with the SNR deadlines. The fast
breeder cores were to be reprocessed in the so-calied mixed core management mode,
Le., the fuel rods were to be reprocessed together with blanket rods.
5.4.2 Physics and Safety
Between the spring of 1969 and the autumn of 1970, the SNEAK 2 and 6 assemblies
were studied in SNEAK as setups typical of sodium cooled breeder reactors. In the
process, the SNEAK 2A uranium core had been incorporated, step by step, a central
Pu zone and a 1500 Pu sector. For this purpose, 90 kg of plutonium had to be obtained
on loan from the MASURCA plant. The SNEAK 6 test series also indicated that kaff
could be predicted with an uncertainty of approx. 1%, and the power distribution, with
approx. 3-4%.
After studies for the steam-cooled breeder (SNEAK 3), on equipping KNK with a fast
core (SNEAK 4), and the sodium-related setups mentioned above (SNEAK 2, 6), the
first assemblies directly tailored to SNR 300 needs were investigated between 1972
and 1975 (SNEAK 9A, B, C). Configuration 9A was an almost true-to-scale replica of
the Mark I core, but already taking into account modifications for Mark la 98.
German-Japanese talks about cooperation
(Ieft to right: A. Oyama, W. Häfele, K. Mochizuki).
Code development progressed in
accordance with the availability of
effective computers. While neutron
While experiments were being conducted on the Van de Graaff accelerator, the data-
base was developed further and
reached another stage of comple-
tion in 1975 when the KEDAK 3
Karlsruhe Nuclear Data Library
was established. Still on the basis
of a revised version of KEDAK 2,
the KfKINR 01 26-group set was
created in 1972 99, 100.
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flux distributions initially could be determined only in a one-dimensional diffusion ap-
proximation, two- and three-dimensional treatment was introduced later (DIXY, KASY,
030, D3E). In 1973, the NUSYS code was replaced by the flexible, modularKAPROS
system, of which a second version came out in 1977 after virtual storage had been in-
troduced on the central host computer 101.
Safety research followed the questions that had been raised in the expert opinions
written about the SNR 300. A special problem affecting fast breeders was seen in the
possibility of cooling defects giving rise to reactivity perturbations followed by power
excursions. A distinction was made between losses of flow in the entire core and local
losses of flow in individual fuel elements. The analyses served to identify individual links
in this chain of events and to produce physical proof that this chain would not be run
through from start to finish. Important problem areas quickly recognized included so-
dium boiling; reactivity increase by way of the positive void effect; fuel rod failure; fuel
meltdown; the fuel-sodium interaction; nuclear aerosols; reactor disintegration; and the
impact on the containment of the mechanical energy released. In those years, these
were the main topics covered in experimental and theoretical work 102, 103, 104, 105, 106.
There was an obvious shortage of in-pile experiments. Consequently, participation
was sought in the evaluation of ongoing programs abroad, and cooperation agreements
were signed which are still valid. In the French Scarabee experiments, fuel rods were
made to melt by means of throttling the coolant flow; in the HFR experiments in Petten,
the temperature of the fuel rod cladding was kept constant at a level below 1000 °C,
and cladding failure was achieved. In addition, the results of the American TREAT ex-
periments were observed. An agreement was signed with CEN/SCK Mol about the
Mol 7C experiments, in which 37-rod bundles with artificial coolant blockages were to
be irradiated. The experiments served to study fault propagation and the reliability of
instrumentation.
SEFOR had gone critical in May 1969 after 44 months of construction. During commis-
sioning it was seen that the Pu-contents of some fuel elements were below the speci-
fied levels. That error was observed with particular attention by the Nuclear Safeguards
Project founded shortly before. In January 1971, the reactor reached its full power of
20 MWth. The step-by-step program of Doppler measurements, which ran from statisti-
cal power measurements and oscillator experiments to sub- and superprompt critical
excursions, had been prepared by a strong Karlsruhe team and ran smoothly. The
Doppler constant, D=TdkldT, was determined to be between -6.5 and -8x10·3 ; the val-
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ues predicted theoretically were between -6.6 and -7.8x10·3. The SEFOR reactor was
decommissioned in 1972, thus unfortunately preventing the execution of a follow-on
test program.
To make up for the loss of SEFOR, the CABRI joint project was started with the
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Typical power transient in the CABRI program.
States of America as junior partners. The modified CABRI reactor in Cadarache was to
be used for experiments in which especially spent mixed oxide fuel rods were to be
made to fail as a result of loss-of-coolant flow and reactivity perturbations. The test re-
actor went critical in March 1977; in the early phase, normally eight to ten scientists
were delegated to Cadarache by KfK to participate in the joint research program.
The CABRI program was most successful; its findings were repeatedly used in the li-
censing procedure of the SNR 300. Follow-on programs (CABRI-2, perhaps even
CABRI-3) confirmed the success of this international cooperative venture.
Theoretical studies of the Bethe-Tait accidents had been started before 1970 with the
compilation of the REX and FAUN-Z codes. In late 1971, KfK and Interatom, in a joint
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crash effort together with the Argonne National Laboratory (ANL), computed the
hypothetical accidents as a basis for designing the reactor vessel of the SNR 300 in
late 1971. Two chains of accidents were analyzed: pump failure, and reactivity accident
accompanied by the simultaneous failure of the two independent shutdown systems.
Core meltdown processes in the core disruption phase were studied by means of the
SAS 2A and VENUS codes. On the basis of the model by Cho-Wright, mechanical en-
ergy releases of 50 to 200 MWs were calculated, which the SNR 300 vessel was able
to withstand 107, 108, 109.
As a consequence, the studies led to the development of a modular computer code
system at Karlsruhe which more or less corresponded to the power of the most ad-
vanced codes of ANL. From 1973 on, the CAPRI-2 code was available to analyze the
phase preceding reactor disintegration. It used point kinetics and allowed thirty charac-
teristic cooling channels to be processed. Important constituent parts of CAPRI-2 were
the BREDA fuel rod module and the BLOW 3 boiling module. The KADIS code was
used for the disintegration phase; it was based on an older version of VENUS and had
been greatly improved at Karlsruhe. Interatom, which was responsible for analyzing the
mechanicalloads and stresses acting on the structures, used the HEINKO, DRAP, and
ARES codes. The first calculations with these codes were conducted on the original
Mark I SNR 300 core; the important Mark la analyses followed later 104.
5.4.3 Sodium Technology and KNK
The main points of interest in the R&D program on sodium technology were the large
component test rigs and the KNK test reactor 110, 111.
At Hengelo, Netherlands, a 50 MW test rig for intermediate heat exchangers and
steam generators had been built and commissioned in 1972 after some teething trou-
bles. The heat exchangers of the SNR 300 were subjected to brief suitability tests and
3000 h long-term tests on a full scale; important indications of necessary modifications
became manifest partly during operation, partly during subsequent inspection.
Interatom commissioned a number of experimental facilities of special importance for
SNR 300 component tests, most of them true to scale. In the Breeder Pump Test Rig
(APB), important components of the main system were tested, such as valves, flowme-
ters, but also the SNR prototype pump.
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The 50 MW test rig for sodium components of the SNR 300
in Hengelo, Netherlands.
In the Fast Breeder Reactor Section (RSB), the rotating shield system and the most
important handling facilities were tested full-scale under real operating conditions. Also
the transport of sodium aerosols was studied, which had had a very negative impact on
the commissioning phase of the KNK test reactor.
In the Breeder Core Elements Facility (AKB), especially the fissile and fertile elements
and parts of the instrumentation plate, were studied for thermohydraulic and vibration
characteristics. Particular importance was attached to tests of the shutdown rods in
which important parameters, such as temperature, flow, and dislocation, were imitated
under reactor conditions.
In the Breeder Engineered Safeguards Experiments Facility (ASB), finally, the very
important experiments on sodium-water interaction were run on models of the SNR 300
steam generator. Their results constituted the base for the design of the steam genera-
tor and the pressure relief system in the Kalkar Nuclear Power Station.
At the Nuclear Research Center, the Compact Sodium Cooled Reactor (KNK) had
received its permit for full power operation on February 19, 1974 and had been raised
to its rated load two days later. This implied a delay by approximately two years over
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the original timetables due, to a considerable extent, also to the licensing procedure,
which initially had been expected to be less complicated. As the experimental nuclear
power plant was subjected to the same criteria under the Atomic Energy Act as a com-
mercial light water nuclear power plant, the final permit was obtained only via ten partial
permits (five construction and operating permits each) plus more than 650 conditions
imposed 112.
With respect to sodium technology it was important to see that the sodium pumps and
intermediate heat exchangers as large components caused no problems (during KNK I
operation). On the other hand, there were difficulties with sodium aerosols in the vessel
top shields, and also with temperature shocks caused by unscheduled reactor scrams.
In the commissioning phase, a major fire occurred in the secondary purification system,
and one leak was detected in a steam generator unit; both accidents were managed
without having any impact on the environment.
The most expensive event occurred in the trace heating system: A tiny stud screw one
millimeter long, but present 8000 times, had not been protected properly and, ulti-
mately, caused a six months' delay because of repair work.
Despite these problems, or possibly just because of them, the KNK facility with its core
moderated by zirconium hydride furnished importance experience in the field of sodium
technology between 1971 and 1974 113.
5.4.4 Reorganization of the Karlsruhe Project Management
KfK adopted a Project Statute on December 16, 1969, in which the organization of the
PSB Project Management as weil as its rights and duties were defined. The Project
Leader now was joined by a deputy and several Project Officers and Project Engineers
for the different R&D areas. A Project Working Committee and a Project Council were
established as advisory and supervisory bodies, respectively. The responsibility of the
Project Leader for the definition and attainment of goals, and his rights and duties vis-a-
vis the Management of the Center, the Scientific-Technical Council (WTR), the Insti-
tutes, and external partners were laid down in detail in writing in these statutes 114.
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The PSB Project Statute, which was slightly modified once more on October 1, 1973 in
order to meet the basic principles of Section 19 of the KfK Company Statute of 1972,
proved to be most successful. It ensured closer contacts with the staff at the Institutes
and also more transparency in decisionmaking, which had occasionally been missed
before, for instance in the coolant controversy. As far as its objectives were concerned,
it was in line with the general move "to dare more democracy" so popular at that time.
On July 1, 1972, Professor Häfele gave up his function of Project Leader. He was suc-
ceeded by Dr. Peter Engelmann, his former deputy. Engelmann was succeeded by
Dr. Günter Keßler in 1975, who passed this function on to Dr. Willy Marth in 1978, who
held this post until the end of the PSB Project (October 31, 1989).
The four Karlsruhe PSB Project Leaders on a rafting tour on the Isar River
(Ieft to right: W. Häfele, P. Engelmann, G. Keßler, W. Marth).
One of the duties of the Karlsruhe Project Leader and his deputy, respectively, was to
chair the "R&D Programs Working Committee." That body was established by the
Fast Breeder Project Committee in September 1970 in order to coordinate and control
the Breeder Research Program in the DeBeNe area, Members of the Committee were
the four national research centers (KfK; CEN/SCK, Mol; ECN; TNO) and the four indus-
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tries (Interatom, ALKEM, Belgonucleaire, Neratoom) together with the Federal Ministry
for Education and Science (now calied Federal Ministry for Research and Technology);
INB and SBK attended as observers 115.
The Committee was organized initially in four, later in ten committed working parties,
which allowed the extensive R&D programs in the three countries to be kept under con-
tinuous contro!. The result of these efforts was documented annually by a coordinating
staff in a loose-Ieaf folder comprising some 4000 pages, the Budget Plan ("Green
Book") and the DeBeNe Annual Report.
6. START OF CONSTRUCTION AND FIRST
DIFFICULTIES (1973 - 78)
6.1 Planning and Site Construction
In March 1973, the delivery contracts had entered into force when the first partial con-
struction permit had been granted and the governments had agreed on their financial
contributions. The mood at the Bensberg Status Report was euphorie:
"We have now entered into the execution phase of the Project... I hope you un-
derstand my feelings about the promising and exciting task which is to be solved
by the men working for this plant and helping to complete it." 116.
The quotation reflects the optimistic expectations in those days and does not indicate
the disappointment to be feit in later years.
A brief summary will be presented below of the planning activities and work on site; in
addition, progress will be described with the large components and in the field of mixed
oxide fabrication. The description will be based on the quarterly reports published by
SBK, which constitute excellent documents of progress in the project between 1973
and 1991 117.
Construction work on site for the Kalkar Nuclear Power Station took off quite briskly.
Within three months, foundations of the baseplate of the reactor building had been pre-
Preparing the SNR 300 construction site
in Kalkar (1973).
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pared; a sheet metal liner was at-
tached, and on top of this structure
the steel reinforced concrete slab
of 3 - 6 m thickness was to be
cast.
At the Status Report in the follow-
ing year, 1974, the Project was
already two months behind sched-
ule, but intended to recover the
loss by the time the reactor vessel
was to undergo pressure testing.
Two extensive plant modifications
had to be incorporated in the in-
termediate heat exchangers and
the emergency core cooling sys-
tem. An analysis of the interme-
diate heat exchangers had revealed their tube plates to be not strong enough to with-
stand the Bethe-Tait accident, which meant that radioactivity could have been trans-
ferred to the steam generator buildings. As it was impossible to upgrade the systems, it
was decided to install not one intermediate heat exchanger per circuit, but three smaller
modules per loop, which added up to a total of nine such units for the SNR 300 80.
Very extensive replanning became necessary as a result of conditions imposed on the
emergency core cooling system by the expert consultants. The capacity of the system
was raised from an earlier 6 x 20% to 2 x 100%, which implied scaling up the immersion
coolers and all the auxiliary systems. These modifications were incorporated also
against the background of being able to submit a consistent concept of protection
against external impacts.
By 1975, the concrete structure of the reactor building had been completed abaut 40%,
but the delay in the timetable had increased to four months, which could no langer be
recouped. The cost associated with further conditions imposed by the licensing authori-
ties was estimated to run up to DM 250 million. A particularly difficult problem was the
suspension of the vessel top shield system in the reactor cell concrete. In a nuclear ex-
cursion, the vessel support beam probably would be subjected to dynamic loads of ap-
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proximately 10,000 t. These loads had to be transmitted safely into the concrete struc-
ture, and expert opinions had to be sought to confirm the validity ofthe design 118.
Also the design of the core catcher was quite difficult. Demonstrations had to be pro-
duced, inter alia, of the ability to avoid nuclear criticality of the melt and manage the
high temperatures of the uranium-plutonium mix.
Formally adopting for prototype reactors, such as the SNR 300, the Iicensing proce-
dure originally developed for commercial light water reactors turned out to be prob-
lematic. INB-CEO Klaus Traube on this point:
"Due to the formal nature of the Iicensing procedure, questions are raised very
early - and must be answered - about the detailed design of components which
will not be installed in the plant until very much later, and whose planning status
accordingly is still incomplete. This situation is causing us much more difficulties
than, for instance, in the case of water reactors, as we cannot fall back upon any
standardization, any precursor, or use existing answers." 80.
In 1976, 80% of the components and systems had been ordered, but the problem of the
vessel support beam had yet to be solved. Sophisticated calculations, for some of
which the methods had to be elaborated first, seemed to indicate the existence of
resonance vibrations in that component. To detune the resonance frequency, concrete
bulkheads were installed, which greatly aggravated formwork and reinforcement activi-
ties and made planning of the installations difficult in the compartments concerned. On
top of that, there was a sophisticated materials testing program for the reactor vessel.
Large specimen tests indicated that the short-term "Bethe-Tait pressures" could be re-
duced to a level of 11 % by strains. Finally, also demonstrations of the heating of, and
absence of cracking in, the concrete took a lot of time 81.
The delay in the timetable meanwhile had increased to twenty months; the additional
cost was estimated to run up to DM 750 million, approximately DM 450 million of which
was due to price escalation. Manning strength on the construction site as an indicator of
the amount of work had increased rather uniformly from the start of construction work
and reached its maximum of approx. 1150 persons in early 1976. After that date, the
headcount dropped just as continuously to some 300 employees for the ARGE con-
struction consortium and INB and SBK by 1978. This drastic decline reflects the short-
age of activities caused by the non-availability of important partial permits.
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The reactor cell and primary cells of the SNR 300 (1975).
The difficulties in executing the SNR 300 Project persisted even beyond 1976; in fact,
as will be seen below, the technical problems were augmented by many others from
other areas. Approximately at that time, a special effort began to be made by the con-
tracting parties and others involved to explain the SNR 300 problems to a broader pub-
lic and try to find solutions. A first step in this direction was the resumption of meetings
of the Fast Breeder Project Committee.
Also the then Federal Minister for Research, H. Matthöfer, showed his commitment in
many ways. In interviews and discussions he tried to educate the public in matters nu-
clear. His discussions "Pro and Con" were addressed more to the expert public and
featured even prominent breeder opponents, such as A.B. Lovins and F.v. Hippel from
the United States of America 119, 120.
In September 1977, some 35,000 nuclear power plant opponents rallied on the site of
the nuclear power station. However, the proclaimed "Battle of Kalkar" did not take
place, because strong police forces controlled the approaches to the site and confis-
cated tons ofaxes, metal pipes, knives, etc., in this way making sure that the situation
would not get out of hand 121.
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6.2 Large-component Tests and Mixed Oxide Fabrication
From 1974 on, also the large components could be tested as soon as the test facilities
at Bensberg and Hengelo had become available. The intermediate heat exchangers
and the straight-tube and helical-tube versions of the steam generators were tested at
TNO in Hengelo, Netherlands. They passed the long-term tests over 3000 hours at par-
tial and full power relatively weil; merely one straight-tube steam generator had to be
examined (in vain) for a leak over a long period of time.
In the APB test facility at Bensberg, the startup of a sodium pump caused turmoil. The
reason finally was found to be an uneven radial temperature distribution in the upper
part of the pump; the problem was settled administratively by phrasing the operating
instructions in more specific terms. This phenomenon of startup under transient loads
later was observed also in pumps of PFR and FFTF 122,123.
The RSB plant, also at Bensberg, was used to try out the entire sequence of handling
steps in refueling under sodium at 250 oe. The experimental program encompassed
also bowed and misaligned fuel elements. In addition, the functioning of the rotating top
shield system, the fuel element transfer system, and of tracing devices and grabs was
demonstrated.
From 1977 on, the AKB plant was used for Iifetime tests of the prototypes of the primary
and secondary shutdown systems.
In the field of fuel elements, most of the effort in 1976 was concentrated on producing
mixed oxide powder. One important specification requirement was the low fuel density
thought to be necessary for attaining high burnups. The fuel rod suppliers, ALKEM and
Belgonucleaire (BN), used different ways of powder preparation: ALKEM tried to
achieve low density by adding pore formers; at BN, correspondingly large amounts of
inactive powder from scrap recycling were added. It was quite problematic to achieve
the required fluidity of the mix for, except for the U02 starting substance, neither AUe
nor PU02 were particularly fluid 124, 125.
When MOX fuel rods irradiated in the Obrigheim Nuclear Power Station were reproc-
essed, the bad solubility in pure nitric acid of the mixed oxide crystals was discovered
in 1977. No special importance had been attributed to that aspect before, as in-pile ir-
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radiation was assumed to produce subsequent crystals of completely mixed compo-
nents and, hence, full solubility of the mixed oxide fue!. As a consequence, therefore,
the former standard fabrication technique was abandoned in favor of the so-calied
AUPuC process, the feedstock of which is not oxides, but Pu- and U-nitride solutions,
which are adjusted to the desired fissile materials content by mixing the two compo-
nents. Out of this solution, ammonium uranyl plutonyl carbonate is precipitated as a
relatively coarse grained solid solution and converted into fluid U/Pu mixed oxide pow-
der by calcination.
6.3 The Breeder before the Federal Constitutional Court
The first partial construction permit, TEG 7/1, of the Kalkar Nuclear Power Station had
been the subject of litigation before the administrative courts since February 1972; its
opponents sought to have it revoked. The plaintiff was a farmer, Mr. Joseph Maas,
from the community siting the SNR 300, Kalkar-Hönnepel. The Düsseldorf Administra-
tive Court had rejected his action in a first decision on October 23, 1973 on the grounds
that the permit under the Atomic Energy Act violated no rights of the plaintiff.
In reacting to an appeal lodged by the plaintiff, the Münster Higher Administrative
Court had suspended proceedings on August 18, 1977 on these grounds 126:
"A ruling by the Federal Constitutional Court shall be sought to find out whether
Section 7 of the German Atomic Energy Act, to the extent in which its present
version enables permits to be issued for nuclear power plants, including the fast
breeder line, is compatible with the Basic Law."
In its ruling of August 8, 1978, the Second Chamber of the Federal Constitutional
Court unanimously stated that the breeder reactor was legally covered by the valid
Atomic Energy Act. It declared the issuance of permits for breeder reactors under
Sec. 7 of the Atomic Energy Act to be compatible with the Basic Law and, in addition, in
its guiding principles publicized on December 8, 1978, contradicted the opinion held by
the Münster Higher Administrative Court that only Parliament, not the executive, had a
right to take guiding decisions about the way in which the Atomic Energy Act was to be
construed. Consequently, the German Federal Parliament on December 14, 1978 took
the important political decision to continue to build the SNR 300 and carry on the nec-
essary R&D work 127.
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6.4 Stop Signs from the USA
Approximately around 1976 nuclear technology, and also the breeder line, increasingly
moved into the focus of politicians. This happened first in the USA, where the two
presidential candidates, Ford and Carter, in the presidential election campaign of 1976
argued partly opposite views about the benefits and risks of nuclear technology.
The new U.S. President Carter elected in 1976 took up office on January 20, 1977;
already in April he announced a new nuclear program constituting a complete reorien-
tation of the previous nuclear policy. The main points of his declaration were these:
(1 )
(2)
National commercial reprocessing activities will be deferred indefinitely.
The U.S. breeder program will be modified so as to avoid early commerciali-
zation of the breeder reactor.
(3)
(4)
The Clinch River Project, which included the construction of an American
prototype breeder power plant, will be discontinued.
The breeder research programs will be reorientated towards the develop-
ment of alternative fuel cycles not based on plutonium.
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The scientific base used
by the Carter administra-
tion for its planned rea-
lignment of nuclear pol-
icy was the so-calied
Ford-MITRE Study com-
piled 1976 by 21 authors
on behalf of the Ford
Foundation and the
MITRE Corporation.
Among the authors were
Harold Brown, later U.S.
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Secretary of Defense, and Joseph S. Nye, later Undersecretary of State with the U.S.
State Department and responsible for U.S. non-proliferation policy. The report is about
400 pages long and, in a c1ear and impressive style, covers the economic, safeguards,
and political aspects of the most important sources of energy. In the nuclear sector, four
problem areas were identified on which early decisic)ns by politicians were deemed to
be necessary: reprocessing and recycling of plutonium; breeder reactors; uranium en-
richment; arid nuclear export policy 129.
President Carter's invitation to the INFCE Conferences was accepted by 46 states and
five organizations. The studies began in 1977 and were concluded in 1980 with a com-
prehensive report. The breeder was treated by Working Group 5 chaired by Belgium,
Italy, and the USSR. The initial reservations of the Americans vis-a-vis the fast breeder
finally gave way to an improved understanding of the needs of the Europeans and
Japanese. On the other hand, it became evident that the political problems associated
with the breeder, such as proliferation, had not been given proper attention earlier on. A
few items will be singled out below from among the large number of statements
contained in the final report by Working Group 5 130, 131:
(1) The sodium cooled breeder based on the uranium-plutonium cycle was re-
ferred to as the state of the art. Breeders with thorium in the core and in the
blanket, respectively, were viewed skeptically, also because of the problems
of the thorium cycle, the need for remote refabrication, and the partly doubt-
ful breeding properties. Molten salt breeders were not taken into account be-
cause of their corrosion problems.
(2) Strategic calculations showed that the uranium requirement can be de-
creased considerably by 2025 even in a mixed LWR-LMFBR system. Even if
the expected requirement is high, the energy requirement can be satisfied for
more than 1000 years when breeders are used.
(3) The environmental impact caused by breeder reactors in normal operation
and under accident conditions does not differ significantly from that of light
water reactors. Besides, breeders offer advantages because of the reduced
rate of uranium mining and the lower waste heat production they entail.
(4) The risks of clandestine diversions of fissile material at various stages in the
breeder fuel cycle were considered to be not greater than those in the LWR
with Pu-recycling (and even without). Alternative cycles involving the use of
thorium and depleted uranium, a mix of U-233/U-238, were considered
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technically unsatisfactory solutions to the proliferation risk. On the other
hand, the proliferation risk was expected to be diminished as a consequence
of co-conversion, co-Iocation, and multinational management of the pluto-
nium stockpiles.
(5) The capital costs of the breeder reactor were considered to be higher
throughout than those of the LWR. This would be offset by advantages in the
nuclear fuel cycle as a result of expected increases in the price of uranium. A
number of countries expected the breeder to break even in 1990. The Ameri-
cans were more skeptical, anticipating a breakthrough of the breeder line not
before the year 2000.
6.4.1 Individual Critics: Riemer, Traube, Keck
Even in the early phase of the Breeder Project, there were a number of critics in the
Federal Republic of Germany who reached a broad public through the media and in
politics. The Frankfurt journalist, Kurt Rudzinski, has already been referred to above.
The first really significant critic probably was the SPD Member of Parliament, Professor
Karl Bechert, Full Professor of Theoretical Physics at the University of Mainz and,
between 1962 and 1965, Chairman of the Parliamentary Committee for Atomic Energy.
He untiringly drew attention to, what he feit, were underestimated problems of radiation
protection, stating that the construction of nuclear reactors had been begun much too
early 132. From among the number of individual critics who came in later, Riemer,
Traube, and Keck will be mentioned in this report as representatives of the areas of
politics, technology, and science.
Dr. Horst-Ludwig Riemer was a Member of the State Parliament and, as State Minis-
ter of Economics in North Rhine-Westphalia, responsible for licensing the SNR 300
when, in September 1978, he expressed an idea about a modification of the SNR 300
which caused a lot of excitement. Riemer proposed to modify the core of the SNR 300
in such a way that the reactor could henceforth be used as a "plutonium annihilator,"
For this purpose, the uranium in the blanket, and later also in the core, should be re-
placed by thorium. Riemer's proposals must be seen against the background of the
INFCE assessment at that time, and also against the influence of American groups 133.
Had this idea been put into practice, it would have meant starting both the U-Pu - and
the thorium-uranium-233 cycles - a huge, nearly futile enterprise. The safety character-
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istics and the fuel element behavior of the reactor would have been unknown, quite
aside from the fact that the proliferation hazards of U-233 are hardly inferior to those
associated with U-235 and Pu. And then, this modified SNR 300 would have been able
to "annihilate" not more than 5% of the plutonium arising from light water reactors in the
Federal Republic. Riemer's "reactor design" has never been put into effect, but never-
theless intrigued the German public for quite some time and c1early hindered progress
in the SNR 300 licensing procedure.
Dr. Klaus Traube, a graduate mechanical engineer and thermodynamicist, had a large
audience especially because, after having held leading posts with the AEG Boiling
Water Reactor Division in Frankfurt, he was Managing
Director and Project Officer responsible for the
SNR 300 with Interatom and INB in Bensberg 1972-
76. In 1976 he resigned his post, supposedly because
of a wire tapping affair by the Secret Service. Over one
year later, his book "Müssen wir umschalten?" (00 We
Have to Change our Mind?) appeared in which he
bitterly criticized nuclear technology 134.
K T b Traube's book turned out to be a perfect surprise es-. rau e.
pecially to his former colleagues, for they had known
and experienced him as a committed proponent of breeder technology for many years.
For this reason, many thought it incredible that he should have changed his mind about
this technology, do an about-face within only one year, and then articulated his new
opinion so eloquentlyon more than 300 pages of a book. He probably must have
harbored his doubts for quite some time, but he never seems to have talked about
them.
A basic tenor in his book is "small is beautiful," an opinion expressed by just about ev-
erybody in the seventies. Traube untiringly praises the simplicity and usefulness of a
"collector on the roof," the advantages of thermal insulation as a means of energy con-
servation. He finds a few positive words even about the "medium-sized technology" of
the Chinese. On the other hand, he relentlessly condemns big science and technology,
nuclear power in particular. His sentence,
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"1 think that big technical developments, by and large, cannot be controlled ra-
tionally; big technology mostly develops in an anarchic, unforeseeable, irrational
way," 133
also contains the gist of his personal experiences. He certainly must have had a hard
time, for instance at the 1976 Status Reportin Utrecht, Netherlands, when he had to tell
a top-level international expert audience that the SNR 300 Breeder Project under his
responsibility had failed technically, in its deadlines, and financially.
In citing reasons for his aversion to big technology, Traube in his book points especially
to the high temperature reactor. In later publications, he ceases to protect his former
project and also aims his criticism against the SNR 300. Finally, Traube also emphati-
cally attacked microelectronics, an attitude which seems highly antiquated at a time
when every point of sale is computerized 135.
Dr. Otto Keck, who had studied theology (in addition to philosophy and economics),
was probably the first scientist to choose the SNR 300 fast breeder reactor as a subject
for a Ph. D. thesis. On the basis of memoranda and records of the German Advisory
Committee on Atomic Energy, the Breeder Project Committee, and the files of the Ger-
man Federal Ministry for Research he investigated the decisionmaking processes in the
German SNR 300 Breeder Project in a doctoral thesis submitted at the English Uni-
versity of Sussex 136.
In his book, Keck analyzed the Breeder Project from its beginnings approximately up to
the late seventies. For this purpose, he also conducted many interviews with partici-
pants in the Project from government, research, and industry. Quite a number of per-
sons he talked to were irritated by the fact that he seemed to know the outcome of his
research even before he had conducted the interviews.
The results of his studies seem to indicate that government subsidies of industrial de-
velopment activities elose to the market normally are inefficient. He criticizes insufficient
controlling in the early phase of the Fast Breeder Project, in particular the absence of
any parliamentary contro!. In his view, the economic analyses conducted by the Nuelear
Research Center were not sufficiently based on reality and were not criticized by the
industrial partners either, probably in order not to endanger their government funding.
Moreover, the government set the level of financial participation by manufacturers and
power utilities in the SNR 300 too low. He also criticizes that the uranium reserves were
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estimated to be much too low and, hence, the fast breeder was prematurely elevated
from a research project to a big-science project, with all the negative consequences,
such as extra cost, etc.
In his book, Keck finds that an introduction of the breeder line on a large scale will
hardly be meaningful and necessary before the middle of the next century. Should in-
dustry nevertheless engage itself in this development, the government should only
make a limited contribution to the research program, if any. O. Keck may be regarded
as an early representative of Technology Assessment. His competence, and the
amount of effort he invested in penetrating the jungle of technology, economics, and
politics in the breeder field, is admirable.
6.5 German-French Cooperation
On May 11, 1977, the agreement about founding the "Fast Breeder Development
Association" was signed at Karlsruhe by KfK, Interatom, and ALKEM. It constituted
one of the administrative preconditions of German-French cooperation as agreed upon
later. In particular, it was meant to express the broad and harmonized base in the Fed-
eral Republic in its relations with its future contracting partner, France.
In addition to its external effect, the Fast Breeder Development Association was very
important also for the relations among the partners in Germany. This was apparent al-
ready from its objectives: regular harmonization and joint execution of all R&D efforts in
the fast breeder sector, including exchanges of the findings made in this way. The an-
nual research programs were to be adapted to the technical and timing needs of the
fast breeder construction schedules and also become integral parts of German-French
cooperation.
Already in the early seventies, conditions seemed to be ready for European cooperation
above and beyond the level of the three countries, Germany, Belgium, the Netherlands.
On the vendors' side, a contract had been formulated ready for execution in 1972 be-
tween Interatom and the British TNPG about the establishment of a joint company for
the production and marketing of fast breeders. However, these intentions came to
nothing, as the structure of the nuclear power industry in Britain was rearranged at that
time 82.
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At the level of the utilities, RWE, the French EdF, and the Italian ENEL agreed in May
1971 to cooperate in the construction and operation of two large breeder reactors. More
details were defined within the so-called Nice Agreement in December 1973. The
NERSA consortium was to launch the 1200 MWe Superphemix (which it did), while the
ESK consortium was to launch the 1500 MWe SNR 2 (which it failed to do) 78,79.
In February 1976, finally, also German-French cooperation was completed at the level
of vendors and national research centers. The basis was constituted by a joint declara-
tion by the German Federal Minister for Research, Matthöfer, and his French colleague,
d'Ornano, in which the Ministers advocated elose cooperation between the two coun-
tries in fast breeder development. Along these Iines, research centers and the industrial
partners in May 1976 agreed on the general principles of cooperation within the frame-
work of guidelines and memoranda.
On July 5, 1977, a number of contracts on German-French cooperation were signed
in Paris in which comprehensive cooperation was foreseen in the development and in-
dustrialization of sodium cooled fast breeders. On the German side, Dr. Hans-Henning
Hennies, KfK, was instrumental in getting the contracts accepted; later, he was Chair-
man of the Steering Committees for a long time and - together with G. Vendryes fram
CEA and others - did a lot to foster cooperation ina spirit of confidence among the
partners 137.
Signing the German-French Cooperation Agreement
(Iett to right: H. Wagner, H.-H. Hennies, both KfK;
J.-P. Sieveking, H. Mausbeck, both Interatom).
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The German-French R&D Contract was signed by KfKllnteratom and the French CEA;
associated partners under a consortial agreement were Neratoom, TNO, ECN (Nether-
lands); CEN/SCK, Mol and BN (Belgium), and CNEN (Italy). The subject of the contract
was the complete exchange of know-how generated in R&D work in the fast breeder
area; in addition, future R&D programs, and the use of facilities, were to be harmonized
and coordinated. A Steering Committee was set up to supervise cooperation, into which
the French and the German sides delegated two representatives each.
In October 1978, SERENA was founded, a company whose purpose since has been to
collect and utilize commercially the know-how existing in the participating countries,
especially by granting licenses. The DeBeNe partner of SERENA is the Kenntnisver-
wertungsgesellschaft Schnelle Brutreaktoren mbH (KVG), in which the Nuclear Re-
search Center holds a 19% interest; other shareholders are Interatom with 51 %, and
BeigonuclE3aire and Neratoom with 15% each. Planning and building breeder power
plants was the subject of a contract on cooperation among the industrial groups, INB
and Novatome. Exempt from this exchange is know-how in reprocessing and manufac-
turing components and fuel elements. The agreements run for twenty years.
In the field of plant construction, the exchanges of experience between INB and Nov-
atome had been greatly intensified before. Delegations of staff members and ex-
changes of documents achieved detailed mutual exchanges of the experience accumu-
lated with KNK and SNR 300, and Rapsodie, Phemix and Superphemix, respectively.
Cooperation among the industrial groups was concentrated on a detailed comparison of
the conceptual design features of the two primary systems, the so-calied Pool-Loop
Study. It is weil known that France pursued the pool concept, while Germany favored
the loop concept. Although comparative studies of the two concepts had been con-
ducted before, a genuine comparison became possible only after the barriers to ex-
changes of know-how had been removed by associations.
In 1984, also the British were incorporated into German-French cooperation on the
R&D side. In 1988/89, this cooperation converged into the project of the European Fast
Reactor (EFR), in which the three countries held equal shares.
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7. COMMITTEES, COMMISSIONS, EXPERT OPINIONS
(1978 .. 82)
7.1 The Project at the Crossroads
Around 1979, the Project had almost reached a dead end. Some 300 people were still
engaged in work on site in Kalkar, approximately half of them assembly workers - a
dramatic decline from the more than 1000 people who had worked on the spot as late
as in early 1976. Most of the work on the building shell had been completed, while ac-
tivities dealing with the reactor cell had suffered a considerable delay. For the biological
shield, time-consuming demonstrations of the integrity of the overall system in an as-
sumed energy release of 370 MWs in case of the Bethe-Tait accident had to be con-
ducted before construction work was c1eared 138, 139,
Component fabrication in the shops of the subcontractors had moved ahead consid-
erably. The large components, such as the reactor vessel, the grid plate, the gas bub-
ble separator, the fixed plug ring, the reactor cover, and the core catcher, were either
finished or about to be finished. The reactor vessel arrived in Kalkar in mid-1976 but, in
the absence of an installation permit, had to be kept in intermediate storage in a sepa-
rate storage building together with the bottom collecting tank. Problems were associ-
ated with the missing partial permits for the auxiliary systems and the main and emer-
gency core cooling systems. They were expected to be issued "very soon," but in actual
fact it took another one or two years for them to materialize. Comparison with the situa-
tion at the date of the last Status Report (Utrecht, 1976) showed that "delivery" as one
of the key points had not been approached any more c1osely. Partial permit 7/5 for the
nuclear main system was the key item on the critical path. Analyses of the timetables
conducted by the manufacturers indicated that delivery of the power plant could be ex-
pected, at the earliest, three years after the permit would have been granted. As seen
from 1979, this could not be before the autumn of 1984.
The Iicensing procedure entailed a tremendous administrative expense bordering on
red tape. Merely for prechecking the 72 bottom troughs, some 2300 drawings, 5500
bills of materials, and 10,000 pages of stress analyses had to be completed. The big-
gest flood of paper had to be coped with for documentation purposes. Experts esti-
mated that one complete set of documents covering the entire plant would require
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some 10,000 files. Putting these files side by side would result in 800 meters of docu-
ments containing 50 to 100 million official seals and 3 million signatures.
The delays in project execution, and the completion of licensing criteria, in the mean-
time had raised the costs of the Kalkar Nuclear Power Station to DM 3.2 billion. A large
fraction, namely DM 1.1 billion, was due to price escalation, Le., the general price
increases coupled with the delays in project completion.
It is easy to understand the responsible Executive Officer and Managing Director,
A. Brandstetter, who had succeeded K. Traube in the executive project management
function in 1979. With an audible sigh, he haduttered at the end of his 1979 Status Re-
port in Karlsruhe:
"It has become very difficult in this country to build a prototype plant."
7.2 The ad hoc Group of the Project Committee
The lack of progress in the Kalkar Nuclear Power Station had alarmed the Project
Committee, the group of high-level representatives of government, the industrial part-
ners, and the R&D centers. At its meeting on September 23, 1979, it commissioned an
ad hoc Group to list the problems encountered in the SNR 300, evaluate them, and
draft proposals for solutions. The Group was composed of representatives of Interatom,
Neratoom, SBK, and KfK, and was chaired by Dr. W. Marth, KfK. Merely six months
later, in February 1980, the report by the Group was submitted to the Project Commit-
tee 140, 141.
The Group had identified roughly half a dozen problems which it considered to be re-
sponsible for the unsatisfactory state of affairs with the SNR 300. At the top of the list
was the Bethe-Tait complex, which had assumed proportions moving this, initially hy-
pothetical, accident in the c10se vicinity of a c1assical design basis accident. More and
more extensive individual evidence not based on any physically credible accident sce-
nario made the licensing criteria rise far beyond the internationally customary level. The
Group therefore suggested that the existing evidence of integrity be accepted and
sensitivity analyses be tolerated even if they occasionally exceeded the set limits by a
slight margin.
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In the field of strength analyses, the problem was found to be in the lack of precise
definitions in the design basis, the American ASME code. The Iicensing authority kept
demanding more and more conservative steps, for instance in upgrading and limiting
load cycles. Far reaching effects were produced by the pessimistic assumptions the
expert consultants made about leaktightness, which were almost impossible to harmo-
nize with the existing containment concept. Even when excluding inelastic analyses, the
computation expense for the pipes was gigantic, reaching almost 3000 man-months.









Ferritic steel structure The assumption of a prompt
pipe break was made in anal-
ogy with LWR practice, al-
though sodium reactors, be-
cause of their low systems
pressure, thinwalled pipes, rela-
tively low loads, and the tough
austenitic material, exhibit quite
different conditions than those
prevailing in highly pressurized
light water reactors. Ensuring
emergency core cooling under
conditions of an extreme loss of
flow associated with a double-
ended (2F) break of a main
coolant pipe, and deflecting the
jet forces, required protective
devices which took up much
space, and also armor-plate-Iike
boUom troughs. The Group therefore recommended to accept the internationally rec-
ognized leak-before-break criterion. Obviously, there would be detectable amounts of
leakage long before critical crack sizes could develop.
Also the external impacts, Le. the design basis earthquake and airplane crashes, es-
calated the amount of computation expense associated with the evidence of such pro-
tective provisions. Almost worse were the huge number of dampers, hangers and sup-
ports to be installed, all of which was bound to reduce accessibility to the plant area.
The Group therefore proposed that manufacturers be allowed to use a computationally
90
less sophisticated rigid body model, and evidence be limited to the crash of an airplane
on the building structures.
The absence of rules specific to the SNR was a constant source of uncertainty; con-
sequently, the expert consultants analogously applied the existing body of rules about
light water reactors, i.e. KTA Rules, BMI Directives, RSK Guidelines, etc. Frequently,
the positive generic properties of sodium cooled reactors were not even taken into ac-
count. Also the expert opinions written about plant components were tightened up all
the time: Instead of the original 39 electronic systems, 117 such systems were included
in the licensing procedure under the Atomic Energy Act in 1980. Also preliminary testing
up to c1earance for assembly had become very cumbersome, causing lengthy, costly
holding times on site 142.
The ad hoc Group therefore proposed that the expert consultants and the licensing
authorities establish an Oversight Group. A small group of people experienced in the
Project should be empowered to determine the scope of expert consultancy and handle
conflicting targets in the interest of a balanced engineered safeguards approach. The
decisions by that group should be binding upon all the expert consultants involved in
the licensing procedure. The Group explained the reasons for this approach as folIows:
"If the present expert consulting and licensing practice continued, the nuclear
power plant, which was to have been started up in 1979 according to original
plans, certainly will not be delivered in 1985, the date now foreseen. We even be-
lieve that completion of the SNR 300 may not be expected before 1990 - perhaps
even considerably later."
The study by the ad hoc Group was later requested for discussion by the Committee of
Inquiry of the German Federal Parliament. In the covering letter to the Chairman of that
Committee, H.B. Schäfer, Federal Minister for Research von Bülow added:
"A large part of the proposals listed in the working document were feit to be un-
feasible, the fears expressed were considered in part to be exaggerated or capa-
ble of being resolved. The extrapolation of the completion date to 1990 or even
later was considered untenable." 143.
This is where Mr. von Bülow was mistaken.
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7.3 Appointing Committee of Inquiry 1
After the December 8, 1978 Kalkar ruling by the German Federal Constitutional Court,
the way seemed to have been paved for the overdue 3rd Partial Construction Permit
which, among other items, covered the control room and the inerting systems. How-
ever, the fast breeder at Kalkar in the meantime had also reached the German Federal
Parliament. A dramatic energy debate revealed that six FDP Members of Parliament
(among them MPs Haussmann and Matthäus) of the Social Democrat-Liberal govern-
ment coalition intended to vote against the continued construction of Kalkar. Only after
the then FDP Ministers Genscher, Lambsdorff, and Baum indicated that they would re-
sign in that case, the six Members of Parliament and breeder opponents were willing to
abstain and, in this way, allow the Energy Report to be adopted 144.
On December 14 of that year, the German Federal Parliament thus agreed on the
updated Energy Program and, hence, on continuing construction of the SNR 300.
There was one important string attached to that decision: Prior to commissioning that
nuclear power plant, another decision by the Federal Parliament was to be sought in a
political debate.
In preparation of that decision, a Parliamentary Committee of Inquiry on Future Nuclear
Energy Policy was set up, which consisted of seven Members of Parliament and eight
experts. The Chairman was the SPD Member of Parliament, R. Ueberhorst. Under its
mandate, the Committee was to work out the lines along which future decisions could
be taken about energy problems in the light of ecological, economic, and other aspects.
Moreover, it was to establish criteria for the acceptance of nuclear power, and study
possibilities of alternative nuclear fuel cycles. Finally, it was expected to prepare the
decision by the German Federal Parliament about possible commissioning of the
SNR 300.
Seven of the total of 24 meetings of the working groups were devoted to breeder
reactor technology. Individual deliberations mostly revolved around reactivity coeffi-
cients, the plutonium economy, the Bethe-Tait accident, and risks. The well-known fact
that breeder reactors the size of the SNR 300 have a positive sodium void coefficient
was discussed widely with respect to its consequences. It was not recommended to lay
down in a rule the magnitude of this coefficient, let alone its sign, as such intervention
easily could have led to a "suboptimization" of the overall system. The Committee also
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concluded that construction and operation of the Kalkar Nuclear Power Station would
not yet raise any problems of a plutonium economy 145, 146.
After lengthy deliberations, the Committee accepted the development of breeder reac-
tor technology "for research policy purposes." This included construction of the
SNR 300. In addition, the requirement was imposed that the safety level of the Kalkar
Nuclear Power Station must not be below that of a modern pressurized water reactor.
Two studies were commissioned for further evaluation of these problems 147 :
1. The so-calied Upper Bound Study was to contain a literature survey of the
scientific work about Bethe-Tait accidents with a high mechanical energy re-
lease potential. In addition, those studies were to be evaluated which main-
tained a mechanical energy release above the limit of 370 MWs in the
SNR 300. The literature survey was to include comments by scientists with
different attitudes towards nuclear power.
2. Moreover, a so-calied Risk-oriented Analysis was to be drafted along the
lines of the "German Nuclear Power Plant Risk Study" carried out for the Bib-
lis B pressurized water reactor. The term, "risk-oriented," was meant to indi-
cate that the comparison between the two reactor systems could also be
qualitative in part. Also the Risk-oriented Study was to be conducted by sci-
entists with different attitudes towards the fast breeder.
In March 1981, KfK was commissioned to conduct the Upper Bound Study; the Risk
Study was to be completed by the Gesellschaft für Reaktorsicherheit (GRS) as com-
missioned in August 1981. On June 27, 1980, the Committee of Inquiry produced an
interim report, as the parliamentary term came to an end; at the same time, it suggested
that the points still open, especially those on commissioning the SNR 300, should be
clarified in an immediate continuation of the Committee's work in the 9th German Fed-
eral Parliament.
7.3.1 The Findings in the "Upper Sound Study"
For the Upper Bound Study, KfK, with the assistance of the FIZ 4 Specialized Informa-
tion Center, listed and evaluated all accessible publications as weil as other known, but
unpublished, reports about energy releases in sodium cooled fast breeders. In particu-
lar, the question was pursued whether these documents provided any indication that
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barely credible accident scenarios, with the SNR 300 conditions taken into account,
could give rise to mechanical energy releases beyond 370 MWs 148.
The conversion of thermal energy into mechanical energy acting on the primary sys-
tem is a very complex process of fluid dynamics and thermodynamics because of the
presence of materials other than fuel (sodium, steel, fission products). Thus, effects of
self-mixing, heat transfer, friction, and condensation, among others, greatly reduce the
energy calculated from isentropic fuel expansion. If these phenomena are taken into
account in the SNR 300, even a pessimistic (Le. conservative) estimate arrives at a re-
lease of mechanical energy below 100 MWs.
In aseparate chapter, the Upper Bound Study dealt with the unpublished hypotheses of
the American, R.E. Webb, quoted at length in a presentation to the Committee by a
"Critical Working Group" (University of Bremen). The KfK study maintained that Webb's
assumptions contained drastic errors in calculation and unrealistic accident conditions.
Moreover, his scenarios violated physical conditions.
The staff of the Nuclear Research Center involved in the study were unable to find any
new accident aspects not already used as a design basis for the SNR 300. International
expense just to deal with the Bethe-Tait problem was estimated to run up to approxi-
mately 10,000 man-years.
The KfK study arrives at this finding:
"With a probability bordering on certainty, Le. to all practical intents and purposes,
it can be excluded for the SNR 300 that major accidents occur whose release of
mechanical energy would go beyond the design level of 370 Mws."
7.3.2 The Findings in the "Risk Study"
The Risk Study, as the Risk-oriented Study was abbreviated, was written under the re-
sponsibility of GRS, and with the participation also of KfK and of SAI (Palo Alto, USA).
A subcontract was awarded to Professor J. Benecke, Munich, to perform parallel stud-
ies of selected risk-related problems. For this purpose, Benecke and a few free-Iance
scientists from Bremen and Heidelberg set up the "Forschungsgruppe Schneller
Brüter eV." (FGSB), which intended to deal "critically" with the SNR 300 accident
problems.
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The most important findings of the Risk Study were the absolute upper limits to dam-
age, as far as early and late deaths were concerned, in connection with the severest
radionuclide releases caused by an uncontrolled loss-of-flow accident. For gaseous
fission products, such as noble gases, no retention mechanisms had been assumed;
for volatile radionuclides, however, sedimentation, diffusion, and thermophoresis were
taken into account as removal processes 149, 150.
The calculations of accident consequences were based on Kalkar as the plant site.
They arrive at the conclusion that early damage by acute radiation injuries will not occur
even in the severest accidents, as the threshold dose required for this to happen will
not be reached. (For pressurized water reactors, in 1979, the "German Risk Study" still
expected a maximum number of 14,500 persons to be killed immediately). The maxi-
mum of somatic late damage was almost one order of magnitude lower in the breeder
than the consequences to be expected from pressurized water reactors 151.
SNR
The accident consequences determined by
the FGSB for the SNR 300 showed a
smaller number of early deaths, compared
with the findings about the pressurized wa-
ter reactor, but a larger number of cases of
somatic late damage. In addition, that
study was based on a considerably larger
area of radioactively contaminated soil.
The FGSB did not include any information
about the probabilities of occurrence and,
consequently, was unable to provide any
quantitative statements about the risk
which, after all, is the product of accident




















10 10 2 10 3 10' 10'
Number of laIe effecls -+
Frequency distribution of somatic
late effects caused by fast breeders and
pressurized water reactors.
95
7.4 The Findings of Committee of Inquiry 2
The IIFuture Nuclear Power Policyll Committee of Inquiry of the next, the 9th, German
Federal Parliament was reconstituted in May 1981, now under the new Chairman,
Harald B. Schäfer, SPD. Because of the earlier deadline demanded by Parliament for a
recommendation about potential commissioning of the SNR 300, the Committee mem-
bers began to concentrate on their first activity, the fast breeder, from the spring
of 1982 on 152, 153.
The Upper Sound Study was submitted in time by KfK on January 22, 1982 and de-
Iiberated by the Committee one week later. Afterwards, experts from various camps,
Germans and foreigners, were invited, among them the Munich physicist, Professor
Maier-Leibnitz, and the nuclear power critic, Dr. Cochran of the Natural Resources De-
fense Council. Especially the statements made by the American physicist and Nobel
prize winner, Professor Hans Sethe, were of interest; his research conducted together
with the physicist, J.A. Tait, constitutes the theoretical basis of the nuclear power ex-
cursion in breeder reactors, an effect now bearing his name. In his letter of March 1982
to the Committee of Inquiry, Bethe writes:
IIThe early paper by Bethe and Tait of 1956 was far too conservative. We did then
not understand many of the physical factors which mitigate a possible core disrup-
tive accident... Everything the Karlsruhe group says seems to me weil founded
and I have great confidence in their conciusions. 1I 154
The Risk Study was submitted by Professor Birkhofer, GRS, on the official date of
April 30, 1982. However, the contribution by the FGSB was missing and did not mate-
rialize until September 1982 in various interim reports. Because of the tight schedule, it
was not possible to write a common final report.
In the GRS study, particular engineered safeguard advantages of the SNR 300, for in-
stance, result from the fact that the insertion of a single shutdown rod already interrupts
the nuclear chain reaction; in addition, decay heat removal has fivefold redundancy. In
addition, even for the molten core cooling remains feasible by technical provisions. The
nuclides released are retained largely in the reactor vessel and, should the vessel fail,
in the double containment. The probability of the design basis level of 370 MWs being
exceeded was made the topic of an assessment invited from fifteen leading interna-
tional personalities and institutions, and used as a basis for the calculations by GRS 155.
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In contrast to these findings, the FGSB postulated an immediate containment failure,
for instance as a result of the cell cover acting as a missile, as weil as a 50% release of
all sparingly volatile nuclides. The relative biological effectiveness of a-radiation was
assumed to be a factor of 5 higher than the internationally valid ICRP levels, and the
body intake of plutonium was increased by a factor of 10. If these extremely pessimistic,
in part even arbitrary, assumptions by the FGSB are corrected, the results of the FGSB
study revised in this way are seen to differ only slightly from those of the GRS study. A
member of the Committee then found:
"In the light of all this, it must be said that the experiment of a parallel investigation
of the fast breeder by scientists of different opinions has failed." 156, 157
The study by the FGSB was not regarded as asound scientific document by the major-
ity of Committee members.
After twenty Committee and Subcommittee meetings merely on the subject of the
SNR 300, the following recommendation was put to a vote on September 23, 1982:
1. The long-term use of nuclear power requires a major conservation of natural
uranium resources. For this reason, the breeder reactor technology must be
made available. It is in the light of this aspect that commissioning the
SNR 300 is important.
2. The Iicensing procedure under the Atomic Energy Act for the SNR 300 is
carried out correctly and with great care, as the Committee has had occasion
to ascertain.
3. In the required comparison of the safety of the SNR 300 and that of a
1300 MWe light water reactor of the Biblis B type, the Committee based its
opinion on scientifically established, quantitative findings, dealt with the
problem of absolute upper bounds to damage, and also looked at conse-
quences of external impacts. In doing so, the Committee has come to the
conclusion that "the risk arising from the operation of the SNR 300 is in the
same bandwidth as the risk associated with the light water reactors now in
operation. The Committee therefore considers commissioning the SNR 300 a
step reflecting political responsibility."
4. The Committee recommends to commission the SNR 300 in several steps,
to make a particular effort in training the personnei, and to develop carefully
and carry out the programs for checking systems and components.
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5. Consequently, the parliamentary reservation should be Iifted.
The pro-side scored a tremendous success: eleven out of sixteen, that is, more than
two thirds of the members of the Committee of Inquiry, voted in favor of this recommen-
dation, Le., in favor of lifting the parliamentary reservation; only five out of sixteen
members voted against 158.
The report by the Committee of Inquiry, and its recommendation, were immediately
passed on to Parliament, which deliberated the documents as early as in late Septem-
ber. After parliamentary committees had dealt with the problem, the final deliberation
and decision was scheduled for the 134th sitting of the German Federal Parliament on
December 3, 1982. The vote turned out a c1ear majority in favor of lifting the parlia-
mentary reservation, which had existed since 1978, also because SPD Members of
Parliament in favor of the breeder from the beginning did not attend the voting cere-
mony, Le., did not vote against lifting the reservation. The majority of the SPD group
voted against the breeder, probably as a reflex to the change in the domestic situation,
the so-calied "Wende," after September 17 and October 1, 1982.
7.5 The Opinion by Kearney/Motor Columbus
In summer 1981, the German Federal Ministry for Research and Technology (BMFT)
commissioned the US-Swiss industrial group, A.T. Kearney-Motor Columbus, to write
an expert opinion about the "causes of cost increases and delays in construction of the
SNR 300." In May 1982, the brief was extended to include a critical review of the new
"overall cost estimate" made by the operators and vendors in mid-1982. The opinion by
the group was submitted in September 1982 as a 268-page study 159.
In the technical analysis, the study found that the Iicensing procedure had required
complete evidence to be produced under very pessimistic assumptions about accident
management, as had not been the case in any other country with comparable breeder
projects. Moreover:
"There was the tendency to strive for absolute safety, irrespective of the resulting
costs."
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By way of example, the continuously escalating demands in connection with the Bethe-
Tait accident, airplane crashes, and protection again seismic effects were mentioned.
The operators' decision in 1970 to change over to a square containment was consid-
ered problematic. Because of the stiff anchorage concept and subsequent stringent
requirements of protection against an airplane crash, a completely new, costly solution
of the steel sheet containment had become necessary. That these opinions were cor-
rect, was confirmed also at the International Breeder Report held at Kalkar in October
1981 instead of the usual Status Report 160.
In the analysis of the Iicensing and supervisory procedures, the lack of rules specific
to fast breeders as weil as the complex Iicensing structure was criticized, with its partly
conflicting rules and competing experts dealing with the same problems (for example:
fire protection, ventilation, radiation protection). Developments in the political and legal
environments resulted in a volume of documents almost impossible to handle and
impossible to fathom. Moreover,
"the lengthy procedure required to match expert opinions and documentsin terms
of format, style and editing indicates that the need to make everything watertight
for a court case plays a major role."
In its management analysis, the opinion continued its recommendation to increase the
personnel capacity at BMFT, MAGS, SBK, INB, and TÜV. Especially the main source of
funds, BMFT, had been understaffed and short of real possibilities to influence
developments and, as a consequence, had not been able to control the Project firmly
also under the unexpected interfering influences. SBK pointed out that the flood of
requir:ements to be met, and the massive political resistance, were developments not to
be anticipated at the onset of construction, which could have been met only inade-
quately even by an increased project management staff.
The study also suggested to hold so-calied "Top Level SNR 300 Project Talks"
among the vendors, SBK, and BMFT, to deal with such general problems as definitions
of strategy for the Iicensing procedure (the similarity with the "Oversight Group" of the
ad hoc Committee was evident). This proposal was later taken up by the BMFT; such
talks were held every four or six weeks, and in the meantime, a small group of Project
Officers monitored progress in the Project on behalf of the Federal Ministry for Re-
search.
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Important items in the opinion were the total cost estimate and the delay in construc-
tion of the Praject. In mid-1982, the SNR 300 costs had reached DM 6050 million; in-
c1uding the DM 1535 million earmarked at the start of construction, extra costs had
arisen of three times this amount, namely DM 4516 million. The latter figure is com-
posed of four main types of costs: non-personnel costs, DM 1301 million (29%); engi-
neering costs, DM 571 million (13%); builder's costs, DM 537 million (12%), and price
escalation, DM 2087 million (46%).
Nearly half of the extra cost thus had been caused by the additional price escalation
resulting fram the delays in the Project. The expert consultants largely agreed with the
overall cost estimate by INB/SBK, merely suggesting that an amount of DM 650 million
be incorporated into the future financial plan for contingencies in technical development
and in the timetable.









Dates of cumulated cost estimates
6/82
11/79 3/81 12/83 2/86 7/87
1978 1979 1900 1981 1982 1983 19114 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989
Year of planned power plant delivery
SNR 300 cost development between 1972 and 1982
(according to Motor Columbus opinion).
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Power plant delivery, originally scheduled for November 1979, now was planned for
July 1987. This implied a delay in construction by 7.5 years. Completion of the plant
(prior to commissioning) now was fixed for November 1985. In the opinion of the expert
consultants, the cause of the Project delay so far had exclusively been the nuclear plant
components. Managing the Bethe-Tait accident had caused a delay by some two or
three years solely in the structural part, and by another three or four years in the pri-
mary and secondary systems.
8. A TURNING POINT AND AN UPSWING (1982 - 85)
After four years of stagnation, a number of important events occurred in late 1982
which took the SNR 300/Kalkar Nuclear Power Station Project out of its lethargy. On
September 22, 1982, the very important 5th Partial Construction Permit, TG 7/5, was
issued. It covered mainly the primary and secondary systems, the reactor vessel with its
internals, the reactor protection system, the emergency power Diesel plants, and the
reventing system. TG 7/5 also implied a comprehensive, positive, stable evaluation of
the Bethe-Tait complex. This meant an almost complete license for construction of the
Kalkar Nuclear Power Station. Shortly before, a supplement to the 4th Partial Construc-
tion Permit had been granted, which covered the ventilation systems, and also the im-
portant permit of the new steel sheet metal containment concept had been issued.
The positive decision taken by the German Federal Parliament on December 3, 1982,
in the light of the recommendations by the Committee of Inquiry, has been referred to
above. It put the Project on safe political grounds, as far as the federal level was con-
cerned.
An event of particular political importance was the change in government in Bonn
from a Social Democrat-Liberal coalition to a Christian Democrat-Liberal Coalition in
October 1982, the so-calied "Wende." The new Federal Government had inherited,
above all, the problems of financing the Project: Construction costs in the meantime
had been extrapolated to DM 6500 million. There was an absolute need for an interim
financial contribution of DM 600 million by the planned election date in April 1983. That
there was no reliance any more on the former initiators and proponents of the SNR 300,
was evident from some statements made by the former SPD Federal Minister for Re-
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search, Dr. von Bülow. In July 1982, when he was still Minister for Research, he stated
in a comment on the draft budget of his Ministry 157:
"The important rank of the advanced reactor Iines [SNR 300 and THTR] was rec-
ognized by the Federal Government in the additional provision in the budget of
DM 120 million."
A few months later, as a former Minister for Research, he said in an interview published
in "Der Spiegel:"
"Immediately after the Wende I stated publicly that both projects [SNR 300 and
THTR] had become insignificant from the point of view of energy policy. At the end
of a learning process completed despite great resistance I think it is necessary to
mothball both projects, despite their advanced stages of completion."
8.1 The Financial Rehabilitation of the Project
In financing the Kalkar Nu-
c1ear Power Station, before the
"Wende" only DM 3738.5 mil-
lion out of the total costs of
DM 6500 million had been se-
cured and spent to meet the
Federal Minister for Research H. Riesenhuber, CDU,
initiated the turnaround in the Kalkar Project in 1982.
Dr. v. Bülow's successor as Federal Minister for Research, Dr. Heinz Riesenhuber, im-
mediately took up the case of the two ailing projects, THTR 300 and SNR 300, and, first
of all, commissioned are-evaluation from the point of view of the power economy. The
result indicated that the breeder continued to be important even against the background
of a reduced role of nuclear power. At this advanced state of construction, moreover,
the only alternatives were to
discontinue or continue the Pro-
ject. In view of the long-term
potential of the breeder, and the
support by important industrial
partners, the Federal Govern-
ment therefore had decided to
go on with the Project 161.
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obligations incurred by that date. The sum total of unsecured expected contributions,
and the budgetary gap, respectively, had risen to DM 2761.5 million by Septem-
ber 30, 1982. The gap was c1osed, mainly by higher financial contributions by industry,
after quick and successful negotiations by the new Government. The share in financing
the total SNR 300 construction costs to be contributed by the German Federal Ministry
for Research and Technology was reduced from 59.2 to 48.5%. The table below shows
the financial situation of the SNR 300 before and after the "Wende" 162:
Cost estimates and cost allocations for the SNR 300
before and after the 1982 political turnaround
State as of Sep. 30, 1982: State as of April 21, 1983:
DM million approx. % DM million approx. %
BMFT 2215.0 59.2 3162.5 48.5
Investment grant 572.0 15.3 572.0 9.0
Belgium 333.0 8.9 470.0 7.0
Netherlands 333.0 8.9 470.0 7.0
SBK, operator 265.5 7.1 265.5 4.0
German utilities 0.0 0.0 1160.0 18.0
INB, vendor 20.0 0.6 300.0 5.0
Loan 0.0 0.0 100.0 1.5
3738.5 100.0 6500.0 100.0
As a new element designed to keep within the cost limits, a highly progressive ven-
dor's share was agreed upon with the Vendors' Consortium, which was to become due
at between DM 5 to 6.5 billion. In addition, an independent company (Lurgi) was com-
missioned to monitor costs and schedules as a permanent "watchdog." Regular talks
about progress in the Project were to be organized with all contracting parties as weil as
the licensing authorities and expert consultants, and were to be directed by the BMFT.
For the THTR, which had suffered a similar cost increase, a comparable balanced fi-
nancing scheme was agreed upon. As a result of contributions by industry, the expendi-
tures to be made by the BMFT to finance the two reactor Iines were to remain below
10% of the annual budget.
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8.2 Completion of the Kalkar Nuclear Power Station
After the permits under the Atomic Energy Act had been received, and the Project was
back on the rails in terms both of national policy and of finance, activity on the con-
struction site, preparatory planning, and shop fabrication assumed a breathtaking
pace.
One case in point is the steel shell, which surrounds the containment of the Kalkar
Nuclear Power Station as apressure resistant, tight outer safety enclosure. It had been
finished roughly one third in 1976, when the need appeared to change to a new con-
cept with a tougher steel variety and, above all, increased permissible relative move-
ment. In mid-1982, assembly of the redesigned steel shell began, and after some
2 1/2 years of construction, the pressure test and the leak rate test were completed
successfully in 1984. The steel shell - designed according to German Iicensing criteria! -
cost nearly as much as the whole of the Phenix and PFR breeders, respectively 163.
The reacter vessel being unleaded at Kalkar.
Since 1976, the reactor
vessel had been kept
ready for installation on the
power plant site. After the
TEG 7/5 Permit had been
received, it was moved to
its final position in the reac-
tor cavity still in the autumn
of 1982 and, less than a
year later, one of the impor-
tant items on the critical
path, "completion of the re-
actor vessel connections,"
was finished 164.
Also the reactor parts and large components were manufactured speedily in' shops in
Germany and abroad. In late 1982, the first Mark la fuel element of the reactor core
was completed. In April 1985, Belgonucleaire had assembled the last Mark la fuel ele-
ment; RBU/ALKEM was still short of 16 items as, by decree of the Hesse State supervi-
sory and licensing authorities, manufacturing operations had had to be discontinued for
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abrief interval, pending instructions from Bonn. But even in Hanau, all fuel rods had
been manufactured in the meantime. Occasionally, manufacturing problems arose,
such as the observance of specific density, stoichiometry, impurities, etc., but they were
overcome in an extensive R&D program at the two manufacturing sites.
The sodium pumps, intermediate heat exchangers, and steam generators for the
SNR 300 were made in the Netherlands by Neratoom and its industrial partners, Royal
Scheide and Stork Boilers. All 33 large components had arrived at the construction
site between 1983 and 1985 and were installed on the spot. In the manufacturing proc-
ess, increasingly tighter licensing criteria had resulted in frequent changes in planning
and, of course, entailed cost increases. In particular, the accidents assumed in connec-
tion with the Bethe-Tait effect and the presumed earthquake and airplane crash impacts
had far reaching ramifications. On top of that, the so-calied Basic Safety Rules had to
be observed, though they had reached the manufacturers relatively late in the fabrica-
tion process. Despite these problems encountered between 1976 and 1982, it was fi-
nally possible to deliver the components in time 163.
The large number of components delivered triggered an unparalleled activity at Kalkar.
Here are some figures: 70 km of pipes with 30,000 hangers, 21,000 valves, 1100
pumps and blowers, and 1500 vessels and heat exchangers had to be installed. In
addition, 5000 km of cable had to be run to 8700 loads and 8600 measuring circuits.
The 300,000 dowels caused major problems especially in the reactor building. Be-
cause of the high level of reinforcement of the concrete containment, it was nearly im-
possible in some cases to place dowels without hitting steel bars. Also this difficulty was
overcome at last by a specialized "dowel team," the use of improved detection equip-
ment, and refined statistical evidencing.
The faster pace of assembly activities at Kalkar is reflected in the rapid rise of per-
sonneion site. In 1982, some 800 persons worked on the construction site; already
next year, the team had to be increased to 3300 in order to meet assembly require-
ments. More than 900 enterprises, most of them small and medium sized, fram the
Federal Republic, the Netherlands, and Belgium participated in the construction work.
Cooperation among planning engineers, vendors, assembly personnei, and the super-
visory and licensing authorities succeeded thanks to the extraordinary management
performance by Interatom-INB Managing Director Wulf Bürkle, who was responsible
for the Project. He even managed, in this period of time, to keep within the cost limits
and deadlines 165, 166.
W. Bürkle, INB Managing Director,
advanced the Kalkar Project.
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The installation of major components in 1982/83,
and the construction of the extensive piping system,
covered the milestones on the critical path step by
step. When, in late 1983, the successful pressure
test of the primary system was completed one
month ahead of schedule and, one year later, also
the pressure test of the containment was finished
with a positive result, the timetable of the Project
was shortened by seven months - an unparalleled
event in the history of the Kalkar Nuclear Power
Station. Unfortunately, this lead was lost again later
as a result of some technical setbacks, but this will
be reported in one of the next chapters.
Commissioning was initiated in mid-1984, when the first sodium volumes were deliv-
ered; the total quantity of approx. 1100 tons was filled into the cooling systems without
major problems. After the reactor vessel and the primary systems had been filled, con-
struction of the Kalkar Nuclear Power Station as specified in the delivery contracts was
formally completed in early May 1985 167, 168.
In the subsequent pre-nuclear commissioning stage, the sodium systems were
cleared of potential impurities in a high-temperature cleanup at 400°C. Moreover, the
primary systems compartments were inerted with nitrogen in the same period of time.
The sodium pumps showed excellent running characteristics; some problems were en-
countered with the new type of Viscoseal on the pump shafts.
The fuel element handling devices in a fast breeder are particularly complicated, as
they are required to permit remote, angle-oriented handling of hexagonal core elements
at pre-programmed positions. But even these tests, which took about ten weeks, were
completed successfully 169.
Finally, also pipe movements should be mentioned. Temperature shifts from room tem-
peratures to operating temperatures cause major displacements between the attach-
ment points on the containment and the hangers, as the Japanese were to leam when
they commissioned their MONJU prototype. When these displacements were measured
in the SNR 300, luckily an optimum was found between the stress contribution affecting
the pipes and the loads acting on the supports.
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8.2.1 Technical Setbacks
As was to be anticipated in a prototype facility the size of the SNR 300, there were also
some technical setbacks in the course of completion, which did not endanger the Pro-
ject, but still need to be c1assified as "experience accumulated in contingencies."
Some of these difficulties caused the time lead which had been accumulated to be lost
again. These events, which differed greatly in terms of technical importance, will be
briefly outlined below in the sequence in which they occurred 170.
1. Corrosion of the Reactor Vessel.
The reactor vessel made of X6 CrNi 1811 type stainless steel had been de-
livered on site in the spring of 1976 and, for lack of an installation permit,
stored in a special depot. In 1980, the outer surface of the vessel displayed
intergranular corrosion caused by moisture and corrosive dust. The damage
was repaired by milling off the entire surface. Continued storage up to instal-
lation in 1982 involved no further problems because the air was filtered and
dried 171.
2. Sodium Fire.
In November 1984, some 200 kg of sodium particles were ignited on the roof
of the reactor building; they accidentally had been carried upward through
depressurization pipes from the basement of a steam generator building in
the commissioning tests. The commissioning staff and the fire brigade on the
spot were able to control the fire very quickly. Repetitions of the event were
precluded by a technical modification in the secondary sodium system 172.
3. Sodium Leakages from Dump Tanks.
In August 1985, leakages were found in the ferritic sodium dump and leak-
age collection tanks. Inspection showed cracked welds through which so-
dium was able to penetrate. Corrosion studies revealed an increased sensi-
tivity to hydrogen-induced cracking of the stressed, unannealed filler metal;
hydrogen release in the reaction between sodium and the corroded material
was demonstrated. The decisive mistake probably had been the lack of heat
treatment after the original welding had been completed. All tanks, irrespec-
tive of their showing cracks or not, were rewelded and annealed and, at least




The broken lance surrounded by
dummy elements.
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4. Separation for Electrical Redundancy.
In the autumn of 1984, the supervisory authority criticized the insufficient
extent of physical separation of plant components and their associated ca-
blings, especially with a view to fire protection. It should be noted at this point
that the design of the Kalkar Nuclear Power Station incorporates fivefold re-
dundancy to control decay heat removal, and that the need to continue this
redundancy in electric cabling is open to some doubt. However, in its very
special style of proceeding in
Kalkar the authority again
had its way, the consequence
being that the SNR 300 fea-
tures a comprehensive level
of fire protection unparalleled Dummy elements
by any other breeder power
plant in the world 166.
5. Break of a Lance for Vibration
Measurement.
In January 1986, a lance for
vibration measurement broke
when handled. It had been in-
stalled in the central position
of the reactor vessel to check
on the gas bubble separator.
Subsequent recovery of the
lance part and some loose
bits and pieces was a difficult
job, but was finished within
two months. Specially made
tools for illumination, detection and manipulation at 12 m distance allowed
the work to be completed successfully in this short span of time. Moreover, it
had become apparent once again that trained and experienced personnel is
a decisive factor in running sodium plants 174.
6. Drying Closure Head Granulate.
In April 1986, the centering tube displacement mechanism of the control rods
was found to stick; this was attributed to coatings. The cause was seen to be
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residual moisture in the basalt granulate boxes shielding the reactor c10sure
head. That residual moisture was released when temperatures rose (e.g.,
when sodium was filled) and penetrated into the cover gas compartment of
the reactor vessel through openings. As a consequence, a moisture removal
system was installed which, in a number of campaigns, took the moisture out
of the reactor vessel by way of higher basalt temperatures and sweeping
with fresh argon. At the end, the hydrogen content in the cover gas, in the
power mode, was demonstrated to be below 10 ppm, an absolutely uncritical
level 175.
8.2.2 The Mark la Reactor Core
A public inquiry about the Iicensing procedure under the Atomic Energy Act for the so-
calied Mark la core of the Kalkar Nuclear Power Station was held in Wesel on De-
cember 4 - 6, 1984. As the two core versions, Mark I and Mark la, are being mixed up
again and again, the cause for, and the history of, this decision about the core configu-
ration should perhaps be highlighted at his point.
In 1972, the Mark I core version served as a basis for the first partial construction permit
of the Kalkar Nuclear Power Station. A number of parameters, such as the geometry of
the core and of the radial and axial blanket zones, were to be defined permanently in a
later phase of detailed planning.
Subsequent studies of the economics of power plant operation had. indicated a possi-
bility to c1early decrease the operating costs by, initially, running the SNR 300 prototype
power plant without the breeding capability. This was communicated to the Iicensing
authority in March 1973.
The new core, Mark la, had one row of fuel elements more in the core, while the radial
blanket had been reduced from five to two rows. Unlike the Mark I core, the Mark la
core had a slightly higher thermal power of 762 MWth. All subsequent calculations were
based on the Mark la core version, also the extensive Bethe-Tait calculations and the
risk analyses conducted for the Committee of Inquiry.
The nuclear design of the Mark I core had been based on the use of plutonium gener-
ated in the reprocessing of fuel from gas-cooled graphite-moderated reactors (of the
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The Mark I and Mark la reactor cores
side by side.
MAGNOX type), which has a
typical isotopic composition and
is called MAGNOX plutonium.
Later, however, only 34% of the
total amount of plutonium re-
quired could be obtained from
MAGNOX inventories for the first
Mark la core. The balance was
made up for by purchasing pluto-
nium from light water reactors
which, however, differs in iso-
topic composition. This change
to a different fuel composition, of
course, would have been neces-
sary also for the original Mark I
reactor core.
In 1983, the Mark I core was formally withdrawn from the licensing procedure and re-
placed by the Mark la first core. The licensing authority took this core modification, es-
pecially the change in the plutonium vector, as a reason for demanding a public inqui-
ry for the objectors; that inquiry was held in Wesel in 1984. Despite the three days of
discussions the inquiry did not produce any fundamentally new aspects even to the au-
thority 176.
Nevertheless the authority later, in the wake of the discussion about opting out of nu-
clear power, emphasized two objections in the TG 7/4(3) Partial Permit:
1. The applicant was accused of "economic" unreliability for having ordered and
manufactured the reactor core before it had been Iicensed under the Atomic
Energy Act. That had been tantamount to the negligent use of public funds.
The representative of the Federal Ministry for Research and Technology
(BMFT) which, as a grantgiver, has to approve the way in which SBK uses
public funds, opposed the argument by stating that that procedure had been
known and approved of. Incidentally, for reasons of time management, this was
common practice in the construction of nuclear power plants.
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2. Doubt was expressed about the manageability of an overprompt critical power
excursion (Bethe-Tait accident), after Donderer and Tränkle, authors critical of
nuclear power, had calculated much higher energy releases in 1984, on the
basis of the American SIMMER code, than had been used as a basis for Partial
Permit 7/5. Their calculations were opposed by detailed analyses by
W. Maschek, D. Struwe, R. Fröhlich, P. Royl of KfK and H. Hübel, W. Roßbach,
G. Friedel, H. Vossebrecker, U. Wehmann of Interatom. According to them the
calculations mentioned above were based on numerical instabilities caused by
errors and inconsistencies in modeling and in phenomenology.
Incidentally, the work by Donderer has never been published and never been
submitted to any nuclear conference. Consequently, no public peer review was
possible. This also applies to horror scenarios invented by the American, Webb.
Scientifically, it was hard to understand why the Düsseldorf licensing authority
relied on those persons for years and even awarded contracts to them 177, 178.
After the inquiry, the Karlsruhe Nuclear Research Center, on behalf of the Düsseldorf
State Ministry for Labor, Health, and Social Affairs, wrote an expert opinion about the
neutron physics design of the Mark la core. On the basis of intercomparison calcula-
tions, mainly by the KfK Institute, INR, under the leadership of G. Keßler and
E. Kiefhaber, the evaluation arrived at showed that the methods of computation and the
results elaborated by the vendor were not to be criticized 179.
9. DECLINE AND THE END (1985 - 91)
9.1 Political Clouds Appearing on the Horizon
The political change in government in the autumn of 1982, and the loss of the federal
elections in the spring of 1983, caused the Social Democratic Party of Germany (SPD)
as the biggest opposition party to redefine its program and look for new areas of conflict
with the coalition parties in government, CDU/CSU and FDP. Nuclear power, especially
the fast breeder, was an obvious choice.
The first steps in this direction were taken at the 1984 Federal Convention in Essen.
That Convention decided on a coal-first policy, on opting out of nuclear fuel reproc-
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essing, and on adding no more nuclear power plants. The breeder was not yet men-
tioned explicitly.
Before the elections to the State Parliament of North Rhine-Westphalia, the Minister
President and candidate for reelection, Johannes Rau, wrote a letter to Federal Chan-
cellor Kohl asking for a reassessment of breeder technology. Bonn refused, referring to
its policy document of the spring of 1983.
The May 1985 State Parliamentary election again re-
turned an absolute majority for the SPO and, conse-
quently, exacerbated the breeder debate. Professor
Farthmann, now Head of the SPD Parliamentary Group
and, as former Minister for Labor, Health, and Social
Affairs (MAGS) responsible for granting roughly a dozen
partial permits for the SNR 300, made a complete
about-face in his argumentation, now expressing him-
self in strong language against commissioning the
State Minister Farthmann, SPD. Kalkar Nuclear Power Station ("00 not kindie this hell
fire." 180). He made the interesting statement that
"one was prepared to go to court, if necessary, until the breeder had died a
peaceful death." 181.
It may be recalled that his Social Democratic Party colleague, von Bülow, when still
Federal Minister for Research, had declared in 1982:
"Kalkar will not become a ruin of Social Oemocrat research policy." 182.
In the new government, Professor Jochimsen had taken over the State Ministry of
Economics (from Riemer), the nuclear supervisory function of the MAGS (from Farth-
mann) and, as Head of the new Ministry for Economics, Small and Medium-sized Busi-
nesses, and Technology (MWMT), had exclusive responsibility for the licensing proce-
dure of the Kalkar Nuclear Power Station. He, too, was no friend of nuclear power. At a
hearing before the Economics Committee of the North Rhine-Westphalian State Par-
Iiament in October 1985 he indicated that the current policy of immediate execution of
partial permits might be discontinued in the future. The reason was the increased risk
suffered by potential plaintiffs as a consequence of the hazard potential inherent in the
plant.
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However, Jochimsen was contradicted by one of the experts he had invited, the Frank-
furt lawyer, Professor Steinberg. Steinberg described the discretion to withhold fur-
ther permits as being very limited, for "the seventeen partial construction permits
granted earlier assume a legally binding character." Moreover, Steinberg regarded the
discretion of the State to be limited by the right of the Federal Government to issue in-
structions. These legal arguments played a major role in the subsequent development
of the licensing procedure for the Kalkar Nuclear Power Station 183, 184.
Eighteen months later, the Energy Advisory Board of the SPD Federal Executive
Board under its Chairman Jochimsen decided on April 28, 1986 - shortly after the Cher-
nobyl accident, but without yet having learned about it - on an amendment to the Ger-
man Atomic Energy Act. In that amendment, the support granted to nuclear power was
to be deleted, and the liability limit was to be increased drastically; furthermore, reproc-
essing and the use of plutonium were to be banned. For the breeder, this meant in con-
crete terms: "Even if the operator, against all expectations, were to succeed in coming
to grips with the technical problems, this type of reactor will be stopped by law." 185.
The accident in the fourth unit of the Chernobyl Nuclear Power Station provoked a
drastic change in the situation: For the first time the public realized, no longer on the
basis of theoretical risk analyses but as a hard fact, that large-area contamination and
enforced evacuation of the population is possible as a consequence of a grossly defi-
cient way of handling nuclear power. The breeder now came under severe attack, es-
pecially because its opponents suggested a technical relationship between the Kalkar
Nuclear Power Station and the Chernobyl unit, which had been of the RBMK 1000 type,
for instance by referring to the burnable substances, sodium and graphite.
For the line of arguments pursued by the SPD at that time it was only logical that the
largest opposition party, at its Party Convention in Nuremberg on August 27, 1986,
followed a proposal by aPreparatory Committee under Hauff and Jochimsen and de-
cided to opt out of nuclear power within ten years. Hesse State Minister President
Börner was one of the few people who dared oppose this trend, albeit in vain, by con-
fessing: "I have always been in favor of nuclear power, and I will remain that way." 186.
The political uncertainty engulfing the breeder finally also extended to the FDP coalition
partner. In March 1987, after the federal elections (which had been won), the FDP de-
manded in the government negotiations that the benefit to research policy of the
SNR 300 be ascertained. The Swiss company, Motor Columbus, was commissioned
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to write the expert opinion; its recommendations were submitted six months later 187,
188·
(1) From the point of view of research policy, the SNR 300 should be commis-
sioned speedily, because the real R&D benefit can be derived only from its
normal operation.
(2) The SNR 300 should be operated over a long period of time so that all sys-
tems and components can be tested for endurance.
(3) The R&D program should be expanded to include also the burning of
longlived nuclides.
The expert opinion by Motor Columbus thus had confirmed the main arguments raised
by the Federal Government in its Energy Report of September 1986 189.
In this connection, a scandal was created by a letter written by the Chief Executive
Officer of the Badenwerk utility, Professor Guck, to the Minister President of the State
of Baden-Württemberg, Lothar Späth, on. August 11, 1988. In that letter Guck not only
refused, on behalf of his utility, to make any contribution towards the costs of financing
the holding phase for the SNR 300, but also vehemently argued against that Project's
benefit to research policy 190.
Of course, the CEO could have expressed any opinion on the SNR 300, but Mr. Guck
then happened to be the President of the Deutsches Atomforum, the German Atomic
Industrial Forum, of many years. In that capacity, he had been untiring in convincing the
participants in the Annual Nuclear Technology Conferences of the necessity to build the
Kalkar Nuclear Power Station. Many engineers, especially the members of the Kern-
technische Gesellschaft (KTG), feit deceived by these written statements of their officer,
Guck, and it is certainly no coincidence that participation in the Conferences showed a
marked decline from then on.
Many dark clouds of party politics had obscured the Project in 1984 - 87. However,
there was a silver Iining on the horizon in the legal field: In the ruling by the Düsseldorf
Administrative Court in April 1984, the actions brought by the farmer, Josef Maas, of
Kalkar-Hönnepel against all Iicensing decisions up until 1982 were dismissed in the first
instance. Oral proceedings revolved around the question of the potential development
of an assumed excursion accident and the resultant release of mechanical energy. The
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experts invited (W. Maschek, KfK, and A. Scharfe, GRS) convinced the court with their
consistent statements. The explanation of the court ruling consequently reads:
"To demand more, a consistent mechanistic description not relying on probabilistic
assumptions with uncertain estimates at any point, would be ignoring the limits to
human perception and, consequently, cannot be demanded by a court of law ei-
ther." 191.
9.2 Permit Refused at Press Conference
The increasingly more difficult political situation had c1early negative impacts upon the
granting of the remaining partial permits under the Atomic Energy Act approximately
from 1984 on. In accordance with the speedy completion of construction work at Kalkar,
the following partial permits were expected:
(1) Mid-1983: Partial Permit TG 7/4(2) for minor supplementary construction
measures.
(2) Early 1985: Partial Permit TG 7/6 for storage of the core elements.
(3) Mid-1986: Partial Permit TG 7/7 for nuclear commissioning and permanent
operation.
Already the relatively minor TG 7/4(2) turned out to be very lengthy in processing and,
for practical reasons, had to be subdivided into two permit decisions, TG 7/4(2) and
7/4(3). TG 7/4(2) was granted in June 1984; activities concerning the other part ex-
tended into the time of the North Rhine-Westphalian State Parliamentary elections in
which the ability, or willingness, of the authority to act appeared to be c1early dimin-
ished 192.
In October 1985, finally, also Permit 7/4(3) was granted, albeit with a rider of seven
pages of very politically sounding reasons for immediate execution and the prelimi-
nary positive overall assessment. This seemed to be indicative of astronger political
influence on the way in which future Iicensing procedures would be handled. For the
reasons explained below, the 7/4(3) decision has remained the last permit granted to
the Kalkar Nuclear Power Station.
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The documents filed with the application tor Partial Permit 7/4
(in the toreground, the corresponding documents tor Partial Permit 7/1).
The application for Partial Permit TG 7/6 for storage of the core elements had been filed
in June 1983; the positive expert opinion had been submitted in the spring of 1984, and
apermit decision was expected to come forth in the autumn of the same year.
However, this timetable was delayed because of the public inquiry held in Wesei, as
described above, and - a new experience - because the authority allegedly was unable
to process it alongside TG 7/4(3). In the course of the deliberations resumed in late
1985 it became more and more apparent that the MWMT considered this licensing step
an operating permit and, consequently, demanded broader-based preconditions, also in
the fields of fire protection and sodium leakages.
In mid-1986, Minister Jochimsen, who was responsible for the proceedings, surprisingly
stated at a press conference, before informing the applicant, that the preliminary
positive overall assessment required for any permit could no longer be expressed for
the Kalkar Nuclear Power Station. Nine months earlier, this had still been possible. The
reasons he cited included these:
(1) There were similarities between the Chernobyl reactor and the SNR 300.
(2) Earlier Bethe-Tait analyses were not reliable.
State Minister Jochimsen, SPD, refused
to grant the operating permit for the SNR 300.
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(3) Technical events in the pre-nuclear commissioning phase had raised doubts
about the quality status of the plant 193,
The applicants were never able after-
wards to discuss these points with the
authority in an unbiased way. Instead,
the same Minister organized another
press conference in April 1987, telling
the public about his intention to even
refuse Partial Permit TG 7/6 194. He
more or less used the same arguments
as before; on top of that, the installa-
tions protecting against sabotage were
to be raised to the final operational level
even before any fuel elements were
stored. Administrative interim solutions,
such as intensified surveillance - a cus-
tomary practice during revision outages
in all nuclear power plants -, were not
permitted. As in the case mentioned
above, the formal letter from the MWMT
arrived a few days after the press con-
ference, when all the media had long
since published their reports, and the applicant, SBK, had no chance of achieving com-
parable publicity with its comments 195, 196.
In the subsequent stage, SBK, in agreement with BMFT and BMU, took the storage of
fuel elements out of the application volume for Permit 7/6 and instead made it part of
Operating Permit TG 7/7, hoping that the procedure might be restarted in this way.
Downsized TG 7/6 now was a mere construction permit; its volume amounted to 1 - 2%
of the total construction volume.
Nevertheless, the authorities did not go ahead in examining the subject matter. They
had taken nearly eight years to move from the application date (1983) to the discon-
tinuation of the Project (1991); this was more than the expert examination of the entire
process engineering part of the SNR 300 had taken, including the decisive engineered
safeguards problems, which had been covered in six years prior to 1982. This dragging
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of feet over Partial Permit TG 7/6, together with the Bethe-Tait complex, was the final
reason why the Federal Minister for the Environment issued an instruction in April 1988,
against which the State, in turn, had filed suit with the Federal Constitutional Court.
Only for the sake of completeness, mention should also be made of Operating Permit
TG 7/7 which, of course, was never issued either. It had been applied for in April 1984;
the expert opinion had been submitted in the spring of 1986 together with a positive
overall assessment.
A major reason for the long time taken for expert evaluation after the political change in
the State of North Rhine-Westphalia was the ineffective way in which the authority now
commissioned its experts. The commissioning procedure frequently took many
months before the expert thus hired was allowed to start working. When an expert
opinion had been completed, there was an acceptance procedure just as cumbersome,
the so-calied reading, which covered several months or even years, as the MWMT of-
ten asked for a large number of so-calied amendments.
Also the switch from experienced experts to relative newcomers ordered by the author-
ity contributed to the long delays. For example, the Gesellschaft für Reaktorsicherheit
(GRS) should be mentioned which, for many years, had been the expert consultant
investigating the difficult problems associated with the Bethe-Tait accident. When GRS
in the autumn of 1986, after the political change in North Rhine-Westphalia, had arrived
at a c1early positive evaluation of this accident in the expert opinion about operation of
the SNR 300, it abruptly ceased to be the expert consultant calied in, and further expert
opinions were commissioned from Elektrowatt-Ingenieurunternehmung Zurich/Mann-
heim (EWI) which, at that time, had hardly any expertise in the field it had been invited
to. The new expert consultant took almost one year to familiarize with the complex
subject matter new to them. Other experts, coming from an anti-nuclear group associ-
ated with the University of Bremen, were of dubious scientific qualification and reputa-
tion, quite aside from the superfluous, expensive duplication of effort caused by the li-
censing authority.
9.2.1 Comments by TÜV and RSK
The negative public comments made by Minister Jochimsen about the technical safety
of the SNR 300 had aroused the attention of the CDU, the opposition party in the North
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Rhine-Westphalian State Parliament. Its Chairman, Worms, asked the Chief Expert
Consultant, the Rhineland Technical Inspectorate (Technischer Überwachungs-Verein
Rheinland e.v.), for information. The Chairman of the Board of that TÜV, Professor
Kuhlmann, followed the request in a personal letter of six pages in August 1986 with a
c1ear comment on the five main points of contention, namely the Bethe-Tait accident,
in-service inspections, a quality assurance system, the Chernobyl accident, and the
waste management aspect 197.
On the Bethe-Tait accident, it was stated in the letter that the manufacturer had taken a
number of additional technical measures, although that accident had no impact on the
design basis because of its low probability. The author of the letter found the compari-
son of the SNR 300 with the Chernobyl reactor "superficial," because of the very differ-
ent physical modes of operation and the technical state of both reactors. In summary,
Kuhlmann arrives at the assessment that
"no reasons of technical safety exist which would oppose commlssloning the
SNR 300 ... In my view, this no longer is a technical matter; it is a political deci-
sion."
Also the German Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards (Reaktorsicherheits-
kommission, RSK) in April 1987 duly investigated the comparison of the RBMK 1000
Chernobyl reactor with the SNR 300. It found major differences between the two reac-
tors in nearly all design aspects. This was true especially of the reactivity behavior: The
SNR 300 was characterized by its good controllability, while the RBMK 1000 showed
unstable behavior and complex physical dependencies. In all major safety-related re-
spects, such as redundancy, diversity, level of automation, and safety margins, the
protection and scram systems of the SNR 300 were found to be c1early superior. In the
RBMK 1000, there were no measures which could be taken to contain the damage in
case of an excursion, while the SNR 300 had the primary system and the containment
with high protective functions. Finally, the consequences of the Chernobyl accident
were aggravated by the exothermic process of the graphite fire while, in the Kalkar Nu-
clear Power Station, the inerted containment and the steel liner would reliably prevent
major fires. Finally, the RSK found that an accident in which all barriers would be de-
stroyed, as in Chernobyl, could never happen in the SNR 300 198, 199.
The Bethe-Tait accident was the subject on which the RSK organized a special meet-
ing on September 30 - October 1, 1987 attended by national expert consultants and in-
119
ternational experts from France, the United Kingdom, Japan, and the United States of
America. The meeting was calied because, despite the positive opinion about commis-
sioning the SNR 300 the RSK had expressed in February 1986, the licensing authority
had feit that there were still some open questions about the initiation phase and about
recriticalities. The international experts agreed that Bethe-Tait accidents of the type
discussed for the SNR 300 were attributed to the residual risk in their countries. They
also confirmed the experimental verification of the SAS 30 computer code used to treat
the initiation phase (0. Struwe and P. Royl, KfK). With regard to the recriticality acci-
dent, the RSK experts stated that its mechanical energy potential remained far below
the design level of 370 MWs. As far as the use of the SIMMER code was concerned,
the participants argued that, at its present state of development, this computer code
was not yet a suitable instrument to be used in a licensing procedure under the Atomic
Energy Act. Consequently, the hearing of international experts confirmed earlier state-
ments by the RSK on this subject 200,201,202.
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9.3 Stagnation on Site
Construction of the Kalkar Nuclear Power Station, for purposes of contractual definition,
was completed in May 1985 after the primary system had been filled with sodium. By
mid-1986, the functional tests of all systems individually (F1 phase) and the functional
tests of the systems combined (F2 phase) had largely been concluded. The plant sta-
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tus, Le. construction and commissioning activities, had reached a 95% level of comple-
tion 203.
Also most of the major unplanned additional activities recognized to be necessary in the
phase of pre-nuclear commissioning had been completed by late 1986. Under this
heading, the events already mentioned above should be recalled:
- Recovery of the broken vibration measurement lance.
- Upgrading of the sodium dump tanks.
- Redundant cabling and fire protection measures.
- Removal of granulate moisture.
They had had a major impact on the speedy decrease of personnel originally
planned 204.
When it became evident in the spring of 1986 that Partial Permit TG 7/6 for the delivery
and storage of fuel elements, which had been applied for in mid-1983, would not come
forth in the near future, the owner, SBK, and the main contractor, INB, took decisive
measures to reduce Project costs. As the delays in the permit procedure c1early were
not based on technical reasons, the BMFT made available interim funds of DM 84 mil-
lion to cover the so-calied "delay phase" between mid-1986 and the spring of 1987,
during which no money was spent out of the Project budget.
But even after that period was over, the licensing situation had not improved; it was still
not possible to see when TG 7/6 would be issued. The parties to the Project now de-
cided on drastic cuts in current Project costs. Within the framework of a "minimum
model phase" a plant operations pool was set up under the leadership and respon-
sibility of INB, to which staff members of the plant operations group of SBK and of the
commissioning team of INB were delegated. The c1ear separation of duties of the owner
and the prime contractor, normally observed very strictly, had been given up in this
area. This measure allowed personneion the construction site to be reduced and, in
this way, operating costs to be cut. The plant operations pool, above all, was required
to run the main heat transfer systems in the recirculation mode; these systems made up
nearly 80% of the whole plant. Draining or even freezing the sodium could not be
risked, as the resultant systems state would not have been under sufficient technical
control because of corrosion and shock stresses.
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In early 1988, a "holding phase" (1988) and, from 1989 on, an "extended holding
phase" till the end of 1991 were defined, which were financed one third each by the
BMFT, various German electricity utilities, and Siemens. The necessary funds
amounted to DM 105 million a year. The financial participation by the utilities (RWE,
Bayernwerk, PreußenElektra) and by Siemens AG was made in the expectation that it
would be possible again, in a foreseeable time frame, to meet with the Iicensing author-
ity for factual debates with a certain objective in mind, at which the questions raised
could be solved without external pressures 205,206.
9.3.1 Events in Kalkar and in other Plants
Judged by the complex structure of the SNR 300 prototype facility and the compara-
tively narrow background of experience, only very few major disturbances arose in pre-
nuclear commissioning between 1985 and 1991. As a consequence of the sodium fire
on the roof of the reactor building in November 1984 and the ensuing public and politi-
cal criticism, special reporting criteria and procedures were agreed upon with the Su-
pervisory Authority. Besides major events, such as the break of the vibration measure-
ment lance, now also the fire of a refuse container or the damage to the outer fence
caused bya protest campaign of nuclear opponents were reported to the authority.
The Almeria solar power plant with
a tower and radiation collectors.
At the experimental solar power station in Almeria,
Spain, a sodium fire had occurred during an inex-
pert repair of the sodium system in August 1986,
as a consequence of which the plant was practi-
cally destroyed. The main reason for the impact of
the fire was the intense spraying of sodium ejected
from the system and the relatively large surface
area this produced. The reaction with oxygen gen-
erated very high temperatures (above 1000 Oe),
which caused the surrounding steel structures to
melt down.
Much more important were special events in other plants, which were collected and
passed on by GRS and had to be analyzed for their
relevance to the Kalkar Nuclear Power Station by
INB and the Technicallnspectorate 204.
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The phenomena to be expected in the Kalkar Nuclear Power Station were quite differ-
ent. Extensive analyses showed that a comparable accident would have taken a very
different turn, with regard both to its origins and to its development, in the Kalkar Nu-
c1ear Power Station and would have been controlled with the measures and means
available.
Another major external event was the steam generator accident in a superheater of the
British PFR prototype reactor, which had caused 40 bundle tubes to fail.As the inter-
mediate heat exchanger, as a containment boundary, had not been damaged, no direct
hazard to plant safety had arisen. Later studies showed that the event had been
caused primarily by vibrations of a few bundle tubes, which had given rise to steam
leakages, producing pronounced superheating of the adjacent tubes and, finally, over-
pressure failure.
For several reasons, this cause of an accident could not be extrapolated t6 the Kalkar
Nuclear Power Station. On the one hand, prototype experiments in the test facility at
Hengelo had shown that the SNR 300 steam generators were not susceptible to vibra-
tions. On the other hand, the Kalkar equipment was monitored for leakages more relia-
bly, which would have caused early shutdown on the steam side. Also the in-service
inspections demanded at Kalkar would have indicated any attrition of wall thicknesses
reliably and in time.
9.4 Instruction, Litigation, Judgment
It had become evident finally, after the two press conferences held by Minister Jochim-
sen, MWMT, in June 1986 and May 1987 and the letters by the authorities following
those events, that the project of the Kalkar Nuclear Power Station had bogged down in
a profound crisis created by political forces. The licensing preconditions had been
broadened considerably, the preliminary positive overall assessment was jeopardized,
and the storage of fuel elements had been delayed indefinitely. In addition, the com-
parison of Kalkar with Chernobyl, and the "recalculations" of the Bethe-Tait accident by
nuclear opponents upon invitation of the authority increasingly developed into bones of
contention between the MWMT and the applicant.
On April 27, 1988, the Federal Minister for the Environment, Professor Töpfer, sent a
letter of instructions to the MWMT with these statements, among others:
123
"... In the supervisory statements by the Federal Government you were informed
of certain legal viewpoints in the Iicensing procedure for the Kalkar Nuclear Power
Station. In view of the failure to reach agreement on these issues I feel compelled
to instruct you, pursuant to Article 85, Sec. 3 of the Basic Law, to observe the fol-
lowing points in the continued Iicensing procedure:
My views about the preliminary positive overall assessment and the justified inter-
est pursuant to Sec. 18 of the Regulations on Nuclear Proceedings as weil as
about the binding effect and the guarantees for continued existence shall consti-
tute the basis of the Iicensing procedure.
The Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards evaluated the Chernobyl acci-
dent with a view to its importance to the SNR 300; I concur with that evaluation.
As a consequence, no more expert opinions shall be commissioned ..."
In issuing these instructions, the BMU had told the State authority how to continue the
Iicensing procedure. The instructions had the character of guiding principles determin-
ing further proceedings and constituted the framework for further decisions on the sub-
ject matter. The actual Iicensing procedure was to be continued, not cut off. A federal
supervisory statement was announced in connection with the treatment of the Bethe-
Tait accident 207,208.
The proponents of the Kalkar Nuclear Power Station welcomed these instructions to the
MWMT; there were quite a few who feit they should have been issued a year earlier.
However, the initial assumption that this woul~ speed up the licensing procedure was
erroneous. Proceedings dragged on for nearly six months, and one day before the legal
deadline for raising objections had expired, the North Rhine-Westphalian State Gov-
ernment responded by bringing/action before the Karlsruhe Federal Constitutional
Court. In its application for a declaratory judgment it argued that the Federal Govern-
ment, in issuing instructions, had violated the independence of the State; the instruc-
tions were out of proportion, not sufficiently weil defined, and unduly backed the opinion
expressed by the Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards.
On February 20, 1990, the parties met for oral proceedings before the Second
Chamber of the Federal Constitutional Court under Vice President Mahrenholz. Minister
Jochimsen as the first speaker feit that the inviolable core of the independent status of
the states in a federation was at stake, and emphatically argued the point of his State
Government. Federal Minister Töpfer, in turn, invoked the danger that the practical exe-
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cution of the Atomic Energy Act could develop in different directions. These proceed-
ings had to determine a way for the Federal Minister of the Environment to enforce his
decision by federal supervision; otherwise the instrument of instruction was a blunt
sword.
The 2nd Chamber of the Karlsruhe Federal Constitutional Court
decided in favor of the SNR 300
(4th fram left: Vice President E. G. Mahrenholz).
The interest of the judges concentrated on the specific ban on commissioning another
Chernobyl expert opinion, which the State described as a ban on thinking, while the
Federal Government referred to it as a measure taken to prevent duplication of expert
consultant effort. The agitated arguments by an official from the middle level of the
MWMT who, repeatedly interrupting the presiding judge, tried to connect all and sundry
technical features of the SNR 300 with the Bethe-Tait accident and, when asked to give
factual reasons for commissioning another Chernobyl expert opinion, made a most
helpless impression, were noted with surprise by experienced court observers 209.
The judgment by the Federal Constitutional Court was pronounced on May 22, 1990
and was impressive in its c1arity. The result, in a nutshell, was this: The action brought
by the State was dismissed in all respects; the Federal Government had been correct in
exercising its power to issue instructions; the instruction had been c1ear and contained
a reliable guidance of proceedings; in addition, the Federal Government had given the
State ample opportunity before to express its comments.
125
The Karlsruhe judges based their decision mainly on the character of federal admini-
stration by commission pur.suant to Article 85 of the Basic Law. This allows the Federal
Government at any time to intervene in proceedings and instruct the State to do or omit
certain things. The responsibility in substance for assessing the subject matter, which
the court called technical competence, can be c1aimed by the State only subject to its
being exercised by the Federal Government; this implies that the Federal Government
may, at its own discretion, exercise this competence at any time. On the other hand, the
so-called competence of performance rests with the States, Le., acting against third
parties, such as applicants or objectors. Administration by commission of the Federal
Government thus moves in a strict hierarchical relationship: The State is bound to obey
the instructions by the Federal Government, unless the Federal Government were to
make absolutely irresponsible demands. Whether such instruction is useful, appropriate
or legal, is not for the State to comment on; this is the sole responsibility of the Federal
Government 210,211.
The SNR 300 judgment by the Federal Constitutiönal Court soon acquired fundamental
importance in the relationship between the Federal Government and the State Gov-
ernments also in other licensing procedures under the Atomic Energy Act.
9.5 Kalkarization according to the Letter of the Law
Anybody believing that the Iicensing procedure for the SNR 300 would be afloat again
after the BMU instruction of April 1988, soon had to admit failure. Processing of Partial
Permit TG 7/6, though that permit had been shrunk to aminimum, did not make head-
way at all. However, precisely this partial permit was of major strategic importance, less
so because of its technical contents, but rather because of the preliminary positive
overall assessment renewed in this way. Even a scaled-down 7/6 Permit would have
demonstrated that the political blockage had been overcome.
The delays in the licensing procedure resulted from daily activities at administrative
level; a few examples will illustrate this point 212 :
1. Points long since decided in earlier permits were reopened as a result of
"general concern" and used as an excuse to commission new, extensive ex-
pert opinions. (One of the applicants aptly calied this "mice playing games of
tennis.")
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2. Technical events in Kalkar and in other facilities (such as Almeria, Dounreay,
Chernobyl, etc.) were used as a pretense for reopening the debate about the
basic principles of the SNR 300 safety design and justifying further commis-
sioning of expert opinions.
3. Expert consultants were chosen who, up to that point, were not sufficiently
familiar with the licensing procedure of the SNR 300 (such as EWI); as a
consequence, much time was needed for familiarization, which delayed the
Project even further.
4. Persons were even nominated as experts who, in past court proceedings, had
acted as consultants on the plaintiffs' side and had publicly appeared as
agitators against nuclear power; consequently, their neutrality and serious-
ness in writing expert opinions about the Kalkar Nuclear Power Station could
be seriously doubted.
5. Finally, the expert opinion phase proceeded without any traceable checks of
management or timetables; MWMT kept adding more and more new prob-
lems, thus causing enormous delays.
Under the German Atomic Energy Act, the licensing authority has practically unlimited
scope of discretion in decisionmaking. Consequently, the MWMT was right in maintain-
ing again and again that it acted "in accordance with the letter of the law." The
weekly "Die Zeit" more aptly calied this feet dragging technique "kalkarization" 213, 214.
It is not really worthwhile speculating whether this approach by the administration was
the result of a political directive or whether the civil servants were merely unwilling or
perhaps even incapable. Anyway, the practical results achieved at the MWMT working
level were quite in line with the political intentions of that authority and of the whole
State. The corresponding decisions to halt the Kalkar Project had been taken by politi-
cal bodies of the State of North Rhine-Westphalia in 1985/86.
In German legal terminology, this is now described by the term "execution of the law
with the intention to opt out" (ausstiegsorientierter Gesetzesvollzug) 215. Professor
Horst Sendler, the former President of the Federal Administrative Court in Berlin, de-
fines it in this way:
"The application of law in a way which results in non-applicability ... Or, in a nut-
shell: non-execution through execution."
127
He compares this attitude with the "go-slow policy" occasionally adopted in collective
bargaining issues in the public sector, and continues:
"But in contrast, execution of the law with the intention to opt out means that the
civil service and its staff make use of the possibility to bypass execution of the law
by busily non-executing it... Therefore, it is not necessarily a contradiction if
somebody propagates opting out of nuclear power, openly declaring the intention
to not complete any other licensing procedure and, at the same time, asserts that,
legally speaking, one was bound to the criteria of the Atomic Energy Act ... cou-
pled with the announcement, probably meant as a threat, ... that the law would be
applied strictly." 216.
Fritz Ossenbühl, a colleague of Sendler's, calls aspade aspade in formulating his
definition:
"0bstruction under the guise of legality." 217.
But let us return to the SNR 300 Project. The possibility was considered repeatedly to
take legal steps against the State authority in order to regain the initiative in the li-
censing procedure. Among the few possibilities available to do so, an action for inactiv-
ity pursuant to Sec. 75 of the Administrative Court Rules of Procedure could have been
brought (followed by stipulating an appropriate deadline), or an action against the costs
charged for expert opinions not actually required. In the latter case, steps could have
been taken against a specific decision. However, for discretionary reasons none of
these legal steps could be taken before the Federal Constitutional Court had ruled. And
even afterwards, lengthy court proceedings of more than two or three years had to be
expected, which would be accompanied by a de facta standstill of the licensing proce-
dure.
Even now, outsiders failed to detect a general concept of the BMU in managing the li-
censing procedure as an act of federal supervision it had been entrusted with. AI-
though the Karlsruhe court had handed the Minister for the Environment an effective
instrument ("Töpfer's Sharp Sword" - see 211), no visible progress was made in the
Project. Many parties expressed the wish that the BMU establish a competent technical
working party in order to be able, in this way, to exercise tighter control, technical and
also of the timetable, over the corresponding groups at the MWMT. This would have
had the advantage of indicating in the very early stages whenever a point of fact was
View of the Kalkar Nuclear Power Station
after completion of the prenuclear commissioning phase.
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about to become the nucleus of an inflated problem, for instance, by being handled by
more than one expert consultant and the like.
Unfortunately, there was no
such support by federal su-
pervision. Consequently, the
parties to the Project met
again in mid-1990 to strike a
balance. The lawsuit before
the Federal Constitutional
Court had been won, but the
Project nevertheless had not
progressed in any way. No
further instructions by the BMU
in points of dispute were to be
expected in the near future,
and probably would not have
helped anyway. After all, it is
impossible in the long run for
the Federal Government and the executive to communicate by instructions. Conversely,
there is every reason to make sparing use of the right to issue instructions.
Meanwhile, the financial problems of the SNR 300 had become more and more ur-
gent. As the funds tiding over the holding phase expired in 1991, the way had to be
paved for further financing, if any, as early as possible and not later than by the end of
1990. But in the absence of any progress in the licensing procedure, and in the ab-
sence also of a firm commissioning date, the providers of funds could hardly be ex-
pected to make available another amount in excess of DM 100 million per year mainly
for waiting, all the more so since residual financing of the Project was still open.
Another, political problem emerged: Federal elections had been scheduled for Decem-
ber 1990. In view of the recognizable volume of funds required for German unity, it was
not at all certain whether the FDP, even the CDU/CSU, Members of Parliament would
vote in favor of spending more millions on Kalkar - provided, of course, that the present
government coalition was reelected.



















Personnel development at Interatom (and Siemens, respectively), Bensberg,
between 1957 and 1994.
9.6 The End
After apreparatory round of discussions on January 9, 1991, Federal Minister for Re-
search Riesenhuber invited the representatives of the three electricity utilities, RWE,
PreußenElektra, and Bayernwerk, as weil as Siemens to the decisive round of talks on
March 20. In the light of the situation, the parties agreed that, because of the attitude of
the State of North Rhine-Westphalia, a successful completion of the licensing proce-
dure for the Kalkar Nuclear Power Station no Ionger was to be expected. To avoid un-
necessary additional costs, therefore, it was decided in accordance with the rules of the
Holding Phase Agreement to provide no more funds; this meant the end of the Project.
Discussions with the Governments of the Netherlands and Belgium were to be held
immediately.
The participants agreed in their finding that the breeder option was to be preserved by
continuing the European Breeder Association within the European Fast Reactor,
EFR 218.
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Although construction and prenuclear testing of the SNR 300 had generated important
knowledge for fast breeder development, the most significant goal, operation of the
SNR 300, was not achieved for political reasons. Effective April 10, 1991, SBK and the
main vendors terminated their delivery contracts as a consequence of that decision.
A press release by the BMFT on March 21, 1991 succinctly notes:
"The responsibility for the end of Kalkar,
thus the participating utilities, the vendor, and the BMFT,
c1early lies
with the State of North Rhine-Westphalia." 219.
1993: The remnants of the experimental sodium facilities
at Interatom, Bensberg described on pages 69 and 70.
Veniet tempus, quo posteri
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Aug. First United Nations Conference about the Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy
held in Geneva.
Oct. German Federal Ministry for Atomic Affairs (BMAt) established;
F.J. Strauß (CSU) appointed Minister.
1956
July Karlsruhe Reactor Center established;
Kernreaktor Bau- und Betriebs GmbH founded.
Oct. S. Balke (CDU) succeeds F.J. Strauß as Minister for Atomic Affairs.
Dec. State Parliament of North Rhine-Westphalia decides to establish a research
center; later, Jülich is chosen as site.
1957
March Agreements founding the European Atomic Energy Community signed.
Alig. Construction of FR 2 begun.
Oct. Federal Ministry for Atomic Affairs renamed Federal Ministry for Nuclear
Energy and Water Management.
Dec. Topics associated with the fast breeder reactor begin to be taken up in the
Federal Republic of Germany at a seminar held at the Institute for Neutron
Physics and Reactor Engineering (INR) of the Karlsruhe Nuclear Research
Center.






European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom) founded;
members are Belgium, Federal Republic of Germany, France, Italy, Lux-
emburg, the Netherlands.
Interatom moves to Bensberg (Old Castle).
June Gesellschaft für Kernforschung (GfK) founded by Federal Government and
State of Baden-Württemberg.







Fast Breeder Project (PSB) founded at the Karlsruhe Nuclear Research
Center.
German Advisory Committee on Atomic Energy adopts Advanced Reactor
Program.
Supervisory Board of the Nuclear Research Center approves Fast Breeder
Project (PSB).
Working Party 111/1, "Nuclear Reactors," of the German Advisory Committee
on Atomic Energy approves preliminary Fast Breeder Project at Karlsruhe
for aperiod of three years.
May Supervisory Board of the Nuclear Research Center decides to intensify ac-
tivities within Fast Breeder Project.
Oct. EBR 11 (25 MWe) goes critical.
Nov. Federal Ministry for Nuclear Energy and Water Management renamed Fed-
eral Ministry for Nuclear Energy.
1962
Nov. In areport to the U.S. President, U.S. Atomic Energy Commission suggests
long-term development program for fast breeder reactors.
153
Dec. German Federal Ministry for Nuclear Energy renamed Federal Ministry for
Scientific Research (BMwF);
H. Lenz (FDP) appointed Minister after S. Balke.








Construction of 5 MWth plant started at Interatom (sodium filling completed
in late 1964).
Association Agreement with Euratom of the Karlsruhe Nuclear Research
Center signed. It provides for expenditures for Karlsruhe Fast Breeder Pro-
ject of DM 185 million over five years.
Enrico Fermi fast breeder reactor (200 MWth, 60 MWe) goes critical.
General Electric (US) awarded contract for Oyster Creek Nuclear Power
Station;
first commercial order for a light water nuclear power plant.
Jan. Gesellschaft für Kernforschung and Kernreaktor Bau- und Betriebs-GmbH
merged.
May Agreements on construction of SEFOR reactor signed, joint project of
U.S. Atomic Energy Commission, General Electric (GE-USA), and Karls-
ruhe Nuclear Research Center (KfK).
Sep. U.S. company, General Electric, declares publicly its confidence to be able
to offer commercial fast breeder by 1974.
1965
June Construction of 23 MWe Superheated Steam Reactor, HDR, begun, a boi-
ling water reactor with nuclear steam superheating.
Oct. G. Stoltenberg (CDU) succeeds H. Lenz as Federal Minister for Scientific
Research (BMwF).
1966
March Construction of 20 MWe sodium cooled zirconium hydride moderated KNK
experimental power plant started at Karlsruhe Nuclear Research Center.
154
Oct. Accident in Enrico Fermi fast breeder reactor (fuel meltdown).
Nov. BMwF appropriates funds for project design of 300 MWe sodium cooled
breeder by Siemens/lnteratom, and 300 MWe steam cooled breeder by
AEG, GHH, MAN consortium.
Dec. SNEAK and MASURCA facilities go critical.
1967
Jan. Project Committee established in Bonn.
July German-Belgian-Netherlands-Luxemburg R&D Agreement (Government
Agreement) signed.
Oct. British scientists report about new measurements of plutonium alpha value.
Oct. Na-2 Study presented by KfK (with contributions by industry).
1968
Jan. Siemensllnteratom-Belgonucleaire-Neratoom Consortial Agreement signed.
April AEG proposes to Fast Breeder Project Committee to terminate design ac-
tivities for steam cooled breeder.
April GfK-Siemens/lnteratom Cooperation Contract for project design and R&D
on 300 MWe sodium cooled prototype breeder signed.
June Deliberations begin at Karlsruhe about possibility to discontinue Steam
Cooled Breeder Project.
July General Electric and East Central Nuclear Group (USA) announce disconti-
nuation of 50 MWe steam cooled prototype fast breeder design work.
Dec. Agreement signed with Belgium about joint German-Belgian use of BR 2
test reactor.
Dec. Working Party 111/1, "Nuclear Reactors," proposes to discontinue all work on
steam cooled breeder.
1969












Industrial activities for steam cooled fast breeder reactor discontinued by
order of Federal Minister for Research, Stoltenberg; Karlsruhe work on this
reactor line scaled down.
AEG and Siemens pool power plant activities in joint subsidiary, Kraft-
werk Union (KWU);
because of existing licensing agreements, nuclear power plant activities ini-
tially excluded from merger.
6th German Federal Parliament, SPD/FDP coalition
(Chancellor: W. Brandt).
Federal Ministry for Scientific Research (BMwF) renamed Federal Ministry
for Education and Science (BMBW).
H. Leussink (unattached) succeeds G. Stoltenberg as Minister.
HDR reactor in Kahl (Main) critical.
Future SNR 300 operators establish Projektgesellschaft Schneller Brüter
(PSB).
Soviet BOR 60 experimental breeder reactor goes critical.
Presentation by SNR Consortium of SNR 300 Safety Report.
March/Oct. Application, under the Atomic Energy Act, for construction and operation of
SNR 300 Nuclear Power Station at Weisweiler and Kalkar, respectively.
April Fast Reactor Coordinating Committee (FRCC) established by Euratom.
May Successful irradiation in DFR of 39 fuel rods typical of SNR completed;
other joint German-British breeder research projects agreed upon.
Sep. R&D Programs Working Party established.
Oct. Memorandum about the prospects of gas cooled breeder reactors compiled
by GfK, KFA, and industry;
preceded in 1969 by agreement about exchange of gas breeder know-how
between Siemens and Gulf General Atomic.
Oct. Projektgesellschaft Schneller Brüter announces Kalkar as new site.
Nov. Bundle irradiation tests for SNR 300 in French RAPSODIE experimental
breeder reactor begin.
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Dec. Preliminary concluding report about Karlsruhe R&D activities on steam
cooled breeder.
1971
Feb. 15 Status Report at Karlsruhe;
public debate about reasons for abandoning steam cooled breeder line.
April HDR reactor decommissioned because of fuel element failure.
May/Dec. Revised Safety Report of Kalkar Nuclear Power Station presented by SNR
Consortium.
May First Agreement on Cooperation in the Breeder Field with Japan signed.
July Memorandum of Understanding signed among manufacturers of SNR 300.
Aug. SEFOR transient experiments conducted successfully.
Aug. KNK reactor goes critical.
Oct. Project Committee, after examination of technical maturity, recommends to
build SNR 300.
1972
Jan. K. v. Dohnanyi (SPD) succeeds H. Leussink as Federal Minister for Educa-
tion and Science.
Jan. German-Belgian-Netherlands Operators' Consortium, Schnell-Brüter-Kern-
kraftwerksgesellschaft mbH (SBK), founded.
Feb. Federal Cabinet approves funding of SNR 300.
March 20 Public inquiry under the Atomic Energy Act about SNR 300 held in Kleve.
March Governments of the Federal Republic of Germany, Netherlands, and Bel-
gium decide to build SNR 300.
March/Nov. First grants-in-aid paid to SBK.
May Technicallnspectorate (TÜV) writes positive general opinion on SNR 300.
June Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards takes positive final vote on
SNR 300.
July Bid for Kalkar Nuclear Power Station sent out to operators.
Aug. KNK reactor generates electricity for the first time.
Dec.18
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Oct. 12 Internationale Natrium-Brutreaktor-Bau-Gesellschaft (INB) founded as Ger-
man-Belgian-Netherlands Vendors' Consortium.
Nov. 10SBK awards power plant contract to INB.
Nov.23 BMBW decides on grants-in-aid for Kalkar Nuclear Power Station.
Nov. 7th German Federal Parliament, SPD/FDP coalition government
(Chancellor: Schmidt).
Dec. Federal Ministry for Education and Science (BMBW) split into Federal Mini-
stry for Research and Technology (BMFT) and Federal Ministry for Educa-
tion and Science (BMBW).
Responsibility for nuclear power rests with Federal Ministry for Research
and Technology under H. Ehmke (SPD).
Partial Permit TG 7/1 issued for basic concept and for reactor building up to
±O.OO m.
1973
March 19 Application filed under the Atomic Energy Act to obtain license for Mk. la re-











Start of construction in Kalkar of SNR 300.
Nuclear Reactor Divisions of AEG and Siemens merged with Kraftwerk
Union.
Action before Administrative Court in Düsseldorf against 1st Partial Con-
struction Permit.
Partial Permit TG 7/1(1) issued for bottom sheet of steel shell.
Convention signed by utilities in France, Germany, and Italy about con-
struction of Superphemix and SNR 2.
H. Matthöfer (SPD) succeeds H. Ehmke.
Partial Permit TG 7/2 issued for reactor building, remainder of the steel
shell, D 2 steam generator building, building for auxiliary plants.
French PHENIX 280 MWe prototype breeder starts commercial operation.




















Partial Permit TG 7/2(1) issued for eable duets between steam generator
buildings.
Partial Permit TG 7/2(2) issued for auxiliary plants building (modifieation).
Partial Permit TG 7/2(3) issued for D 0 and D 4 steam generator buildings,
switehing systems buildings, eooling water intake and discharge struetures,
seeondary eooling water pipe, eavities, bottom troughs, platforms, and
erane systems.
German-Freneh Government Agreement signed on eooperation in breeder
field.
Partial Permit TG 7/2(4) issued for reaetor emergeney eooling stack, eoo-
ling water pump strueture.
8th German Federal Parliament, SPD/FDP eoalition government
(Chancellor: H. Sehmidt); H. Matthöfer reappointed BMFT.
Construetion aetivity reaehes first peak: approx. 1200 persons work on site
(700 persons in engineering).
Siemens takes over AEG interests in Kraftwerk Union.
British 250 MWe PFR prototype breeder operated at full power.
U.S. President Carter announees new atomie energy program (no reproe-
essing, redueed breeder aetivities).
German-Freneh Breeder Agreements signed.
Münster Higher Administrative Court rules that Federal Constitutional Court
be invoked to determine applieability of the Atomie Energy Aet also to
breeders.
Report by BMFT about SNR 300 reevaluation published;
eonfirmation expressed in September 1985.
First major rally at Kalkar.
Federal Parliamentary eommittees reeommend politieal reservation about























KNK 11 goes critical.
Partial Permit TG 7/2(5) issued for biological shield, crane facility for auxil-
iary plants wing, and for redundant Diesel air intake system.
V. Hauff (SPD) succeeds H. Matthöfer as BMFT.
New cost estimate of Kalkar Nuclear Power Station results in DM 3.2 billion.
H.-L. Riemer, NRW MWMV, recommends to run SNR 300 as plutonium an-
nihilation plant.
Federal Constitutional Court finds Iicensing regulations in the Atomic En-
ergy Act constitutional, and dismisses Münster court decision;
file No.: BVerfG 2 BvL 8/77 ("Kalkar Ruling").
Federal Parliament decides on reservation about commissioning SNR 300;
Committee of Inquiry established to prepare decision.
Partial Permit TG 7/3 issued for inerting systems, fuel element storage and
handling (in part) including the associated instrumentation and control sys-
tems, electrical power installations, control room, reactor cell cover.
8th Germany Federal Parliament establishes Committee of Inquiry 1,
"Future Nuclear Energy Policy," to draft also recommendations on commis-
sioning SNR (Chairman: R. Ueberhorst).
KNK 11 in full power operation (20 MWe).
Partial Permit TG 7/2(6) issued for the fayades.
Lowest point in activity on construction site: < 400 persons.
RSK recommends that reactor vessel be suspended in concrete structure.
American 400 MWth FFTF experimental breeder goes critical.
BMI Principles on Waste Management Provisions promulgated.
Report by ad hoc Group to Project Committee (causes of project delays).
Soviet BN 600 (600 MWe) breeder delivers electricity.
First report by Committee of Inquiry on Future Nuclear Energy Policy.
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June 10 Partial Permit TG 7/3(1) issued for sodium secondary systems, gas sys-
tems, fuel element storage and handling (in part), cooling water systems,
supply systems, treatment and disposal systems, electrical systems and
instrumentation and control systems, reactor cell internals.
Oct. 5 9th German Federal Parliament, SPD/FDP coalition government
(Chancellor: H. Schmidt).
Oct. New cost estimate of Kalkar Nuclear Power Station results in DM 5 billion.
Nov. A. v. Bülow (SPD) succeeds V. Hauff as Federal Minister for Research and
Technology (BMFT).














Intergranular corrosion found in reactor vessel.
Federal Parliament establishes Committee of Inquiry 2, Future Energy
Policy (Chairman: H.B. Schäfer).
Partial Permit TG 7/4 issued for ventilation systems (excluding reactor
building), core catcher, decay heat removal systems and secondary cooling
water system for specific trains, reactor emergency cooling system,
handling device.
Federal Minister for Research v. Bülow appropriates additional
DM 166 million, thus avoiding impending halt of construction of Kalkar Nu-
c1ear Power Station.
International Breeder Report at Kalkar.
Upper Bound Study delivered to Committee of Inquiry by KfK.
Risk-oriented Study delivered to Committee of Inquiry by GRS.
Partial Permit TG 7/2(7) issued for steel shell.
Partial Permit issued for cooling tower.
Partial Permit TG 7/4(1) issued for weil building, ventilation systems in reac-





















New cost estimate for Kalkar Nuclear Power Station results in
DM 6.5 billion.
Positive vote by Committee of Inquiry;
second report on completion and recommendation for commissioning sub-
mitted.
Partial Permit TG 7/5 issued for reventing system, emergency power sys-
tems, reactor vessel with internals, ratating shield system, primary and sec-
ondary systems, reactor protection system.
Switch of government in Bonn ("Wende");
H. Riesenhuber (CDU) succeeds v. Bülow as Federal Minister for Re-
search;
Chancellor: H. Kohl.
Reservation about commissioning SNR 300 as expressed by Federal Par-
Iiament lifted with CDU/CSU and FDP votes.
Interim financing by new Federal Government.
Considerably increased activity on site.
Lurgi hired for praject control.
Mk. I core withdrawn fram praceedings under the Atomic Energy Act for
Kalkar Nuclear Power Station.
New Federal Cabinet decides to increase funding for construction and com-
missioning SNR 300 (and THTR).
Documents filed for storage of core elements.
ARGO Study Group established in Paris.
Belgian and Netherlands partners limit their financial contribution to Kalkar
Nuclear Power Station.
Peak activity on site: 3300 persons.
Accident Directives promulgated by BMU.
Documents filed for operating permit for SNR 300.
Positive expert opinion presented on fuel element storage.
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March 14 SPD motion to amend Atomic Energy Act.
April 10 Düsseldorf Administrative Court:
Action by Maas against TG 7/1-7/5 dismissed.
May 17 SPD Convention in Essen:
Nuclear power to be used only for limited interim period.
June 6 Government Agreement about Cooperation on Sodium Cooled Breeder Re-
actors signed by Germany, France, and the United Kingdom.
June 20 Partial Permit TG 7/4(2) issued for various technical plant modifications.
Oct. SPD State Convention in Oberhausen:
Commissioning SNR 300 refused.
Oct. Positive result of SNR 300 containment pressure test.












Construction of Kalkar Nuclear Power Station completed, sodium filled into
the main system.
Non-nuclear commissioning begins.
NRW Minister President J. Rau writes to Federal Chancellor H. Kohl:
fundamental objections to breeder technology and SNR 300.
State Parliamentary elections in NRW; absolute SPD majority;
Minister F. Farthmann, hitherto responsible for SNR permits, becomes
Chairman of SPD Parliamentary Group;
Minister of Economics, R. Jochimsen (MWMT), is given responsibility for li-
censing the Project.
Brief halt of SNR 300 fuel element fabrication at Alkem/RBU.
SBK and CEA sign reprocessing agreement for SNR 300 fuel elements.
Farthmann demands to refrain from kindling "hell fire of Kalkar" ("Spiegel"
interview).
Vessel upgrading in Kalkar.
All fuel elements for SNR 300 fabricated.




















Comment by Federal Government to NRW State Government: Kalkar Op-
eration feasible from safety point of view, spent fuel and waste manage-
ment ensured.
SPD State Convention in NRW opts for terminating development of fast
breeder technology.
Partial Construction Permit TG 7/4(3) issued "according to letter of law" by
NRW Minister Jochimsen;
strange comments on immediate execution and preliminary positive overall
assessment.
SPD Executive Council against continuation of breeder technology; at the
same time, refusal of construction of Wackersdorf Reprocessing Plant.
Expert hearing before North Rhine-Westphalian State Economics Commit-
tee.
SNEAK facility at Karlsruhe decommissioned and converted into tritium
labaratory.
Münster Higher Administrative Court dismisses action for cancellation.
Cables rerouted in SNR 300.
Expert opinions (12/1 and 12/2) about operation of SNR 300 published.
All Permits (7/1 to 7/4(3)) legally binding with waiver of appeals proceed-
ings by plaintiff.
Positive RSK recommendation of first step in operation (Ioading).
Chernobyl accident.
German Federation of Labor (Deutscher Gewerkschaftsbund, DGB) votes
against Kalkar.
Kalkar Nuclear Power Station ready to take in care elements, and for load-
ing.
SPD Party Executive in Hanover: SNR not to be commissioned;
R&D activities to be stopped.
W. Wallmann (CDU) appointed Federal Minister for the Environment
(BMU).









NRW State Parliament votes against Kalkar.
Under chairmanship of Minister Jochimsen, Advisory Energy Board to SPD
Executive Council recommends opting out of nuclear power.
Jochimsen press conference: preliminary positive overall assessment of
SNR 300 no longer possible.
Moisture removal in Kalkar begun.
SPD Convention in Nuremberg demands opt-out of nuclear power within
ten years (proposed by Hauff Committee).
Energy Report by Federal Government: main arguments in favor of devel-
oping breeder technology continue to be valid.
March K. Töpfer (CDU) replaces W. Wallmann as Federal Minister for the Environ-
ment (BMU).
March 6 FDP demands independent expert opinion within coalition agreements.
April 1 Jochimsen press conference: no storage permit possible.
April 15 Positive RSK vote on document about incomparability of Chernobyl and
Kalkar.
June THTR 300 delivered to operator.
Sep. 30 International expert hearing about Bethe-Tait accident.
Oct. Motor-Columbus expert opinion about research policy benefits of SNR 300
presented on behalf of BMFT: Kalkar to be commissioned speedily and op-
erated over long period of time.
Nov. 11 Positive RSK comment on Bethe-Tait accident.
Dec. 12 Core element storage taken out of 7/6 application.
Dec. MWMT report on licensing and supervisory proceedings after BMU quest of
Feb. 5, 1987.
1988
Feb. Kalkar complete except for minor points;
pre-nuclear commissioning activities completed approximately 95%.




















SPD applies to Federal Constitutional Court to ban plutonium use.
BMU instructs MWMT in guidance of proceedings.
Supervisory comment by Federal Government about Bethe-Tait accident.
SPD motion to Parliamentary Budget Committee to stop breeder develop-
ment.
State of NRW sues Federal Government before Federal Constitutional
Court because of instruction.
MWMT remonstration after Bethe-Tait comments.
Budget Committee of Federal Parliament lifts freeze of DM 35 million for
SNR 300.
Agreement on financing holding phase (DM 105 million annually) secured
until 1991.
Agreements signed in Bonn by United Kingdom, France, and Federal Re-
public of Germany about Breeder Cooperation for European Fast Reactor,
EFR.
SBK writ against action for unconstitutionality brought against Federal Gov-
ernment by State of North Rhine-Westphalia.
BMU report to Budget Committee about status of SNR 300 licensing proce-
dure.
THTR 300 decommissioned.
Fast Breeder Project (PSB) in Karlsruhe terminated;
LWR and LMFBR Safety Programs combined in Nuclear Safety Research
Project (PSF).
Management Group for Research and Development (MGRD) founded for
European Fast Reactor (EFR).
BMFT presents Third Energy Research and Energy Technologies Program;
importance of breeder reactor development, specifically SNR 300, con-
firmed.





Federal Constitutional Court dismisses as unjustified on all points action
brought by State of North Rhine-Westphalia; file No. 2 BvG 1/88 ("SNR 300
Ruling").
Reunification of Germany.
Jan. CDU/CSU-FDP coalition government repeated (Chancellor: H. Kohl);
H. Riesenhuber confirmed as BMFT.
Jan. 9 Partners in the holding phase financing agreement discuss project situation
with BMFT.
March 20 Contracting partners and BMFT decide to terminate SNR 300/Kaikar Nu-
clear Power Station Project.
March 21 Press release by Federal Minister for Research and Technology attributing
cause for termination to State of North Rhine-Westphalia.
April 10 Delivery contracts for SNR 300/Kaikar Nuclear Power Station terminated by
SBK.
